| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: remove all cifs files before kill super
Cifs files may be put into fileinfo_put_wq during umounting cifs.
After umount done, cifsFileInfo_put_final is called, which cause
following BUG:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
[ 134.222152] list_lru_add+0x64/0x1a0
[ 134.222399] ? cifs_put_tcon+0x171/0x340 [cifs]
[ 134.222772] d_lru_add+0x44/0x60
[ 134.222997] dput+0x1fc/0x210
[ 134.223213] cifsFileInfo_put_final+0x11a/0x140 [cifs]
[ 134.223576] process_one_work+0x17c/0x320
[ 134.223843] worker_thread+0x188/0x280
[ 134.224084] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 134.224366] kthread+0xcc/0x100
[ 134.224576] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 134.224827] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
[ 134.225063] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 134.225328] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
This can be reproduce by following:
unshare -n bash -c "
mkdir -p ${CIFS_MNT}
ip netns attach root 1
ip link add eth0 type veth peer veth0 netns root
ip link set eth0 up
ip -n root link set veth0 up
ip addr add 192.168.0.2/24 dev eth0
ip -n root addr add 192.168.0.1/24 dev veth0
ip route add default via 192.168.0.1 dev eth0
ip netns exec root sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o
${DEV} -j MASQUERADE
mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${CIFS_MNT} -o
vers=3.0,sec=ntlmssp,credentials=${CIFS_CRED},rsize=65536,wsize=65536,cache=none,echo_interval=1
touch ${CIFS_MNT}/a.txt
ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o
${DEV} -j MASQUERADE
"
umount ${CIFS_MNT} |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_dup_netdev: add nf_dev_xmit_recursion*() helpers and use them
Update nft_dup and nft_fwd to use the nf_dev_xmit_recursion() helpers.
This patch also disables BH when transmitting the skb to address a
possible migration to different CPU leading to imbalanced decrementation
of the recursion counters.
This is modeled after Florian Westphal's dev_xmit_recursion*() API
available since commit 97cdcf37b57e ("net: place xmit recursion in
softnet data") according to its current state in the tree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: watchdog: fix refcount tracking races
Blamed commit converted the untracked dev_hold()/dev_put() calls
in the watchdog code to use the tracked dev_hold_track()/dev_put_track()
(which were later renamed/interfaced to netdev_hold() and netdev_put()).
By introducing dev->watchdog_dev_tracker to store the
reference tracking information without adding synchronization
between netdev_watchdog_up() and dev_watchdog(), it enabled the
race condition where this pointer could be overwritten or freed
concurrently, leading to the list corruption crash syzbot reported:
list_del corruption, ffff888114a18c00->next is NULL
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 91 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026
Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0x22/0x2a lib/list_debug.c:52
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:246 [inline]
list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:341 [inline]
ref_tracker_free+0x1a7/0x6c0 lib/ref_tracker.c:329
netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4491 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4508 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4504 [inline]
netdev_watchdog_down net/sched/sch_generic.c:600 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x28c/0xfe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1363
dev_deactivate+0x109/0x1d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1397
linkwatch_do_dev net/core/link_watch.c:184 [inline]
linkwatch_do_dev+0xd3/0x120 net/core/link_watch.c:166
__linkwatch_run_queue+0x3a5/0x810 net/core/link_watch.c:240
linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:314
process_one_work+0xa0e/0x1980 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397 [inline]
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x69a/0xc80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
This patch has three coordinated parts:
1) Add dev->watchdog_lock and dev->watchdog_ref_held to serialize watchdog operations.
2) Remove netdev_watchdog_up() call from netif_carrier_on():
This ensures netdev_watchdog_up() is only called from process/BH context
(via linkwatch workqueue dev_activate()), allowing us to use
spin_lock_bh() for synchronization.
3) Synchronize watchdog up and watchdog timer:
Protect netdev_watchdog_up() with tx_global_lock and watchdog_lock.
Only allocate a new tracker in netdev_watchdog_up() if one is
not already present.
In dev_watchdog(), ensure we don't release the tracker if the
timer was rescheduled either by dev_watchdog() itself or concurrently
by netdev_watchdog_up(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/dma-iommu: Fix wrong scatterlist length assignment in P2PDMA path
In iommu_dma_map_sg(), when handling PCI P2PDMA cases, the DMA length
of the current scatterlist segment `s` is incorrectly assigned from the
head entry `sg->length` instead of the current entry `s->length`.
This typo causes all P2PDMA segments in the scatterlist to inherit the
length of the first segment, leading to corrupted DMA lengths for multi-
segment scatterlists.
