| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: sja1105: add error handling in sja1105_setup()
If any of sja1105_static_config_load(), sja1105_clocking_setup() or
sja1105_devlink_setup() fails, we can't just return in the middle of
sja1105_setup() or memory will leak. Add a cleanup path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix data stream corruption
Maxim reported several issues when forcing a TCP transparent proxy
to use the MPTCP protocol for the inbound connections. He also
provided a clean reproducer.
The problem boils down to 'mptcp_frag_can_collapse_to()' assuming
that only MPTCP will use the given page_frag.
If others - e.g. the plain TCP protocol - allocate page fragments,
we can end-up re-using already allocated memory for mptcp_data_frag.
Fix the issue ensuring that the to-be-expanded data fragment is
located at the current page frag end.
v1 -> v2:
- added missing fixes tag (Mat) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
interconnect: qcom: bcm-voter: add a missing of_node_put()
Add a missing of_node_put() in of_bcm_voter_get() to avoid the
reference leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fec: fix the potential memory leak in fec_enet_init()
If the memory allocated for cbd_base is failed, it should
free the memory allocated for the queues, otherwise it causes
memory leak.
And if the memory allocated for the queues is failed, it can
return error directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: fix a buffer overflow in otx2_set_rxfh_context()
This function is called from ethtool_set_rxfh() and "*rss_context"
comes from the user. Add some bounds checking to prevent memory
corruption. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mld: fix panic in mld_newpack()
mld_newpack() doesn't allow to allocate high order page,
only order-0 allocation is allowed.
If headroom size is too large, a kernel panic could occur in skb_put().
Test commands:
ip netns del A
ip netns del B
ip netns add A
ip netns add B
ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
ip link set veth0 netns A
ip link set veth1 netns B
ip netns exec A ip link set lo up
ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::1/64 dev veth0
ip netns exec B ip link set lo up
ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::2/64 dev veth1
for i in {1..99}
do
let A=$i-1
ip netns exec A ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
local 2001:db8:$A::1 remote 2001:db8:$A::2 encaplimit 100
ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::1/64 dev ip6gre$i
ip netns exec A ip link set ip6gre$i up
ip netns exec B ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
local 2001:db8:$A::2 remote 2001:db8:$A::1 encaplimit 100
ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::2/64 dev ip6gre$i
ip netns exec B ip link set ip6gre$i up
done
Splat looks like:
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.12.0+ #891
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15d/0x15f
Code: 92 fe 4c 8b 4c 24 10 53 8b 4d 70 45 89 e0 48 c7 c7 00 ae 79 83
41 57 41 56 41 55 48 8b 54 24 a6 26 f9 ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 6c 24 20 89
34 24 e8 4a 4e 92 fe 8b 34 24 48 c7 c1 20
RSP: 0018:ffff88810091f820 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8881086e9000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1020123efb
RBP: ffff888005f6eac0 R08: ffffed1022fc0031 R09: ffffed1022fc0031
R10: ffff888117e00187 R11: ffffed1022fc0030 R12: 0000000000000028
R13: ffff888008284eb0 R14: 0000000000000ed8 R15: 0000000000000ec0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888117c00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8b801c5640 CR3: 0000000033c2c006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
skb_put.cold.104+0x22/0x22
ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
mld_newpack+0x398/0x8f0
? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x600/0x600
? lock_contended+0xc40/0xc40
add_grhead.isra.33+0x280/0x380
add_grec+0x5ca/0xff0
? mld_sendpack+0xf40/0xf40
? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
mld_send_initial_cr.part.34+0xb9/0x180
ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x15d/0x1b0
addrconf_dad_completed+0x8d2/0xbb0
? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
? addrconf_rs_timer+0x660/0x660
? addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
Allowing high order page allocation could fix this problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: remove device from smcd_dev_list after failed device_add()
If the device_add() for a smcd_dev fails, there's no cleanup step that
rolls back the earlier list_add(). The device subsequently gets freed,
and we end up with a corrupted list.
Add some error handling that removes the device from the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: Add NULL pointer checks when freeing irqs.
When freeing notification blocks, we index priv->msix_vectors.
