| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-sysman: Fix reference leak
If a duplicate attribute is found using kset_find_obj(),
a reference to that attribute is returned. This means
that we need to dispose it accordingly. Use kobject_put()
to dispose the duplicate attribute in such a case.
Compile-tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Take RTNL lock when needed before calling xdp_set_features()
Hold RTNL lock when calling xdp_set_features() with a registered netdev,
as the call triggers the netdev notifiers. This could happen when
switching from uplink rep to nic profile for example.
This resolves the following call trace:
RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (1953)
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 112670 at net/core/dev.c:1953 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
Modules linked in: sch_mqprio sch_mqprio_lib act_tunnel_key act_mirred act_skbedit cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding ib_umad ip_gre rdma_ucm mlx5_vfio_pci ipip tunnel4 ip6_gre gre mlx5_ib vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 ib_uverbs vfio mlx5_core ib_ipoib geneve nf_tables ip6_tunnel tunnel6 iptable_raw openvswitch nsh rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
CPU: 6 PID: 112670 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_06_28_17_02 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
Code: 90 ff 80 3d 2d 6b f7 00 00 75 c5 ba a1 07 00 00 48 c7 c6 e4 ce 0b 82 48 c7 c7 c8 f4 04 82 c6 05 11 6b f7 00 01 e8 a4 7c 8e ff <0f> 0b eb a2 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 48 83 e4 f0 48 83 ec
RSP: 0018:ffff8882a21c3948 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff82e6f880 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff88885f99b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88885f99b5c0
RBP: 0000000000000028 R08: ffff88887ffabaa8 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffff88887fecbac0 R11: ffff88887ff7bac0 R12: ffff8882a21c3968
R13: ffff88811c018940 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881274401a0
FS: 00007fe141c81800(0000) GS:ffff88885f980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f787c28b948 CR3: 000000014bcf3005 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x79/0x120
? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
? report_bug+0x17c/0x190
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
call_netdevice_notifiers+0x2e/0x50
mlx5e_set_xdp_feature+0x21/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_nic_init+0xf1/0x1a0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_init_profile+0x76/0x110 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_attach_profile+0x1f/0x90 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x92/0x160 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0xaa/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
__esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x52/0x60 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_unload+0x52/0x70 [mlx5_core]
esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x34/0x70 [mlx5_core]
esw_offloads_disable+0x2b/0x90 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked+0x1b9/0x210 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0xf5/0x630 [mlx5_core]
? devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x9e/0x110
devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_set_doit+0x60/0xe0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xc2/0x110
genl_rcv_msg+0x17d/0x2b0
? devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x110/0x110
? devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_get_doit+0x290/0x290
? devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0xf0/0xf0
? genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x110/0x110
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x1f6/0x2c0
netlink_sendmsg+0x232/0x4a0
sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x60
__sys_sendto+0x110/0x160
? __count_memcg_events+0x48/0x90
? handle_mm_fault+0x161/0x260
? do_user_addr_fault+0x278/0x6e0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix an information leak in tipc_topsrv_kern_subscr
Use a 8-byte write to initialize sub.usr_handle in
tipc_topsrv_kern_subscr(), otherwise four bytes remain uninitialized
when issuing setsockopt(..., SOL_TIPC, ...).
This resulted in an infoleak reported by KMSAN when the packet was
received:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout+0xbc/0x100 lib/iov_iter.c:169
instrument_copy_to_user ./include/linux/instrumented.h:121
copyout+0xbc/0x100 lib/iov_iter.c:169
_copy_to_iter+0x5c0/0x20a0 lib/iov_iter.c:527
copy_to_iter ./include/linux/uio.h:176
simple_copy_to_iter+0x64/0xa0 net/core/datagram.c:513
__skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0xdc0 net/core/datagram.c:419
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x58/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:527
skb_copy_datagram_msg ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3903
packet_recvmsg+0x521/0x1e70 net/packet/af_packet.c:3469
____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x810 net/socket.c:?
___sys_recvmsg+0x217/0x840 net/socket.c:2743
__sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2773
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2783
__se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2780
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x364/0x540 net/socket.c:2780
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
...
