| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Fix KMS with 3D on HW version 10
HW version 10 does not have GB Surfaces so there is no backing buffer for
surface backed FBs. This would result in a nullptr dereference and crash
the driver causing a black screen. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macvlan: fix possible UAF in macvlan_forward_source()
Add RCU protection on (struct macvlan_source_entry)->vlan.
Whenever macvlan_hash_del_source() is called, we must clear
entry->vlan pointer before RCU grace period starts.
This allows macvlan_forward_source() to skip over
entries queued for freeing.
Note that macvlan_dev are already RCU protected, as they
are embedded in a standard netdev (netdev_priv(ndev)).
https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/695fb1e8.050a0220.1c677c.039f.GAE@google.com/T/#u |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: ip_gre: make ipgre_header() robust
Analog to commit db5b4e39c4e6 ("ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust")
Over the years, syzbot found many ways to crash the kernel
in ipgre_header() [1].
This involves team or bonding drivers ability to dynamically
change their dev->needed_headroom and/or dev->hard_header_len
In this particular crash mld_newpack() allocated an skb
with a too small reserve/headroom, and by the time mld_sendpack()
was called, syzbot managed to attach an ipgre device.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff89ea3cb7 len:2030915468 put:2030915372 head:ffff888058b43000 data:ffff887fdfa6e194 tail:0x120 end:0x6c0 dev:team0
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:213 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1322 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:213
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:223 [inline]
skb_push+0xc3/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2641
ipgre_header+0x67/0x290 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:897
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3436 [inline]
neigh_connected_output+0x286/0x460 net/core/neighbour.c:1618
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Don't store mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink priv
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails, mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink private is used to
reference the netdev and mdev associated with that struct. Instead,
store netdev directly into mlx5e_dev and get mdev from the containing
mlx5_adev aux device structure.
This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.
$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000520
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 521 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #117 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_remove+0x68/0x130
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034838f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff88810283c380 RBX: ffff888101874400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff888102d789c0 R08: ffff8881007137f0 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc90003483898 R11: ffffc900034838a0 R12: ffff888100d261a0
R13: ffff888100d261a0 R14: ffff8881018749a0 R15: ffff888101874400
FS: 00007f8565fea740(0000) GS:ffff88856a759000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000520 CR3: 000000010b11a004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
device_del+0x160/0x3d0
? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dst: fix races in rt6_uncached_list_del() and rt_del_uncached_list()
syzbot was able to crash the kernel in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev()
in an interesting way [1]
Crash happens in list_del_init()/INIT_LIST_HEAD() while writing
list->prev, while the prior write on list->next went well.
static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)
{
WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list); // This went well
WRITE_ONCE(list->prev, list); // Crash, @list has been freed.
}
Issue here is that rt6_uncached_list_del() did not attempt to lock
ul->lock, as list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached) returned
true because the WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list) happened on the other CPU.
We might use list_del_init_careful() and list_empty_careful(),
or make sure rt6_uncached_list_del() always grabs the spinlock
whenever rt->dst.rt_uncached_list has been set.
A similar fix is neeed for IPv4.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880294cfa78 by task kworker/u8:14/3450
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3450 Comm: kworker/u8:14 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
addrconf_ifdown+0x143/0x18a0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3853
addrconf_notify+0x1bc/0x1050 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:-1
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline]
netif_close_many+0x29c/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1785
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xb50/0x2330 net/core/dev.c:12353
ops_exit_rtnl_list net/core/net_namespace.c:187 [inline]
ops_undo_list+0x3dc/0x990 net/core/net_namespace.c:248
cleanup_net+0x4de/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:696
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
</TASK>
Allocated by task 803:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x18d/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270
dst_alloc+0x105/0x170 net/core/dst.c:89
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x460 net/ipv6/route.c:3333
mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entr
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: return the handler error from mon_handle_auth_done()
Currently any error from ceph_auth_handle_reply_done() is propagated
via finish_auth() but isn't returned from mon_handle_auth_done(). This
results in higher layers learning that (despite the monitor considering
us to be successfully authenticated) something went wrong in the
authentication phase and reacting accordingly, but msgr2 still trying
to proceed with establishing the session in the background. In the
case of secure mode this can trigger a WARN in setup_crypto() and later
lead to a NULL pointer dereference inside of prepare_auth_signature(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv()
Blamed commit did not take care of VLAN encapsulations
as spotted by syzbot [1].
Use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() instead of pskb_inet_may_pull().