If we failed to allocate priv->msix_vectors (see abort_with_msix_vectors)
this could lead to a NULL pointer dereference if the driver is unloaded. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Clear DMA ops when switching domain
Since commit 08a27c1c3ecf ("iommu: Add support to change default domain
of an iommu group") a user can switch a device between IOMMU and direct
DMA through sysfs. This doesn't work for AMD IOMMU at the moment because
dev->dma_ops is not cleared when switching from a DMA to an identity
IOMMU domain. The DMA layer thus attempts to use the dma-iommu ops on an
identity domain, causing an oops:
# echo 0000:00:05.0 > /sys/sys/bus/pci/drivers/e1000e/unbind
# echo identity > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:05.0/iommu_group/type
# echo 0000:00:05.0 > /sys/sys/bus/pci/drivers/e1000e/bind
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
...
Call Trace:
iommu_dma_alloc
e1000e_setup_tx_resources
e1000e_open
Since iommu_change_dev_def_domain() calls probe_finalize() again, clear
the dma_ops there like Vt-d does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: put off calling register_netdev() until client initialize complete
Currently, the netdevice is registered before client initializing
complete. So there is a timewindow between netdevice available
and usable. In this case, if user try to change the channel number
or ring param, it may cause the hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap() being called
twice, and report bug.
[47199.416502] hns3 0000:35:00.0 eth1: set channels: tqp_num=1, rxfh=0
[47199.430340] hns3 0000:35:00.0 eth1: already uninitialized
[47199.438554] hns3 0000:35:00.0: rss changes from 4 to 1
[47199.511854] hns3 0000:35:00.0: Channels changed, rss_size from 4 to 1, tqps from 4 to 1
[47200.163524] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[47200.171674] kernel BUG at lib/cpu_rmap.c:142!
[47200.177847] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[47200.185259] Modules linked in: hclge(+) hns3(-) hns3_cae(O) hns_roce_hw_v2 hnae3 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio pv680_mii(O) [last unloaded: hclge]
[47200.205912] CPU: 1 PID: 8260 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G O 5.11.0-rc3+ #1
[47200.215601] Hardware name: , xxxxxx 02/04/2021
[47200.223052] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[47200.230188] pc : cpu_rmap_add+0x38/0x40
[47200.237472] lr : irq_cpu_rmap_add+0x84/0x140
[47200.243291] sp : ffff800010e93a30
[47200.247295] x29: ffff800010e93a30 x28: ffff082100584880
[47200.254155] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[47200.260712] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000004
[47200.267241] x23: ffff08209ba03000 x22: ffff08209ba038c0
[47200.273789] x21: 000000000000003f x20: ffff0820e2bc1680
[47200.280400] x19: ffff0820c970ec80 x18: 00000000000000c0
[47200.286944] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffb43debe4a0d0
[47200.293456] x15: fffffc2082990600 x14: dead000000000122
[47200.300059] x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 000000000000003e
[47200.306606] x11: ffff0820815b8080 x10: ffff53e411988000
[47200.313171] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff0820e2bc1700
[47200.319682] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
[47200.326170] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff800010e93a20
[47200.332656] x3 : 0000000000000004 x2 : ffff0820c970ec80
[47200.339168] x1 : ffff0820e2bc1680 x0 : 0000000000000004
[47200.346058] Call trace:
[47200.349324] cpu_rmap_add+0x38/0x40
[47200.354300] hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap+0x6c/0xe0 [hns3]
[47200.362294] hns3_reset_notify_init_enet+0x1cc/0x340 [hns3]
[47200.370049] hns3_change_channels+0x40/0xb0 [hns3]
[47200.376770] hns3_set_channels+0x12c/0x2a0 [hns3]
[47200.383353] ethtool_set_channels+0x140/0x250
[47200.389772] dev_ethtool+0x714/0x23d0
[47200.394440] dev_ioctl+0x4cc/0x640
[47200.399277] sock_do_ioctl+0x100/0x2a0
[47200.404574] sock_ioctl+0x28c/0x470
[47200.409079] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0x100
[47200.415217] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x84/0x210
[47200.422088] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x34
[47200.426387] el0_svc+0x28/0x70
[47200.431308] el0_sync_handler+0x1a4/0x1b0
[47200.436477] el0_sync+0x174/0x180
[47200.441562] Code: 11000405 79000c45 f8247861 d65f03c0 (d4210000)
[47200.448869] ---[ end trace a01efe4ce42e5f34 ]---
The process is like below:
excuting hns3_client_init
|
register_netdev()
| hns3_set_channels()
| |
hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap() hns3_reset_notify_uninit_enet()
| |
| quit without calling function
| hns3_free_rx_cpu_rmap for flag
| HNS3_NIC_STATE_INITED is unset.