Uninit was stored to memory at:
tipc_sub_subscribe+0x42d/0xb50 net/tipc/subscr.c:156
tipc_conn_rcv_sub+0x246/0x620 net/tipc/topsrv.c:375
tipc_topsrv_kern_subscr+0x2e8/0x400 net/tipc/topsrv.c:579
tipc_group_create+0x4e7/0x7d0 net/tipc/group.c:190
tipc_sk_join+0x2a8/0x770 net/tipc/socket.c:3084
tipc_setsockopt+0xae5/0xe40 net/tipc/socket.c:3201
__sys_setsockopt+0x87f/0xdc0 net/socket.c:2252
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2263
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2260
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xe0/0x160 net/socket.c:2260
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
Local variable sub created at:
tipc_topsrv_kern_subscr+0x57/0x400 net/tipc/topsrv.c:562
tipc_group_create+0x4e7/0x7d0 net/tipc/group.c:190
Bytes 84-87 of 88 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 88 starts at ffff88801ed57cd0
Data copied to user address 0000000020000400
...
===================================================== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function
When BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, BPF trampoline uses BLR to jump
back to the instruction next to call site to call the patched function.
For BTI-enabled kernel, the instruction next to call site is usually
PACIASP, in this case, it's safe to jump back with BLR. But when
the call site is not followed by a PACIASP or bti, a BTI exception
is triggered.
Here is a fault log:
Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI
CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 40400805 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
pc : bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
lr : bpf_trampoline_6442573892_0+0x48/0x1000
sp : ffff80000c0c3a50
x29: ffff80000c0c3a90 x28: ffff0000c2e6c080 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000050
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x21: 000000000000000a
x20: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80000914f5e4 x9 : ffff8000082a1528
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0101010101010101
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000fffffff2 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : ffff8001f4b82000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001
Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xec/0x144
show_stack+0x24/0x7c
dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
panic+0x1cc/0x3ec
__el0_error_handler_common+0x0/0x130
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xd0
el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c
bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
bpf_prog_test_run_tracing+0xdc/0x2a0
__sys_bpf+0x438/0x22a0
__arm64_sys_bpf+0x30/0x54
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x110
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xe0
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0
el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x0000,00034c24,f994fdab
Memory Limit: none
And the instruction next to call site of bpf_fentry_test1 is ADD,
not PACIASP:
<bpf_fentry_test1>:
bti c
nop
nop
add w0, w0, #0x1
paciasp
For BPF prog, JIT always puts a PACIASP after call site for BTI-enabled
kernel, so there is no problem. To fix it, replace BLR with RET to bypass
the branch target check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
test_firmware: fix memory leak in test_firmware_init()
When misc_register() failed in test_firmware_init(), the memory pointed
by test_fw_config->name is not released. The memory leak information is
as follows:
unreferenced object 0xffff88810a34cb00 (size 32):
comm "insmod", pid 7952, jiffies 4294948236 (age 49.060s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
74 65 73 74 2d 66 69 72 6d 77 61 72 65 2e 62 69 test-firmware.bi
6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 n...............
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81b21fcb>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x4b/0xc0
[<ffffffff81affb96>] kstrndup+0x46/0xc0
[<ffffffffa0403a49>] __test_firmware_config_init+0x29/0x380 [test_firmware]
[<ffffffffa040f068>] 0xffffffffa040f068
[<ffffffff81002c41>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x780
[<ffffffff816a72c3>] do_init_module+0x1c3/0x630
[<ffffffff816adb9e>] load_module+0x623e/0x76a0
[<ffffffff816af471>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x181/0x240
[<ffffffff89978f99>] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[<ffffffff89a0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix possible double unlock when moving a directory |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix possible data races in gfs2_show_options()
Some fields such as gt_logd_secs of the struct gfs2_tune are accessed
without holding the lock gt_spin in gfs2_show_options():
val = sdp->sd_tune.gt_logd_secs;
if (val != 30)
seq_printf(s, ",commit=%d", val);
And thus can cause data races when gfs2_show_options() and other functions
such as gfs2_reconfigure() are concurrently executed:
spin_lock(>->gt_spin);
gt->gt_logd_secs = newargs->ar_commit;
To fix these possible data races, the lock sdp->sd_tune.gt_spin is
acquired before accessing the fields of gfs2_tune and released after these
accesses.
Further changes by Andreas:
- Don't hold the spin lock over the seq_printf operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/hist: Fix out-of-bound write on 'action_data.var_ref_idx'
When generate a synthetic event with many params and then create a trace
action for it [1], kernel panic happened [2].
It is because that in trace_action_create() 'data->n_params' is up to
SYNTH_FIELDS_MAX (current value is 64), and array 'data->var_ref_idx'
keeps indices into array 'hist_data->var_refs' for each synthetic event
param, but the length of 'data->var_ref_idx' is TRACING_MAP_VARS_MAX
(current value is 16), so out-of-bound write happened when 'data->n_params'
more than 16. In this case, 'data->match_data.event' is overwritten and
eventually cause the panic.
