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CVSS v3.1 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscache: delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when fscache exits to avoid UAF
The fscache_cookie_lru_timer is initialized when the fscache module
is inserted, but is not deleted when the fscache module is removed.
If timer_reduce() is called before removing the fscache module,
the fscache_cookie_lru_timer will be added to the timer list of
the current cpu. Afterwards, a use-after-free will be triggered
in the softIRQ after removing the fscache module, as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff803c9e9
PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 21ffea067 P4D 21ffea067 PUD 21ffe6067 PMD 110a7c067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3 #855
Tainted: [W]=WARN
RIP: 0010:__run_timer_base.part.0+0x254/0x8a0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x627/0x810
__walk_groups.isra.0+0x47/0x140
tmigr_handle_remote+0x1fa/0x2f0
handle_softirqs+0x180/0x590
irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20
default_idle_call+0x38/0x60
do_idle+0x2b5/0x300
cpu_startup_entry+0x54/0x60
start_secondary+0x20d/0x280
common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148
</TASK>
Modules linked in: [last unloaded: netfs]
==================================================================
Therefore delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when removing the fscahe module. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ila: call nf_unregister_net_hooks() sooner
syzbot found an use-after-free Read in ila_nf_input [1]
Issue here is that ila_xlat_exit_net() frees the rhashtable,
then call nf_unregister_net_hooks().
It should be done in the reverse way, with a synchronize_rcu().
This is a good match for a pre_exit() method.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rhashtable_lookup_fast+0x77a/0x9b0 include/linux/rhashtable.h:672
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888064620008 by task ksoftirqd/0/16
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00238-g2ad6d23f465a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline]
__rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 [inline]
rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline]
rhashtable_lookup_fast+0x77a/0x9b0 include/linux/rhashtable.h:672
ila_lookup_wildcards net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:132 [inline]
ila_xlat_addr net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:652 [inline]
ila_nf_input+0x1fe/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:190
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:269 [inline]
NF_HOOK+0x29e/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:312
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1ea/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775
process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108
__napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963
handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554
run_ksoftirqd+0xca/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:928
smpboot_thread_fn+0x544/0xa30 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x64620
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xbfffffff(buddy)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0000959608 ffffea00019d9408 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 00000000bfffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as freed
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), pid 5242, tgid 5242 (syz-executor), ts 73611328570, free_ts 618981657187
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1493
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1501 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x2e4c/0x2f10 mm/page_alloc.c:3439
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4695
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:269 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:296 [inline]
___kmalloc_large_node+0x8b/0x1d0 mm/slub.c:4103
__kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x1a/0x80 mm/slub.c:4130
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4146 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2d2/0x440 mm/slub.c:4164
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:650
bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline]
rhashtable_init_noprof+0x534/0xa60 lib/rhashtable.c:1071
ila_xlat_init_net+0xa0/0x110 net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:613
ops_ini
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix missing cleanup on rollforward recovery error
In an error injection test of a routine for mount-time recovery, KASAN
found a use-after-free bug.
It turned out that if data recovery was performed using partial logs
created by dsync writes, but an error occurred before starting the log
writer to create a recovered checkpoint, the inodes whose data had been
recovered were left in the ns_dirty_files list of the nilfs object and
were not freed.
Fix this issue by cleaning up inodes that have read the recovery data if
the recovery routine fails midway before the log writer starts. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered.
syzkaller reported a warning in bcm_connect() below. [0]
The repro calls connect() to vxcan1, removes vxcan1, and calls
connect() with ifindex == 0.
Calling connect() for a BCM socket allocates a proc entry.
Then, bcm_sk(sk)->bound is set to 1 to prevent further connect().
However, removing the bound device resets bcm_sk(sk)->bound to 0
in bcm_notify().
The 2nd connect() tries to allocate a proc entry with the same
name and sets NULL to bcm_sk(sk)->bcm_proc_read, leaking the
original proc entry.
Since the proc entry is available only for connect()ed sockets,
let's clean up the entry when the bound netdev is unregistered.