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
__INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x16f/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:729
__ip6_tnl_rcv+0xed9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:860
ip6_tnl_rcv+0xc3/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:903
gre_rcv+0x1529/0x1b90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:-1
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c89/0x2c60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
ip6_input+0x9c/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
ip6_mc_input+0x7ca/0xc10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x958/0x990 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0xf1/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6139 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1df/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:6252
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6338 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x630 net/core/dev.c:6397
tun_rx_batched+0x1df/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1485
tun_get_user+0x5c0e/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1953
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746
x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4960 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x9e7/0x17a0 mm/slub.c:5315
kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:586
__alloc_skb+0x805/0x1040 net/core/skbuff.c:690
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc5/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:6712
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xacc/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2995
tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1461 [inline]
tun_get_user+0x1142/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1794
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746
x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6465 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(none)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: check that server is running in unlock_filesystem
If we are trying to unlock the filesystem via an administrative
interface and nfsd isn't running, it crashes the server. This
happens currently because nfsd4_revoke_states() access state
structures (eg., conf_id_hashtbl) that has been freed as a part
of the server shutdown.
[ 59.465072] Call trace:
[ 59.465308] nfsd4_revoke_states+0x1b4/0x898 [nfsd] (P)
[ 59.465830] write_unlock_fs+0x258/0x440 [nfsd]
[ 59.466278] nfsctl_transaction_write+0xb0/0x120 [nfsd]
[ 59.466780] vfs_write+0x1f0/0x938
[ 59.467088] ksys_write+0xfc/0x1f8
[ 59.467395] __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xb8
[ 59.467746] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xdc/0x1e8
[ 59.468177] do_el0_svc+0x154/0x1d8
[ 59.468489] el0_svc+0x40/0xe0
[ 59.468767] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
[ 59.469138] el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0
Ensure this can't happen by taking the nfsd_mutex and checking that
the server is still up, and then holding the mutex across the call to
nfsd4_revoke_states(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpiolib: fix race condition for gdev->srcu
If two drivers were calling gpiochip_add_data_with_key(), one may be
traversing the srcu-protected list in gpio_name_to_desc(), meanwhile
other has just added its gdev in gpiodev_add_to_list_unlocked().
This creates a non-mutexed and non-protected timeframe, when one
instance is dereferencing and using &gdev->srcu, before the other
has initialized it, resulting in crash:
[ 4.935481] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800272bcc000
[ 4.943396] Mem abort info:
[ 4.943400] ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[ 4.943403] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 4.943407] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 4.943410] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 4.943413] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[ 4.943416] Data abort info:
[ 4.943418] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 4.946220] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 4.955261] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 4.955268] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000038e6c000
[ 4.961449] [ffff800272bcc000] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 4.969203] , p4d=1000000039739003
[ 4.979730] , pud=0000000000000000
[ 4.980210] phandle (CPU): 0x0000005e, phandle (BE): 0x5e000000 for node "reset"
[ 4.991736] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
[ 5.121359] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x44/0x98
[ 5.131091] lr : gpio_name_to_desc+0x60/0x1a0
[ 5.153671] sp : ffff8000833bb430
[ 5.298440]
[ 5.298443] Call trace:
[ 5.298445] __srcu_read_lock+0x44/0x98
[ 5.309484] gpio_name_to_desc+0x60/0x1a0
[ 5.320692] gpiochip_add_data_with_key+0x488/0xf00
5.946419] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Move initialization code for gdev fields before it is added to
gpio_devices, with adjacent initialization code.
Adjust goto statements to reflect modified order of operations
[Bartosz: fixed a build issue, removed stray newline] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: make free_choose_arg_map() resilient to partial allocation
free_choose_arg_map() may dereference a NULL pointer if its caller fails
after a partial allocation.
For example, in decode_choose_args(), if allocation of arg_map->args
fails, execution jumps to the fail label and free_choose_arg_map() is
called. Since arg_map->size is updated to a non-zero value before memory
allocation, free_choose_arg_map() will iterate over arg_map->args and
dereference a NULL pointer.
To prevent this potential NULL pointer dereference and make
free_choose_arg_map() more resilient, add checks for pointers before
iterating. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: do not free existing class in qfq_change_class()
Fixes qfq_change_class() error case.
cl->qdisc and cl should only be freed if a new class and qdisc
were allocated, or we risk various UAF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix crash on profile change rollback failure
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile can fail to attach a new profile and can
fail to rollback to old profile, in such case, we could end up with a
dangling netdev with a fully reset netdev_priv. A retry to change
profile, e.g. another attempt to call mlx5e_netdev_change_profile via
switchdev mode change, will crash trying to access the now NULL
priv->mdev.