To solve the issue, adjust the length of 'data->var_ref_idx' to be
SYNTH_FIELDS_MAX and add sanity checks to avoid out-of-bound write.
[1]
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
# echo "my_synth_event int v1; int v2; int v3; int v4; int v5; int v6;\
int v7; int v8; int v9; int v10; int v11; int v12; int v13; int v14;\
int v15; int v16; int v17; int v18; int v19; int v20; int v21; int v22;\
int v23; int v24; int v25; int v26; int v27; int v28; int v29; int v30;\
int v31; int v32; int v33; int v34; int v35; int v36; int v37; int v38;\
int v39; int v40; int v41; int v42; int v43; int v44; int v45; int v46;\
int v47; int v48; int v49; int v50; int v51; int v52; int v53; int v54;\
int v55; int v56; int v57; int v58; int v59; int v60; int v61; int v62;\
int v63" >> synthetic_events
# echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs if comm=="bash"' >> \
events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
# echo "hist:keys=next_pid:onmatch(sched.sched_waking).my_synth_event(\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid)" >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
[2]
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff91c900000000
PGD 61001067 P4D 61001067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 2 PID: 322 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc8+ #229
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30
Code: 75 f7 31 d2 44 0f b6 04 16 44 88 04 11 48 83 c2 01 45 84 c0 75 ee
c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 00 31 c0 eb 08 48 83 c0 01 84 d2 74 13 <0f> b6 14
07 3a 14 06 74 ef 19 c0 83 c8 01 c3 cc cc cc cc 31 c3
RSP: 0018:ffff9b3b00f53c48 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffba958a68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff91c943d33a90 RDI: ffff91c900000000
RBP: ffff91c900000000 R08: 00000018d604b529 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff91c9483eddb1 R11: ffff91ca483eddab R12: ffff91c946171580
R13: ffff91c9479f0538 R14: ffff91c9457c2848 R15: ffff91c9479f0538
FS: 00007f1d1cfbe740(0000) GS:ffff91c9bdc80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff91c900000000 CR3: 0000000006316000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__find_event_file+0x55/0x90
action_create+0x76c/0x1060
event_hist_trigger_parse+0x146d/0x2060
? event_trigger_write+0x31/0xd0
trigger_process_regex+0xbb/0x110
event_trigger_write+0x6b/0xd0
vfs_write+0xc8/0x3e0
? alloc_fd+0xc0/0x160
? preempt_count_add+0x4d/0xa0
? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f1d1d0cf077
Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e
fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00
f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74
RSP: 002b:00007ffcebb0e568 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000143 RCX: 00007f1d1d0cf077
RDX: 0000000000000143 RSI: 00005639265aa7e0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00005639265aa7e0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000142
R
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix soft lockup in status_resync
status_resync() will calculate 'curr_resync - recovery_active' to show
user a progress bar like following:
[============>........] resync = 61.4%
'curr_resync' and 'recovery_active' is updated in md_do_sync(), and
status_resync() can read them concurrently, hence it's possible that
'curr_resync - recovery_active' can overflow to a huge number. In this
case status_resync() will be stuck in the loop to print a large amount
of '=', which will end up soft lockup.
Fix the problem by setting 'resync' to MD_RESYNC_ACTIVE in this case,
this way resync in progress will be reported to user. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: mlme: fix null-ptr deref on failed assoc
If association to an AP without a link 0 fails, then we crash in
tracing because it assumes that either ap_mld_addr or link 0 BSS
is valid, since we clear sdata->vif.valid_links and then don't
add the ap_mld_addr to the struct.
Since we clear also sdata->vif.cfg.ap_addr, keep a local copy of
it and assign it earlier, before clearing valid_links, to fix
this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/mediatek: Check return value after calling platform_get_resource()
platform_get_resource() may return NULL pointer, we need check its
return value to avoid null-ptr-deref in resource_size(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: fix null pointer dereference in blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping()
Our syzkaller report a null pointer dereference, root cause is
following:
__blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs
set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs
blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs
blk_mq_alloc_rqs
// failed due to oom
alloc_pages_node
// set->tags[hctx_idx] is still NULL
blk_mq_free_rqs
drv_tags = set->tags[hctx_idx];
// null pointer dereference is triggered
blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping(drv_tags, ...)