[0]:
proc_dir_entry 'can-bcm/2456' already registered
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 394 at fs/proc/generic.c:376 proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 394 Comm: syz-executor403 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-g852e42cc2dd4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375
Code: 00 00 00 00 00 48 85 ed 0f 85 97 02 00 00 4d 85 f6 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 9b cb cf 87 48 89 de 4c 89 fa e8 1c 6f eb fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 c7 c7 98 37 99 89 e8 cb 7e 22 05 bb 00 00 00 10 48
RSP: 0018:ffa0000000cd7c30 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 9e129be1950f0200 RBX: ff1100011b51582c RCX: ff1100011857cd80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffd400000000000f R09: ff1100013e78cac0
R10: ffac800000cd7980 R11: ff1100013e12b1f0 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff1100011a99a2ec
FS: 00007fbd7086f740(0000) GS:ff1100013fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200071c0 CR3: 0000000118556004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_create_net_single+0x144/0x210 fs/proc/proc_net.c:220
bcm_connect+0x472/0x840 net/can/bcm.c:1673
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2049 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x5d2/0x690 net/socket.c:2066
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2076 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2073 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x8f/0x100 net/socket.c:2073
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fbd708b0e5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff8cd33f08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fbd708b0e5d
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8cd34098
R13: 0000000000401280 R14: 0000000000406de8 R15: 00007fbd70ab9000
</TASK>
remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'net/can-bcm', leaking at least '2456' |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen: privcmd: Fix possible access to a freed kirqfd instance
Nothing prevents simultaneous ioctl calls to privcmd_irqfd_assign() and
privcmd_irqfd_deassign(). If that happens, it is possible that a kirqfd
created and added to the irqfds_list by privcmd_irqfd_assign() may get
removed by another thread executing privcmd_irqfd_deassign(), while the
former is still using it after dropping the locks.
This can lead to a situation where an already freed kirqfd instance may
be accessed and cause kernel oops.
Use SRCU locking to prevent the same, as is done for the KVM
implementation for irqfds. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: amd_sfh: free driver_data after destroying hid device
HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has
been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the
hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several
callbacks.
I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling
KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output:
[ 13.050438] ==================================================================
[ 13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh]
[ 13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3
[ 13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479
[ 13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0
[ 13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024
[ 13.067860] Call Trace:
[ 13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8
[ 13.071486] <TASK>
[ 13.071492] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 13.078296] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.082199] print_report+0x174/0x505
[ 13.085776] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 13.089367] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.093255] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.097464] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150
[ 13.101461] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.105802] amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.110303] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
[ 13.114879] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.119450] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082]
[ 13.124097] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
[ 13.127404] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.131925] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
[ 13.136455] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
[ 13.140197] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 13.143602] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b]
[ 13.147234] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.150446] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0
[ 13.155061] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
[ 13.158581] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.161814] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150
[ 13.165029] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0
[ 13.168243] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
[ 13.171500] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
[ 13.175000] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
[ 13.178521] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[ 13.181771] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180
[ 13.185033] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 13.188229] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[ 13.191446] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.194382] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0
[ 13.197328] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
[ 13.200283] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
[ 13.203362] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380
[ 13.206432] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[ 13.210175] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 13.213211] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
[ 13.216688] do_init_module+0x238/0x750
[ 13.2196
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in
vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource
handle by comparing context and resource fields.
It is possible though to create two resources with different types
but same handle (same context and resource fields).
When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove()
may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed
as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle().
vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource
leading to a use-after-free vulnerability.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239
__kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425
kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442
vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline]
vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147
vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182
ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline]
vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195
vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143
__fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282
task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313
do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0
This change ensures the type is also checked when removing
the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Make ICC_*SGI*_EL1 undef in the absence of a vGICv3
On a system with a GICv3, if a guest hasn't been configured with
GICv3 and that the host is not capable of GICv2 emulation,
a write to any of the ICC_*SGI*_EL1 registers is trapped to EL2.
We therefore try to emulate the SGI access, only to hit a NULL
pointer as no private interrupt is allocated (no GIC, remember?).