This fix allows mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() to handle previous
failures and an empty priv, by not assuming priv is valid.
Pass netdev and mdev to all flows requiring
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() and avoid passing priv.
In mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() check if current priv is valid, and if
not, just attach the new profile without trying to access the old one.
This fixes the following oops, when enabling switchdev mode for the 2nd
time after first time failure:
## Enabling switchdev mode first time:
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
^^^^^^^^
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
## retry: Enabling switchdev mode 2nd time:
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #91 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x3c/0x90
Code: 50 00 00 f0 80 4f 78 02 48 8b bf e8 07 00 00 48 85 ff 74 16 48 8b 73 78 48 d1 ee 83 e6 01 83 f6 01 40 0f b6 f6 e8 c4 42 00 00 <48> 8b 45 38 48 85 c0 74 08 48 89 df e8 cc 47 40 1e 48 8b bb f0 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000673890 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881036a89c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888113f63800 RSI: ffffffff822fe720 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000002dcd R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900006738e8 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881036a89c0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fdfb8384740(0000) GS:ffff88856a9d6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000112ae0005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x45/0xb0
mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x27b/0x2d0
mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x72/0xf0
esw_offloads_enable+0x5d0/0x970
mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x349/0x430
? is_mp_supported+0x57/0xb0
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x26b/0x430
devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x6f/0xf0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140
genl_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x290
? __pfx_devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_devlink_nl_post_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x52/0x100
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x282/0x3e0
? __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x190
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
__sys_sendto+0x213/0x220
? __sys_recvmsg+0x6a/0xd0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfb8495047 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts
If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running,
the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object
linked to the context's call_controls list. Let's suppose the object is
deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is
executed against the same context. The function tries to add the new
damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the
pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated.
As a result, use-after-free happens.
This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface. It is not
easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making
a definitely weird file writes, though. Please refer to the report for
more details about the issue reproduction steps.
Fix the issue by making two changes. Firstly, move the final
kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from
terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx->kdamond reset. This
makes any code that sees NULL ctx->kdamond can safely assume the context
may not access damon_call() requests anymore. Secondly, let damon_call()
to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the
already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: fix use-after-free in ublk_partition_scan_work
A race condition exists between the async partition scan work and device
teardown that can lead to a use-after-free of ub->ub_disk:
1. ublk_ctrl_start_dev() schedules partition_scan_work after add_disk()
2. ublk_stop_dev() calls ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() which does:
- del_gendisk(ub->ub_disk)
- ublk_detach_disk() sets ub->ub_disk = NULL
- put_disk() which may free the disk
3. The worker ublk_partition_scan_work() then dereferences ub->ub_disk
leading to UAF
Fix this by using ublk_get_disk()/ublk_put_disk() in the worker to hold
a reference to the disk during the partition scan. The spinlock in
ublk_get_disk() synchronizes with ublk_detach_disk() ensuring the worker
either gets a valid reference or sees NULL and exits early.
Also change flush_work() to cancel_work_sync() to avoid running the
partition scan work unnecessarily when the disk is already detached. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cnic: Fix use-after-free bugs in cnic_delete_task
The original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw(),
which does not guarantee that the delayed work item 'delete_task' has
fully completed if it was already running. Additionally, the delayed work
item is cyclic, the flush_workqueue() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() only
blocks and waits for work items that were already queued to the
workqueue prior to its invocation. Any work items submitted after
flush_workqueue() is called are not included in the set of tasks that the
flush operation awaits. This means that after the cyclic work items have
finished executing, a delayed work item may still exist in the workqueue.
This leads to use-after-free scenarios where the cnic_dev is deallocated
by cnic_free_dev(), while delete_task remains active and attempt to
dereference cnic_dev in cnic_delete_task().
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)
cnic_netdev_event() |
cnic_stop_hw() | cnic_delete_task()
cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() | ...
cancel_delayed_work() | /* the queue_delayed_work()
flush_workqueue() | executes after flush_workqueue()*/
| queue_delayed_work()
cnic_free_dev(dev)//free | cnic_delete_task() //new instance
| dev = cp->dev; //use
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure
that the cyclic delayed work item is properly canceled and that any
ongoing execution of the work item completes before the cnic_dev is
deallocated. Furthermore, since cancel_delayed_work_sync() uses
__flush_work(work, true) to synchronously wait for any currently
executing instance of the work item to finish, the flush_workqueue()
becomes redundant and should be removed.