| |
| hns3_reset_notify_init_enet()
| |
set HNS3_NIC_STATE_INITED call hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap()-- crash
Fix it by calling register_netdev() at the end of function
hns3_client_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxgb4: avoid accessing registers when clearing filters
Hardware register having the server TID base can contain
invalid values when adapter is in bad state (for example,
due to AER fatal error). Reading these invalid values in the
register can lead to out-of-bound memory access. So, fix
by using the saved server TID base when clearing filters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lantiq: fix memory corruption in RX ring
In a situation where memory allocation or dma mapping fails, an
invalid address is programmed into the descriptor. This can lead
to memory corruption. If the memory allocation fails, DMA should
reuse the previous skb and mapping and drop the packet. This patch
also increments rx drop counter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: fix possible AOOB issue in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report
Fix possible array out of bound access in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report.
Remove unnecessary varibable in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi/fdt: fix panic when no valid fdt found
setup_arch() would invoke efi_init()->efi_get_fdt_params(). If no
valid fdt found then initial_boot_params will be null. So we
should stop further fdt processing here. I encountered this
issue on risc-v. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: amd_sfh: Fix memory leak in amd_sfh_work
Kmemleak tool detected a memory leak in the amd_sfh driver.
====================
unreferenced object 0xffff88810228ada0 (size 32):
comm "insmod", pid 3968, jiffies 4295056001 (age 775.792s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 20 73 1f 81 88 ff ff 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de . s.............
22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 01 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 "...............
backtrace:
[<000000007b4c8799>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x163/0x4f0
[<0000000005326893>] amd_sfh_get_report+0xa4/0x1d0 [amd_sfh]
[<000000002a9e5ec4>] amdtp_hid_request+0x62/0x80 [amd_sfh]
[<00000000b8a95807>] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x145/0x270 [hid_sensor_hub]
[<00000000fda054ee>] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x215/0x460 [hid_sensor_iio_common]
[<0000000021279ecf>] hid_accel_3d_probe+0xff/0x4a0 [hid_sensor_accel_3d]
[<00000000915760ce>] platform_probe+0x6a/0xd0
[<0000000060258a1f>] really_probe+0x192/0x620
[<00000000fa812f2d>] driver_probe_device+0x14a/0x1d0
[<000000005e79f7fd>] __device_attach_driver+0xbd/0x110
[<0000000070d15018>] bus_for_each_drv+0xfd/0x160
[<0000000013a3c312>] __device_attach+0x18b/0x220
[<000000008c7b4afc>] device_initial_probe+0x13/0x20
[<00000000e6e99665>] bus_probe_device+0xfe/0x120
[<00000000833fa90b>] device_add+0x6a6/0xe00
[<00000000fa901078>] platform_device_add+0x180/0x380
====================
The fix is to freeing request_list entry once the processed entry is
removed from the request_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Fix use-after-free after the TLS device goes down and up
When a netdev with active TLS offload goes down, tls_device_down is
called to stop the offload and tear down the TLS context. However, the
socket stays alive, and it still points to the TLS context, which is now
deallocated. If a netdev goes up, while the connection is still active,
and the data flow resumes after a number of TCP retransmissions, it will
lead to a use-after-free of the TLS context.
This commit addresses this bug by keeping the context alive until its
normal destruction, and implements the necessary fallbacks, so that the
connection can resume in software (non-offloaded) kTLS mode.
On the TX side tls_sw_fallback is used to encrypt all packets. The RX
side already has all the necessary fallbacks, because receiving
non-decrypted packets is supported. The thing needed on the RX side is
to block resync requests, which are normally produced after receiving
non-decrypted packets.
The necessary synchronization is implemented for a graceful teardown:
first the fallbacks are deployed, then the driver resources are released
(it used to be possible to have a tls_dev_resync after tls_dev_del).
A new flag called TLS_RX_DEV_DEGRADED is added to indicate the fallback
mode. It's used to skip the RX resync logic completely, as it becomes
useless, and some objects may be released (for example, resync_async,
which is allocated and freed by the driver). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix freeing unallocated p2pmem
In case p2p device was found but the p2p pool is empty, the nvme target
is still trying to free the sgl from the p2p pool instead of the
regular sgl pool and causing a crash (BUG() is called). Instead, assign
the p2p_dev for the request only if it was allocated from p2p pool.