The obvious fix is to give the guest what it deserves, in the
shape of a UNDEF exception. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix potential UAF in nfsd4_cb_getattr_release
Once we drop the delegation reference, the fields embedded in it are no
longer safe to access. Do that last. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix a use-after-free when hitting errors inside btrfs_submit_chunk()
[BUG]
There is an internal report that KASAN is reporting use-after-free, with
the following backtrace:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btrfs_check_read_bio+0xa68/0xb70 [btrfs]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881117cec28 by task kworker/u16:2/45
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-next-20240805-default+ #76
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs]
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5e/0x2f0
print_report+0x118/0x216
kasan_report+0x11d/0x1f0
btrfs_check_read_bio+0xa68/0xb70 [btrfs]
process_one_work+0xce0/0x12a0
worker_thread+0x717/0x1250
kthread+0x2e3/0x3c0
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
Allocated by task 20917:
kasan_save_stack+0x37/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x7d/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x16e/0x3e0
mempool_alloc_noprof+0x12e/0x310
bio_alloc_bioset+0x3f0/0x7a0
btrfs_bio_alloc+0x2e/0x50 [btrfs]
submit_extent_page+0x4d1/0xdb0 [btrfs]
btrfs_do_readpage+0x8b4/0x12a0 [btrfs]
btrfs_readahead+0x29a/0x430 [btrfs]
read_pages+0x1a7/0xc60
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x2ad/0x560
filemap_get_pages+0x629/0xa20
filemap_read+0x335/0xbf0
vfs_read+0x790/0xcb0
ksys_read+0xfd/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Freed by task 20917:
kasan_save_stack+0x37/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x60
kmem_cache_free+0x214/0x5d0
bio_free+0xed/0x180
end_bbio_data_read+0x1cc/0x580 [btrfs]
btrfs_submit_chunk+0x98d/0x1880 [btrfs]
btrfs_submit_bio+0x33/0x70 [btrfs]
submit_one_bio+0xd4/0x130 [btrfs]
submit_extent_page+0x3ea/0xdb0 [btrfs]
btrfs_do_readpage+0x8b4/0x12a0 [btrfs]
btrfs_readahead+0x29a/0x430 [btrfs]
read_pages+0x1a7/0xc60
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x2ad/0x560
filemap_get_pages+0x629/0xa20
filemap_read+0x335/0xbf0
vfs_read+0x790/0xcb0
ksys_read+0xfd/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[CAUSE]
Although I cannot reproduce the error, the report itself is good enough
to pin down the cause.
The call trace is the regular endio workqueue context, but the
free-by-task trace is showing that during btrfs_submit_chunk() we
already hit a critical error, and is calling btrfs_bio_end_io() to error
out. And the original endio function called bio_put() to free the whole
bio.
This means a double freeing thus causing use-after-free, e.g.:
1. Enter btrfs_submit_bio() with a read bio
The read bio length is 128K, crossing two 64K stripes.
2. The first run of btrfs_submit_chunk()
2.1 Call btrfs_map_block(), which returns 64K
2.2 Call btrfs_split_bio()
Now there are two bios, one referring to the first 64K, the other
referring to the second 64K.
2.3 The first half is submitted.
3. The second run of btrfs_submit_chunk()
3.1 Call btrfs_map_block(), which by somehow failed
Now we call btrfs_bio_end_io() to handle the error
3.2 btrfs_bio_end_io() calls the original endio function
Which is end_bbio_data_read(), and it calls bio_put() for the
original bio.
Now the original bio is freed.
4. The submitted first 64K bio finished
Now we call into btrfs_check_read_bio() and tries to advance the bio
iter.
But since the original bio (thus its iter) is already freed, we
trigger the above use-after free.
And even if the memory is not poisoned/corrupted, we will later call
the original endio function, causing a double freeing.
[FIX]
Instead of calling btrfs_bio_end_io(), call btrfs_orig_bbio_end_io(),
which has the extra check on split bios and do the pr
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: prevent UAF around preempt fence
The fence lock is part of the queue, therefore in the current design
anything locking the fence should then also hold a ref to the queue to
prevent the queue from being freed.
However, currently it looks like we signal the fence and then drop the
queue ref, but if something is waiting on the fence, the waiter is
kicked to wake up at some later point, where upon waking up it first
grabs the lock before checking the fence state. But if we have already
dropped the queue ref, then the lock might already be freed as part of
the queue, leading to uaf.
To prevent this, move the fence lock into the fence itself so we don't
run into lifetime issues. Alternative might be to have device level
lock, or only release the queue in the fence release callback, however
that might require pushing to another worker to avoid locking issues.
