| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An infinite loop issue discovered in Mathtex 1.05 and before allows a remote attackers to consume CPU resources via crafted string in the application URL. |
| MP4Box GPAC version 2.3-DEV-rev636-gfbd7e13aa-master was discovered to contain an infinite loop in the function av1_uvlc at media_tools/av_parsers.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted MP4 file. |
| The iconv function in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) 2.32 and earlier, when processing invalid multi-byte input sequences in IBM1364, IBM1371, IBM1388, IBM1390, and IBM1399 encodings, fails to advance the input state, which could lead to an infinite loop in applications, resulting in a denial of service, a different vulnerability from CVE-2016-10228. |
| Philips Clinical Collaboration Platform, Versions 12.2.1 and prior, does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input
before it is placed in output used as a webpage that is served to other
users. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Fix a deadlock in dma buf fence polling
Introduce a version of the fence ops that on release doesn't remove
the fence from the pending list, and thus doesn't require a lock to
fix poll->fence wait->fence unref deadlocks.
vmwgfx overwrites the wait callback to iterate over the list of all
fences and update their status, to do that it holds a lock to prevent
the list modifcations from other threads. The fence destroy callback
both deletes the fence and removes it from the list of pending
fences, for which it holds a lock.
dma buf polling cb unrefs a fence after it's been signaled: so the poll
calls the wait, which signals the fences, which are being destroyed.
The destruction tries to acquire the lock on the pending fences list
which it can never get because it's held by the wait from which it
was called.
Old bug, but not a lot of userspace apps were using dma-buf polling
interfaces. Fix those, in particular this fixes KDE stalls/deadlock. |
| An issue discovered in BitmapAccess.cpp::FreeImage_AllocateBitmap in FreeImage 3.18.0 leads to an infinite loop and allows attackers to cause a denial of service. |
| DOCSIS dissector crash in Wireshark 4.2.0 allows denial of service via packet injection or crafted capture file |
| Proofpoint Enterprise Protection contains a vulnerability in the email delivery agent that allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject improperly encoded HTML into the email body of a message through the email subject. The vulnerability is caused by inappropriate encoding when rewriting the email before delivery.This issue affects Proofpoint Enterprise Protection: from 8.20.2 before patch 4809, from 8.20.0 before patch 4805, from 8.18.6 before patch 4804 and all other prior versions.
|
| A vulnerability in Drupal Core allows Excessive Allocation.This issue affects Drupal Core: from 10.2.0 before 10.2.2, from 10.1.0 before 10.1.8. |
| EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an out-of-bounds read
vulnerability when processing the IA_NA or IA_TA option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message. This
vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized
access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality. |
| EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an infinite loop vulnerability when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header of IPv6. This
vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized
access and potentially lead to a loss of Availability. |
| The site log report required additional encoding of event descriptions to ensure any HTML in the content is displayed in plaintext instead of being rendered. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. A PCRE rule can be written that leads to an infinite loop when negated PCRE is used. Packet processing thread becomes stuck in infinite loop limiting visibility and availability in inline mode. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.9. |
| Inappropriate implementation in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 136.0.7103.59 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to bypass discretionary access control via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Inappropriate implementation in Web Browser UI in Google Chrome prior to 120.0.6099.62 allowed a remote attacker to potentially spoof the contents of an iframe dialog context menu via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Fix deadlock in ivpu_ms_cleanup()
Fix deadlock in ivpu_ms_cleanup() by preventing runtime resume after
file_priv->ms_lock is acquired.
During a failure in runtime resume, a cold boot is executed, which
calls ivpu_ms_cleanup_all(). This function calls ivpu_ms_cleanup()
that acquires file_priv->ms_lock and causes the deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: hibernate: Avoid deadlock in hibernate_compressor_param_set()
syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below).
The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor"
conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock
when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock.
To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use
mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and
return -EBUSY when it fails.
Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling
mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going
to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system
suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user
space.
syzbot report:
syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline]
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline]
rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline]
ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015
ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531
mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558
init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910
do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257
do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline]
do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline]
do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline]
kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568
kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
-> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline]
wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64
notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85
notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline]
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline]
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333
pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102
snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77
misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179
chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414
do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956
vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086
do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline]
path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989
do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016
do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kerne
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: vlan: don't propagate flags on open
With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock:
[ 1.211455] ============================================
[ 1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted
[ 1.211823] --------------------------------------------
[ 1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0
[ 1.212207]
[ 1.212207] but task is already holding lock:
[ 1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.212487]
[ 1.212487] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1.212626] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1.212626]
[ 1.212751] CPU0
[ 1.212815] ----
[ 1.212871] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.212944] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213016] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213143] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 1.213143]
[ 1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184:
[ 1.213371] #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0
[ 1.213543] #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0
[ 1.213727] #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.213895]
[ 1.213895] stack backtrace:
[ 1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5
[ 1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 1.213994] Call Trace:
[ 1.213995] <TASK>
[ 1.213996] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0
[ 1.214000] print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0
[ 1.214020] lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0
[ 1.214027] __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40
[ 1.214038] dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI
[ 1.214040] vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev
[ 1.214042] __dev_open+0x145/0x270
[ 1.214046] __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0
[ 1.214051] netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev
[ 1.214053] dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info
[ 1.214055] vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214058] notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120
[ 1.214062] netif_open+0x6d/0x90
[ 1.214064] dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0
[ 1.214066] bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230
[ 1.214075] do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214077] do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0
[ 1.214094] rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80
[ 1.214132] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490
[ 1.214144] netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120
[ 1.214150] netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320
[ 1.214153] netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0
[ 1.214157] __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0
[ 1.214160] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220
[ 1.214164] ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0
[ 1.214179] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140
[ 1.214184] do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0
[ 1.214190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56
Device setup:
netdevsim0 (down)
^ ^
bond netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down)
When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we
propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes
(re)locking on of the real_dev.
Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There
is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate
the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues.
Reproducer:
echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*)
dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev)
ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0
ip link set dev netdevsim0 up
ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100
ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allm
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: Don't take register_mutex with copy_from/to_user()
The infamous mmap_lock taken in copy_from/to_user() can be often
problematic when it's called inside another mutex, as they might lead
to deadlocks.
In the case of ALSA timer code, the bad pattern is with
guard(mutex)(®ister_mutex) that covers copy_from/to_user() -- which
was mistakenly introduced at converting to guard(), and it had been
carefully worked around in the past.
This patch fixes those pieces simply by moving copy_from/to_user() out
of the register mutex lock again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: zswap: fix crypto_free_acomp() deadlock in zswap_cpu_comp_dead()
Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding
the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock
(through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()).
On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through
crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation
results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.
The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the
following scenario:
(1) Task A running on CPU #1:
crypto_alloc_acomp_node()
Holds scomp_lock
Enters reclaim
Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)
(2) Task A is descheduled
(3) CPU #1 goes offline
zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1)
Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1))
Calls crypto_free_acomp()
Waits for scomp_lock
(4) Task A running on CPU #2:
Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1
DEADLOCK
Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU
acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is
unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for
consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the
future.
With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex
held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes
acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations
before holding the mutex.
Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place
before the mutex dereference. |
