| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to bail out in get_new_segment()
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 579 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2832 new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc
pc : new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc
Call trace:
new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc
f2fs_allocate_data_block+0xa54/0xe28
do_write_page+0x6c/0x194
f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x38/0x78
__write_node_page+0x248/0x6d4
f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x524/0x72c
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x4bc/0x9b0
__checkpoint_and_complete_reqs+0x80/0x244
issue_checkpoint_thread+0x8c/0xec
kthread+0x114/0x1bc
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
get_new_segment() detects inconsistent status in between free_segmap
and free_secmap, let's record such error into super block, and bail
out get_new_segment() instead of continue using the segment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/nfs/read: fix double-unlock bug in nfs_return_empty_folio()
Sometimes, when a file was read while it was being truncated by
another NFS client, the kernel could deadlock because folio_unlock()
was called twice, and the second call would XOR back the `PG_locked`
flag.
Most of the time (depending on the timing of the truncation), nobody
notices the problem because folio_unlock() gets called three times,
which flips `PG_locked` back off:
1. vfs_read, nfs_read_folio, ... nfs_read_add_folio,
nfs_return_empty_folio
2. vfs_read, nfs_read_folio, ... netfs_read_collection,
netfs_unlock_abandoned_read_pages
3. vfs_read, ... nfs_do_read_folio, nfs_read_add_folio,
nfs_return_empty_folio
The problem is that nfs_read_add_folio() is not supposed to unlock the
folio if fscache is enabled, and a nfs_netfs_folio_unlock() check is
missing in nfs_return_empty_folio().
Rarely this leads to a warning in netfs_read_collection():
------------[ cut here ]------------
R=0000031c: folio 10 is not locked
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 29 at fs/netfs/read_collect.c:133 netfs_read_collection+0x7c0/0xf00
[...]
Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_read_collection_worker
RIP: 0010:netfs_read_collection+0x7c0/0xf00
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
netfs_read_collection_worker+0x67/0x80
process_one_work+0x12e/0x2c0
worker_thread+0x295/0x3a0
Most of the time, however, processes just get stuck forever in
folio_wait_bit_common(), waiting for `PG_locked` to disappear, which
never happens because nobody is really holding the folio lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/bpf: fix JIT code size calculation of bpf trampoline
arch_bpf_trampoline_size() provides JIT size of the BPF trampoline
before the buffer for JIT'ing it is allocated. The total number of
instructions emitted for BPF trampoline JIT code depends on where
the final image is located. So, the size arrived at with the dummy
pass in arch_bpf_trampoline_size() can vary from the actual size
needed in arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(). When the instructions
accounted in arch_bpf_trampoline_size() is less than the number of
instructions emitted during the actual JIT compile of the trampoline,
the below warning is produced:
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 204190 at arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:981 __arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline.isra.0+0xd2c/0xdcc
which is:
/* Make sure the trampoline generation logic doesn't overflow */
if (image && WARN_ON_ONCE(&image[ctx->idx] >
(u32 *)rw_image_end - BPF_INSN_SAFETY)) {
So, during the dummy pass, instead of providing some arbitrary image
location, account for maximum possible instructions if and when there
is a dependency with image location for JIT'ing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: cs_dsp: Fix OOB memory read access in KUnit test
KASAN reported out of bounds access - cs_dsp_mock_bin_add_name_or_info(),
because the source string length was rounded up to the allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: avoid double free when failing to DMA-map FW msg
The semantics are that caller of fbnic_mbx_map_msg() retains
the ownership of the message on error. All existing callers
dutifully free the page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: drop fragments with multicast or broadcast RA
IEEE 802.11 fragmentation can only be applied to unicast frames.
Therefore, drop fragments with multicast or broadcast RA. This patch
addresses vulnerabilities such as CVE-2020-26145. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex
Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then
doing a
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free.
That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the
code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after
it has unlocked the mutex.
But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody
*else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're
still using the mutex.
Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep
mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership,
even if they guarantee mutual exclusion.
A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still
accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in
and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the
first user is still cleaning up.
See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst,
in particular the section [1] about semantics:
"mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has
internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for
another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the
mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore"
So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the
last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops
_their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all
while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it.
Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex:
the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's
the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently
about object lifetimes). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/hyper-v: Skip non-canonical addresses during PV TLB flush
In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls
HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX
allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB.
For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed
to be invalidated.
However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no
filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of
INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores
non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly
signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error():
invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482
invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 #14 PREEMPT(voluntary)
RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel]
kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm]
Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's
GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this
ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that
assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets
the specification in the same way.
Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid
tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad"
GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only
downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so
is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB
flushes for non-canonical addresses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Fix taking invalid lock on wedge
If device wedges on e.g. GuC upload, the submission is not yet enabled
and the state is not even initialized. Protect the wedge call so it does
nothing in this case. It fixes the following splat:
[] xe 0000:bf:00.0: [drm] device wedged, needs recovery
[] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
[] WARNING: CPU: 48 PID: 312 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:564 __mutex_lock+0x8a1/0xe60
...
[] RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x8a1/0xe60
[] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[] xe_guc_submit_wedge+0x80/0x2b0 [xe] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Process deferred GGTT node removals on device unwind
While we are indirectly draining our dedicated workqueue ggtt->wq
that we use to complete asynchronous removal of some GGTT nodes,
this happends as part of the managed-drm unwinding (ggtt_fini_early),
which could be later then manage-device unwinding, where we could
already unmap our MMIO/GMS mapping (mmio_fini).
This was recently observed during unsuccessful VF initialization:
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: probe with driver xe failed with error -62
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747340 __xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747540 __xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747240 __xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747040 tiles_fini (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e746840 mmio_fini (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747f40 xe_bo_pinned_fini (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e746b40 devm_drm_dev_init_release (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] drmres release begin
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef81640 __fini_relay (8 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef80d40 guc_ct_fini (8 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef80040 __drmm_mutex_release (8 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef80140 ggtt_fini_early (8 bytes)
and this was leading to:
[ ] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900058162a0
[ ] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ ] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ ] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ ] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ ] Workqueue: xe-ggtt-wq ggtt_node_remove_work_func [xe]
[ ] RIP: 0010:xe_ggtt_set_pte+0x6d/0x350 [xe]
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] <TASK>
[ ] xe_ggtt_clear+0xb0/0x270 [xe]
[ ] ggtt_node_remove+0xbb/0x120 [xe]
[ ] ggtt_node_remove_work_func+0x30/0x50 [xe]
[ ] process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0
[ ] worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d
Add managed-device action that will explicitly drain the workqueue
with all pending node removals prior to releasing MMIO/GSM mapping.
(cherry picked from commit 89d2835c3680ab1938e22ad81b1c9f8c686bd391) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/guc: Explicitly exit CT safe mode on unwind
During driver probe we might be briefly using CT safe mode, which
is based on a delayed work, but usually we are able to stop this
once we have IRQ fully operational. However, if we abort the probe
quite early then during unwind we might try to destroy the workqueue
while there is still a pending delayed work that attempts to restart
itself which triggers a WARN.
This was recently observed during unsuccessful VF initialization:
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: probe with driver xe failed with error -62
[ ] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ ] workqueue: cannot queue safe_mode_worker_func [xe] on wq xe-g2h-wq
[ ] WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 0 at kernel/workqueue.c:2257 __queue_work+0x287/0x710
[ ] RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x287/0x710
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] delayed_work_timer_fn+0x19/0x30
[ ] call_timer_fn+0xa1/0x2a0
Exit the CT safe mode on unwind to avoid that warning.
(cherry picked from commit 2ddbb73ec20b98e70a5200cb85deade22ccea2ec) |
| The Qualys Cloud Agent included a bundled uninstall script (qagent_uninstall.sh), specific to Mac and Linux supported versions that invoked multiple system commands without using absolute paths and without sanitizing the $PATH environment. If the uninstall script is executed with elevated privileges (e.g., via sudo) in an environment where $PATH has been manipulated, an attacker with root/sudo privileges could cause malicious executables to be run in place of the intended system binaries. This behavior can be leveraged for local privilege escalation and arbitrary command execution under elevated privileges. |
| A flaw was found in the soup_multipart_new_from_message() function of the libsoup HTTP library, which is commonly used by GNOME and other applications to handle web communications. The issue occurs when the library processes specially crafted multipart messages. Due to improper validation, an internal calculation can go wrong, leading to an integer underflow. This can cause the program to access invalid memory and crash. As a result, any application or server using libsoup could be forced to exit unexpectedly, creating a denial-of-service (DoS) risk. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup, where the soup_multipart_new_from_message() function is vulnerable to an out-of-bounds read. This flaw allows a malicious HTTP client to induce the libsoup server to read out of bounds. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup, where the soup_message_headers_get_content_disposition() function is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference. This flaw allows a malicious HTTP peer to crash a libsoup client or server that uses this function. |
| A use-after-free type vulnerability was found in libsoup, in the soup_message_headers_get_content_disposition() function. This flaw allows a malicious HTTP client to cause memory corruption in the libsoup server. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup, where the soup_headers_parse_request() function may be vulnerable to an out-of-bound read. This flaw allows a malicious user to use a specially crafted HTTP request to crash the HTTP server. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. The SoupWebsocketConnection may accept a large WebSocket message, which may cause libsoup to allocate memory and lead to a denial of service (DoS). |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. The package is vulnerable to a heap buffer over-read when sniffing content via the skip_insight_whitespace() function. Libsoup clients may read one byte out-of-bounds in response to a crafted HTTP response by an HTTP server. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. It is vulnerable to memory leaks in the soup_header_parse_quality_list() function when parsing a quality list that contains elements with all zeroes. |