References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2454
References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2342
References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2020
(cherry picked from commit 7116c35aacedc38be6d15bd21b2fc936eed0008b) |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: st: fix probed platform device ref count on probe error path
The probe function never performs any paltform device allocation, thus
error path "undo_platform_dev_alloc" is entirely bogus. It drops the
reference count from the platform device being probed. If error path is
triggered, this will lead to unbalanced device reference counts and
premature release of device resources, thus possible use-after-free when
releasing remaining devm-managed resources. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: move stopping keep-alive into nvme_uninit_ctrl()
Commit 4733b65d82bd ("nvme: start keep-alive after admin queue setup")
moves starting keep-alive from nvme_start_ctrl() into
nvme_init_ctrl_finish(), but don't move stopping keep-alive into
nvme_uninit_ctrl(), so keep-alive work can be started and keep pending
after failing to start controller, finally use-after-free is triggered if
nvme host driver is unloaded.
This patch fixes kernel panic when running nvme/004 in case that connection
failure is triggered, by moving stopping keep-alive into nvme_uninit_ctrl().
This way is reasonable because keep-alive is now started in
nvme_init_ctrl_finish(). |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: idt77252: prevent use after free in dequeue_rx()
We can't dereference "skb" after calling vcc->push() because the skb
is released. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mtk_wed: fix use-after-free panic in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb()
When there are multiple ap interfaces on one band and with WED on,
turning the interface down will cause a kernel panic on MT798X.
Previously, cb_priv was freed in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block() without
marking NULL,and mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb() didn't check the value, too.
Assign NULL after free cb_priv in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block() and check NULL
in mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb().
----------
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0072460bca32b4f5
Call trace:
mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb+0x4/0x38
0xffffffc0794084bc
tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x70/0x1e8
tcf_block_unbind+0x6c/0xc8
...
--------- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent UAF in ip6_send_skb()
syzbot reported an UAF in ip6_send_skb() [1]
After ip6_local_out() has returned, we no longer can safely
dereference rt, unless we hold rcu_read_lock().
A similar issue has been fixed in commit
a688caa34beb ("ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc()")
Another potential issue in ip6_finish_output2() is handled in a
separate patch.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806dde4858 by task syz.1.380/6530
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6530 Comm: syz.1.380 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00306-gdf6cbc62cc9b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588
rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890
vfs_writev+0x37c/0xbb0 fs/read_write.c:971
do_writev+0x1b1/0x350 fs/read_write.c:1018
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f936bf79e79
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f936cd7f038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f936c115f80 RCX: 00007f936bf79e79
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f936bfe7916 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f936c115f80 R15: 00007fff2860a7a8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6530:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044
dst_alloc+0x12b/0x190 net/core/dst.c:89
ip6_blackhole_route+0x59/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2670
make_blackhole net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3120 [inline]
xfrm_lookup_route+0xd1/0x1c0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3313
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x13e/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1257
rawv6_sendmsg+0x1283/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:898
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 45:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x145/0x350 mm/slub.c:4548
dst_destroy+0x2ac/0x460 net/core/dst.c:124
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2569 [inline]
rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent possible UAF in ip6_xmit()
If skb_expand_head() returns NULL, skb has been freed
and the associated dst/idev could also have been freed.
We must use rcu_read_lock() to prevent a possible UAF. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Free job before xe_exec_queue_put
Free job depends on job->vm being valid, the last xe_exec_queue_put can
destroy the VM. Prevent UAF by freeing job before xe_exec_queue_put.
(cherry picked from commit 32a42c93b74c8ca6d0915ea3eba21bceff53042f) |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: avoid possible UaF when selecting endp
select_local_address() and select_signal_address() both select an
endpoint entry from the list inside an RCU protected section, but return
a reference to it, to be read later on. If the entry is dereferenced
after the RCU unlock, reading info could cause a Use-after-Free.
A simple solution is to copy the required info while inside the RCU
protected section to avoid any risk of UaF later. The address ID might
need to be modified later to handle the ID0 case later, so a copy seems
OK to deal with. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/mgag200: Bind I2C lifetime to DRM device
Managed cleanup with devm_add_action_or_reset() will release the I2C
adapter when the underlying Linux device goes away. But the connector
still refers to it, so this cleanup leaves behind a stale pointer
in struct drm_connector.ddc.
Bind the lifetime of the I2C adapter to the connector's lifetime by
using DRM's managed release. When the DRM device goes away (after
the Linux device) DRM will first clean up the connector and then
clean up the I2C adapter. |