This is because commit 63064be150e4 ("blk-mq:
Add blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs()") merged the two steps:
1) set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_rq_map()
2) blk_mq_alloc_rqs(..., set->tags[hctx_idx])
into one step:
set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs()
Since tags is not initialized yet in this case, fix the problem by
checking if tags is NULL pointer in blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: hi846: Fix memory leak in hi846_parse_dt()
If any of the checks related to the supported link frequencies fail, then
the V4L2 fwnode resources don't get released before returning, which leads
to a memleak. Fix this by properly freeing the V4L2 fwnode data in a
designated label. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-iolatency: Fix memory leak on add_disk() failures
When a gendisk is successfully initialized but add_disk() fails such as when
a loop device has invalid number of minor device numbers specified,
blkcg_init_disk() is called during init and then blkcg_exit_disk() during
error handling. Unfortunately, iolatency gets initialized in the former but
doesn't get cleaned up in the latter.
This is because, in non-error cases, the cleanup is performed by
del_gendisk() calling rq_qos_exit(), the assumption being that rq_qos
policies, iolatency being one of them, can only be activated once the disk
is fully registered and visible. That assumption is true for wbt and iocost,
but not so for iolatency as it gets initialized before add_disk() is called.
It is desirable to lazy-init rq_qos policies because they are optional
features and add to hot path overhead once initialized - each IO has to walk
all the registered rq_qos policies. So, we want to switch iolatency to lazy
init too. However, that's a bigger change. As a fix for the immediate
problem, let's just add an extra call to rq_qos_exit() in blkcg_exit_disk().
This is safe because duplicate calls to rq_qos_exit() become noop's. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpt3sas: Fix possible resource leaks in mpt3sas_transport_port_add()
In mpt3sas_transport_port_add(), if sas_rphy_add() returns error,
sas_rphy_free() needs be called to free the resource allocated in
sas_end_device_alloc(). Otherwise a kernel crash will happen:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000108
CPU: 45 PID: 37020 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc1+ #189
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : device_del+0x54/0x3d0
lr : device_del+0x37c/0x3d0
Call trace:
device_del+0x54/0x3d0
attribute_container_class_device_del+0x28/0x38
transport_remove_classdev+0x6c/0x80
attribute_container_device_trigger+0x108/0x110
transport_remove_device+0x28/0x38
sas_rphy_remove+0x50/0x78 [scsi_transport_sas]
sas_port_delete+0x30/0x148 [scsi_transport_sas]
do_sas_phy_delete+0x78/0x80 [scsi_transport_sas]
device_for_each_child+0x68/0xb0
sas_remove_children+0x30/0x50 [scsi_transport_sas]
sas_rphy_remove+0x38/0x78 [scsi_transport_sas]
sas_port_delete+0x30/0x148 [scsi_transport_sas]
do_sas_phy_delete+0x78/0x80 [scsi_transport_sas]
device_for_each_child+0x68/0xb0
sas_remove_children+0x30/0x50 [scsi_transport_sas]
sas_remove_host+0x20/0x38 [scsi_transport_sas]
scsih_remove+0xd8/0x420 [mpt3sas]
Because transport_add_device() is not called when sas_rphy_add() fails, the
device is not added. When sas_rphy_remove() is subsequently called to
remove the device in the remove() path, a NULL pointer dereference happens. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix memory leak in hpd_rx_irq_create_workqueue()
If construction of the array of work queues to handle hpd_rx_irq offload
work fails, we need to unwind. Destroy all the created workqueues and
the allocated memory for the hpd_rx_irq_offload_work_queue struct array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: fix wrong ct->timeout value
(struct nf_conn)->timeout is an interval before the conntrack
confirmed. After confirmed, it becomes a timestamp.
It is observed that timeout of an unconfirmed conntrack:
- Set by calling ctnetlink_change_timeout(). As a result,
`nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly added to `ct->timeout` twice.
- Get by calling ctnetlink_dump_timeout(). As a result,
`nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly subtracted.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl
ctnetlink_dump_timeout
__ctnetlink_glue_build
ctnetlink_glue_build
__nfqnl_enqueue_packet
nf_queue
nf_hook_slow
ip_mc_output
? __pfx_ip_finish_output
ip_send_skb
? __pfx_dst_output
udp_send_skb
udp_sendmsg
? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag
sock_sendmsg
Separate the 2 cases in:
- Setting `ct->timeout` in __nf_ct_set_timeout().