This is the crash that was caused:
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:518!
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
...
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:518!
...
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] RIP: 0010:gen_pool_free_owner+0xa8/0xb0
...
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] Call Trace:
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] pci_free_p2pmem+0x2b/0x70
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] pci_p2pmem_free_sgl+0x4f/0x80
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] nvmet_req_free_sgls+0x1e/0x80 [nvmet]
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:518!
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] nvmet_rdma_release_rsp+0x4e/0x1f0 [nvmet_rdma]
[Sun May 30 19:13:53 2021] nvmet_rdma_send_done+0x1c/0x60 [nvmet_rdma] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: skip expectations for confirmed conntrack
nft_ct_expect_obj_eval() calls nf_ct_ext_add() for a confirmed
conntrack entry. However, nf_ct_ext_add() can only be called for
!nf_ct_is_confirmed().
[ 1825.349056] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1279 at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c:48 nf_ct_xt_add+0x18e/0x1a0 [nf_conntrack]
[ 1825.351391] RIP: 0010:nf_ct_ext_add+0x18e/0x1a0 [nf_conntrack]
[ 1825.351493] Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 41 bc 0a 00 00 00 e9 15 ff ff ff ba 09 00 00 00 31 f6 4c 89 ff e8 69 6c 3d e9 eb 96 45 31 ed eb cd <0f> 0b e9 b1 fe ff ff e8 86 79 14 e9 eb bf 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00
[ 1825.351721] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002e1f1e8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 1825.351790] RAX: 000000000000000e RBX: ffff88814f5783c0 RCX: ffffffffc0e4f887
[ 1825.351881] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88814f578440
[ 1825.351971] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88814f578447
[ 1825.352060] R10: ffffed1029eaf088 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88814f578440
[ 1825.352150] R13: ffff8882053f3a00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000a20
[ 1825.352240] FS: 00007f992261c900(0000) GS:ffff889faec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1825.352343] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1825.352417] CR2: 000056070a4d1158 CR3: 000000015efe0000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 1825.352508] Call Trace:
[ 1825.352544] nf_ct_helper_ext_add+0x10/0x60 [nf_conntrack]
[ 1825.352641] nft_ct_expect_obj_eval+0x1b8/0x1e0 [nft_ct]
[ 1825.352716] nft_do_chain+0x232/0x850 [nf_tables]
Add the ct helper extension only for unconfirmed conntrack. Skip rule
evaluation if the ct helper extension does not exist. Thus, you can
only create expectations from the first packet.
It should be possible to remove this limitation by adding a new action
to attach a generic ct helper to the first packet. Then, use this ct
helper extension from follow up packets to create the ct expectation.
While at it, add a missing check to skip the template conntrack too
and remove check for IPCT_UNTRACK which is implicit to !ct. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, lockdown, audit: Fix buggy SELinux lockdown permission checks
Commit 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")
added an implementation of the locked_down LSM hook to SELinux, with the aim
to restrict which domains are allowed to perform operations that would breach
lockdown. This is indirectly also getting audit subsystem involved to report
events. The latter is problematic, as reported by Ondrej and Serhei, since it
can bring down the whole system via audit:
1) The audit events that are triggered due to calls to security_locked_down()
can OOM kill a machine, see below details [0].