This bug was identified through static analysis. To reproduce the issue
and validate the fix, I simulated the cnic PCI device in QEMU and
introduced intentional delays — such as inserting calls to ssleep()
within the cnic_delete_task() function — to increase the likelihood
of triggering the bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal: intel_powerclamp: Use get_cpu() instead of smp_processor_id() to avoid crash
When CPU 0 is offline and intel_powerclamp is used to inject
idle, it generates kernel BUG:
BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: bash/15687
caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
CPU: 4 PID: 15687 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7+ #57
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
check_preemption_disabled+0xdd/0xe0
debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
powerclamp_set_cur_state+0x7f/0xf9 [intel_powerclamp]
...
...
Here CPU 0 is the control CPU by default and changed to the current CPU,
if CPU 0 offlined. This check has to be performed under cpus_read_lock(),
hence the above warning.
Use get_cpu() instead of smp_processor_id() to avoid this BUG.
[ rjw: Subject edits ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix crash when I/O abort times out
While performing CPU hotplug, a crash with the following stack was seen:
Call Trace:
qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x42a/0x970 [qla2xxx]
qla2x00_start_nvme_mq+0x3a2/0x4b0 [qla2xxx]
qla_nvme_post_cmd+0x166/0x240 [qla2xxx]
nvme_fc_start_fcp_op.part.0+0x119/0x2e0 [nvme_fc]
blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x17b/0x610
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xb0/0x140
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x30/0x60
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x35/0x90
__blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x161/0x180
blk_execute_rq+0xbe/0x160
__nvme_submit_sync_cmd+0x16f/0x220 [nvme_core]
nvmf_connect_admin_queue+0x11a/0x170 [nvme_fabrics]
nvme_fc_create_association.cold+0x50/0x3dc [nvme_fc]
nvme_fc_connect_ctrl_work+0x19/0x30 [nvme_fc]
process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0
On abort timeout, completion was called without checking if the I/O was
already completed.
Verify that I/O and abort request are indeed outstanding before attempting
completion. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: fix use-after-free on probe deferral
The bridge counter was never reset when tearing down the DRM device so
that stale pointers to deallocated structures would be accessed on the
next tear down (e.g. after a second late bind deferral).
Given enough bridges and a few probe deferrals this could currently also
lead to data beyond the bridge array being corrupted.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/502665/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
null_blk: fix poll request timeout handling
When doing io_uring benchmark on /dev/nullb0, it's easy to crash the
kernel if poll requests timeout triggered, as reported by David. [1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work
RIP: 0010:null_timeout_rq+0x4e/0x91
Call Trace:
? null_timeout_rq+0x4e/0x91
blk_mq_handle_expired+0x31/0x4b
bt_iter+0x68/0x84
? bt_tags_iter+0x81/0x81
__sbitmap_for_each_set.constprop.0+0xb0/0xf2
? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0xf/0xf
bt_for_each+0x46/0x64
? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0xf/0xf
? percpu_ref_get_many+0xc/0x2a
blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x14d/0x18e
blk_mq_timeout_work+0x95/0x127
process_one_work+0x185/0x263
worker_thread+0x1b5/0x227
This is indeed a race problem between null_timeout_rq() and null_poll().
null_poll() null_timeout_rq()
spin_lock(&nq->poll_lock)
list_splice_init(&nq->poll_list, &list)
spin_unlock(&nq->poll_lock)
while (!list_empty(&list))
req = list_first_entry()
list_del_init()
...
blk_mq_add_to_batch()
// req->rq_next = NULL
spin_lock(&nq->poll_lock)
// rq->queuelist->next == NULL
list_del_init(&rq->queuelist)
spin_unlock(&nq->poll_lock)
Fix these problems by setting requests state to MQ_RQ_COMPLETE under
nq->poll_lock protection, in which null_timeout_rq() can safely detect
this race and early return.
Note this patch just fix the kernel panic when request timeout happen.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/3893581.1691785261@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix slot write race condition
Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked
zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this:
CPU0 CPU1
zram_slot_lock()
zs_free(handle)
zram_slot_lock()
zram_slot_lock()
zs_free(handle)
zram_slot_lock()
compress compress
handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc()
zram_slot_lock
zram_set_handle(handle)
zram_slot_lock
zram_slot_lock
zram_set_handle(handle)
zram_slot_lock
Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done
too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its
new handle, all under the same slot lock scope. |