- Getting `ct->timeout` in ctnetlink_dump_timeout().
Pablo appends:
Update ctnetlink to set up the timeout _after_ the IPS_CONFIRMED flag is
set on, otherwise conntrack creation via ctnetlink breaks.
Note that the problem described in this patch occurs since the
introduction of the nfnetlink_queue conntrack support, select a
sufficiently old Fixes: tag for -stable kernel to pick up this fix. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: qcom-adm: fix wrong sizeof config in slave_config
Fix broken slave_config function that uncorrectly compare the
peripheral_size with the size of the config pointer instead of the size
of the config struct. This cause the crci value to be ignored and cause
a kernel panic on any slave that use adm driver.
To fix this, compare to the size of the struct and NOT the size of the
pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: Avoid nf_ct_helper_hash uses after free
If nf_conntrack_init_start() fails (for example due to a
register_nf_conntrack_bpf() failure), the nf_conntrack_helper_fini()
clean-up path frees the nf_ct_helper_hash map.
When built with NF_CONNTRACK=y, further netfilter modules (e.g:
netfilter_conntrack_ftp) can still be loaded and call
nf_conntrack_helpers_register(), independently of whether nf_conntrack
initialized correctly. This accesses the nf_ct_helper_hash dangling
pointer and causes a uaf, possibly leading to random memory corruption.
This patch guards nf_conntrack_helper_register() from accessing a freed
or uninitialized nf_ct_helper_hash pointer and fixes possible
uses-after-free when loading a conntrack module. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/swap: fix swap_info_struct race between swapoff and get_swap_pages()
The si->lock must be held when deleting the si from the available list.
Otherwise, another thread can re-add the si to the available list, which
can lead to memory corruption. The only place we have found where this
happens is in the swapoff path. This case can be described as below:
core 0 core 1
swapoff
del_from_avail_list(si) waiting
try lock si->lock acquire swap_avail_lock
and re-add si into
swap_avail_head
acquire si->lock but missing si already being added again, and continuing
to clear SWP_WRITEOK, etc.
It can be easily found that a massive warning messages can be triggered
inside get_swap_pages() by some special cases, for example, we call
madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) on blocks of touched memory concurrently, meanwhile,
run much swapon-swapoff operations (e.g. stress-ng-swap).
However, in the worst case, panic can be caused by the above scene. In
swapoff(), the memory used by si could be kept in swap_info[] after
turning off a swap. This means memory corruption will not be caused
immediately until allocated and reset for a new swap in the swapon path.
A panic message caused: (with CONFIG_PLIST_DEBUG enabled)
------------[ cut here ]------------
top: 00000000e58a3003, n: 0000000013e75cda, p: 000000008cd4451a
prev: 0000000035b1e58a, n: 000000008cd4451a, p: 000000002150ee8d
next: 000000008cd4451a, n: 000000008cd4451a, p: 000000008cd4451a
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 1843 at lib/plist.c:60 plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
Modules linked in: rfkill(E) crct10dif_ce(E)...
CPU: 21 PID: 1843 Comm: stress-ng Kdump: ... 5.10.134+
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
pc : plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
lr : plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
sp : ffff0018009d3c30
x29: ffff0018009d3c40 x28: ffff800011b32a98
x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff001803908000
x25: ffff8000128ea088 x24: ffff800011b32a48
x23: 0000000000000028 x22: ffff001800875c00
x21: ffff800010f9e520 x20: ffff001800875c00
x19: ffff001800fdc6e0 x18: 0000000000000030
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0736076307640766 x14: 0730073007380731
x13: 0736076307640766 x12: 0730073007380731
x11: 000000000004058d x10: 0000000085a85b76
x9 : ffff8000101436e4 x8 : ffff800011c8ce08
x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff0017df9ed338 x4 : 0000000000000001
x3 : ffff8017ce62a000 x2 : ffff0017df9ed340
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
plist_check_head+0x80/0xf0
plist_add+0x28/0x140
add_to_avail_list+0x9c/0xf0
_enable_swap_info+0x78/0xb4
__do_sys_swapon+0x918/0xa10
__arm64_sys_swapon+0x20/0x30
el0_svc_common+0x8c/0x220
do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x90
el0_svc+0x1c/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0_sync+0x148/0x180
irq event stamp: 2082270
Now, si->lock locked before calling 'del_from_avail_list()' to make sure
other thread see the si had been deleted and SWP_WRITEOK cleared together,
will not reinsert again.
This problem exists in versions after stable 5.10.y. |