2) It also seems to be causing a deadlock via avc_has_perm()/slow_avc_audit()
when trying to wake up kauditd, for example, when using trace_sched_switch()
tracepoint, see details in [1]. Triggering this was not via some hypothetical
corner case, but with existing tools like runqlat & runqslower from bcc, for
example, which make use of this tracepoint. Rough call sequence goes like:
rq_lock(rq) -> -------------------------+
trace_sched_switch() -> |
bpf_prog_xyz() -> +-> deadlock
selinux_lockdown() -> |
audit_log_end() -> |
wake_up_interruptible() -> |
try_to_wake_up() -> |
rq_lock(rq) --------------+
What's worse is that the intention of 59438b46471a to further restrict lockdown
settings for specific applications in respect to the global lockdown policy is
completely broken for BPF. The SELinux policy rule for the current lockdown check
looks something like this:
allow <who> <who> : lockdown { <reason> };
However, this doesn't match with the 'current' task where the security_locked_down()
is executed, example: httpd does a syscall. There is a tracing program attached
to the syscall which triggers a BPF program to run, which ends up doing a
bpf_probe_read_kernel{,_str}() helper call. The selinux_lockdown() hook does
the permission check against 'current', that is, httpd in this example. httpd
has literally zero relation to this tracing program, and it would be nonsensical
having to write an SELinux policy rule against httpd to let the tracing helper
pass. The policy in this case needs to be against the entity that is installing
the BPF program. For example, if bpftrace would generate a histogram of syscall
counts by user space application:
bpftrace -e 'tracepoint:raw_syscalls:sys_enter { @[comm] = count(); }'
bpftrace would then go and generate a BPF program from this internally. One way
of doing it [for the sake of the example] could be to call bpf_get_current_task()
helper and then access current->comm via one of bpf_probe_read_kernel{,_str}()
helpers. So the program itself has nothing to do with httpd or any other random
app doing a syscall here. The BPF program _explicitly initiated_ the lockdown
check. The allow/deny policy belongs in the context of bpftrace: meaning, you
want to grant bpftrace access to use these helpers, but other tracers on the
system like my_random_tracer _not_.
Therefore fix all three issues at the same time by taking a completely different
approach for the security_locked_down() hook, that is, move the check into the
program verification phase where we actually retrieve the BPF func proto. This
also reliably gets the task (current) that is trying to install the BPF tracing
program, e.g. bpftrace/bcc/perf/systemtap/etc, and it also fixes the OOM since
we're moving this out of the BPF helper's fast-path which can be called several
millions of times per second.
The check is then also in line with other security_locked_down() hooks in the
system where the enforcement is performed at open/load time, for example,
open_kcore() for /proc/kcore access or module_sig_check() for module signatures
just to pick f
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: track AF_XDP ZC enabled queues in bitmap
Commit c7a219048e45 ("ice: Remove xsk_buff_pool from VSI structure")
silently introduced a regression and broke the Tx side of AF_XDP in copy
mode. xsk_pool on ice_ring is set only based on the existence of the XDP
prog on the VSI which in turn picks ice_clean_tx_irq_zc to be executed.
That is not something that should happen for copy mode as it should use
the regular data path ice_clean_tx_irq.
This results in a following splat when xdpsock is run in txonly or l2fwd
scenarios in copy mode:
<snip>
[ 106.050195] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
[ 106.057269] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 106.062493] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 106.067709] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 106.070293] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 106.074721] CPU: 61 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/61 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2+ #45
[ 106.081436] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[ 106.092027] RIP: 0010:xp_raw_get_dma+0x36/0x50
[ 106.096551] Code: 74 14 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 48 21 f0 48 c1 ee 30 48 01 c6 48 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 89 f2 81 e6 ff 0f 00 00 48 c1 ea 0c <48> 8b 04 d0 48 83 e0 fe 48 01 f0 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
[ 106.115588] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d694e50 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 106.120893] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88984b8c8a00 RCX: ffff889852581800
[ 106.128137] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88984cd8b800
[ 106.135383] RBP: ffff888123b50001 R08: ffff889896800000 R09: 0000000000000800
[ 106.142628] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff826060c0 R12: 00000000000000ff
[ 106.149872] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: ffff888123b50018
[ 106.157117] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8897e0f40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 106.165332] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 106.171163] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000000560a004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 106.178408] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 106.185653] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 106.192898] PKRU: 55555554
[ 106.195653] Call Trace:
[ 106.198143] <IRQ>
[ 106.200196] ice_clean_tx_irq_zc+0x183/0x2a0 [ice]
[ 106.205087] ice_napi_poll+0x3e/0x590 [ice]
[ 106.209356] __napi_poll+0x2a/0x160
[ 106.212911] net_rx_action+0xd6/0x200
[ 106.216634] __do_softirq+0xbf/0x29b
[ 106.220274] irq_exit_rcu+0x88/0xc0
[ 106.223819] common_interrupt+0x7b/0xa0
[ 106.227719] </IRQ>
[ 106.229857] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
</snip>
Fix this by introducing the bitmap of queues that are zero-copy enabled,
where each bit, corresponding to a queue id that xsk pool is being
configured on, will be set/cleared within ice_xsk_pool_{en,dis}able and
checked within ice_xsk_pool(). The latter is a function used for
deciding which napi poll routine is executed.
Idea is being taken from our other drivers such as i40e and ixgbe. |