Fix this by using `s->length` instead of `sg->length`. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in treefrogframework treefrog-framework up to 2.11.2. This vulnerability affects the function std::strncmp of the file src/tsessioncookiestore.cpp of the component Session Cookie Handler. The manipulation results in improper authentication. The attack can be launched remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. It is stated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),
before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero,
because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),
which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and
kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather
than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with
priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.
Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor
enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes
buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls
memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.
Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in
mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:
- Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that
returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and
use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().
- Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on
stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire
format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled
by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.
The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where
mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a
detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev
does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when
the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute
buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based
on the reduced max_nch.
Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns
early without (re)creating the agent. Clear
priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after
freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a
subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left
from a previous enable/disable cycle.
This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of
size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating
entries up to stats_nch on demand. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Fix handling of _PAGE_UNUSED pte bit
The _PAGE_UNUSED softbit should not really be lying around. Its sole
purpose is to signal to try_to_unmap_one() and try_to_migrate_one()
that the page can be discarded instead of being moved / swapped.
KVM has no way to know why a page is being unmapped, so it sets the bit
on userspace ptes corresponding to unused guest pages every time they
get unmapped. KVM has no reasonable way to clear the bit once the page
is in use again.
While set_ptes() checks and clears the bit, other paths that set new
ptes did not. This led to used pages being thrown out as if they were
unused, causing guest corruption.
Fix the issue by clearing the _PAGE_UNUSED bit for present ptes in
set_pte(), i.e. whenever a present pte is getting set. The check in
set_ptes() is then redundant and can be removed.
Also fix gmap_helper_try_set_pte_unused() to only set the bit if the
pte is present; the _PAGE_UNUSED bit is only defined for present ptes
and thus should not be set for non-present ptes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid1: fix writes_pending and barrier reference leaks on write failures
raid1_make_request() acquires a writes_pending reference with
md_write_start() before calling raid1_write_request(). Several failure
paths in raid1_write_request() complete the bio and return without
reaching the normal write completion path, causing the corresponding
md_write_end() to be skipped.
Make raid1_write_request() return a status indicating whether the write
request was successfully queued. This allows raid1_make_request() to
call md_write_end() when raid1_write_request() fails.
Additionally, if wait_blocked_rdev() fails after wait_barrier()
succeeds, the associated barrier reference is not released.
Call allow_barrier() before returning from that path to keep the barrier
accounting balanced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: qcom: reject stream disable with no active interface
handle_uaudio_stream_req() resolves an interface index with
info_idx_from_ifnum(), which returns -EINVAL when no interface matches.
The enable branch and the response: cleanup label both guard against a
negative index, but the disable branch does not: it forms
info = &uadev[pcm_card_num].info[info_idx] and dereferences it.
uadev[].info is a pointer allocated only when a stream is first enabled,
so a negative info_idx on the disable path is unsafe in two ways:
- If the card was never enabled, .info is NULL and &info[-EINVAL] is a
wild pointer; reading info->data_ep_pipe faults (kernel oops).
- If the card was enabled at least once (.info allocated) and the
disable names an interface that does not match, &info[-EINVAL] points
before the allocation; info->data_ep_pipe / info->sync_ep_pipe are an
out-of-bounds slab read and, when non-zero, an out-of-bounds 4-byte
write (both pipe fields are cleared to 0). That is memory corruption,
not just a NULL dereference.
The request is reachable from unprivileged local userspace over
AF_QIPCRTR. Reject a disable request with no resolved interface, matching
the guard the enable path already has. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: aa_label_alloc use aa_label_free on alloc failure
aa_label_alloc() allocates a secid before allocating or taking the label
proxy. If the later proxy step fails, the error path only freed the label
memory, leaking any resources initialized by aa_label_init().
Use aa_label_free() on the failure path so partially initialized labels
release their secid and other label resources before the backing memory is
freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race in unix socket mediation when peer_path is used
The holding a reference to the peer_sk is not enough to ensure access
to the peer sk path. Accessing the path outside of the state lock
allows for a race with unix_release_sock(). Fix this by taking the
state lock and getting a reference to the path under lock.
Ideally for connected sockets we would cache this information so we
don't have to take the lock here. But for now just fix the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_nat_sip: reload possible stale data pointer
quoting sashiko:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[..] noticed a potential memory bug and header corruption involving the
SIP NAT helper.
In net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c:nf_nat_sip():
if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, skb->len)) {
nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot mangle packet");
return NF_DROP;
}
uh = (void *)skb->data + protoff;
uh->dest = ct_sip_info->forced_dport;
if (!nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet(skb, ct, ctinfo, protoff,
0, 0, NULL, 0)) {
If a cloned or fragmented SKB is reallocated by skb_ensure_writable(), the
old data buffer is freed. However, nf_nat_sip() fails to update *dptr to
point to the new buffer.
It also appears to use nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet() on what could be a TCP
packet, which would overwrite the sequence number with a checksum update.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
nf_conntrack_sip linerizes skbs, hence no fragmented skb can be seen.
But clones are possible, so rebuild dptr.
Disable nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet() branch for TCP streams.
It doesn't look like this can ever happen, else we should have received
bug reports about this, so just check the conntrack is UDP and drop
otherwise.
The calling conntrack_sip set ->forced_dport for SIP_HDR_VIA_UDP messages,
so I don't think this is ever expected to be true for a TCP stream. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/pf: Don't attempt to process FAST_REQ or EVENT relays
Currently defined VF/PF relay actions use regular REQUEST messages
only and the PF shouldn't attempt to handle FAST_REQUEST nor EVENT
messages as this would result in breaking the VFPF ABI protocol
and also might trigger an assert on the PF side.
(cherry picked from commit 1714d360fc5ae2e0886a69e979095d9c7ff3568a) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix lack of locking around modifications of net->cells_dyn_ino
Fix the lack of locking around modifications of net->cells_dyn_ino by
taking net->cells_lock exclusively. This also requires to cell to be
removed from net->cells_dyn_ino in afs_destroy_cell_work() rather than in
afs_cell_destroy() as the latter runs in RCU cleanup context and sleeping
locks cannot be taken there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete()
Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete()
re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the
current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can
disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/
geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if
the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed.
geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in
NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the
offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case
where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if
it lands past inner_network_offset.
Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner
L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag
(vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves
inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies
inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint
gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header,
i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Nullify irqfd->producer if updating IRTE for bypass fails
Nullify irqfd->producer if updating the IRTE for bypass fails, as leaving a
dangling pointer will result in a use-after-free if the irqfd is reachable
through KVM's routing, but the producer is freed separately. E.g. for VFIO
PCI, the producer is embedded in struct "vfio_pci_irq_ctx" and freed when
the vector is disabled, which can happen independent of routing updates.
[sean: drop PPC change, massage changelog] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Do not allow intra-host migration/mirroring of SNP VMs
The intra-host migration/mirroring feature is not fully implemented for
SEV-SNP VMs. The proper migration requires additional SNP-specific
state such as guest_req_mutex, guest_req_buf, and guest_resp_buf to be
transferred or initialized on the destination.
The SNP VM mirroring requires vmsa features to be copied as well otherwise
ASID would be bound to SNP range while VM is detected as a SEV VM.
Reject SNP source VMs in migration/mirroring until proper SNP state
transfer is implemented.
[sean: let lines poke past 80 chars, tag for stable] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic: Handle race between interrupt affinity change and LPI disabling
Hyunwoo Kim reports some really bad races should the following
situation occur:
- LPI-I is pending in vcpu-B's AP list
- vcpu-A writes to vcpu-B's RD to disable its LPIs
- vcpu-C moves I from B to C
If the last two race nicely enough, vgic_prune_ap_list() can drop
the irq and AP list locks, reacquire them, and in the interval
the irq has been freed. UAF follows.
The fix is two-fold:
- Before dropping the irq and ap_list locks, take a reference on
the irq
- Do not try to handle migration of the pending bit: there is no
expectation that this state is retained, as per the architecture
With that, we're sure that the interrupt is still around, and we
safely remove it from the AP list as it has no target at this
stage (unless another interrupt fires, but that's another story). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Fix unlikely race in try_get_locked_pte()
Fix an unlikely race in try_get_locked_pte(), which could have happened
if puds or pmds get unmapped between the p?dp_get() and p?d_offset()
functions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atm: reject out-of-range traffic classes in QoS validation
Reject ATM traffic classes above ATM_ANYCLASS in check_tp().
SO_ATMQOS stores the supplied QoS after check_qos() succeeds, so
accepting larger values leaves invalid traffic_class values in
vcc->qos.
That bad state later reaches pvc_info(), which indexes class_name[]
with vcc->qos.{rx,tp}.traffic_class. Values above ATM_ANYCLASS cause
an out-of-bounds read when /proc/net/atm/pvc is read.
Tighten the existing QoS validation so invalid traffic_class values
are rejected at the point where user supplied QoS is accepted. |
