| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Fix condition check in acpi_ps_parse_loop()
Fix condition check for AML_ELSE_OP in acpi_ps_parse_loop() to prevent
out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Enhance buffer validation in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources()
Enhance buffer validation in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources() to prevent
buffer overflows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: add boundary checks in two places
Add boundary checks in acpi_ps_get_next_namestring() and
acpi_ps_peek_opcode() to prevent out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: ahci: fail probe if BAR too small for claimed ports
When an AHCI controller is disabled in BIOS, its HOST_CAP register may
contain a bogus value, e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF.
Since CAP.NP (Number of Ports) is a zeroes based 5-bit register field,
a value of 0x1f means 32 ports. If CAP.NP claims more ports than can
physically fit within the mapped BAR region, accessing port registers
beyond the BAR boundary causes a kernel panic.
Add validation in ahci_init_one() to check that the BAR size is
sufficient for the number of ports claimed in CAP.NP. The check
calculates the required MMIO size as:
required_size = 0x100 (global registers) + max_ports * 0x80
If required_size exceeds the actual BAR size, the probe fails with
-ENODEV, preventing the panic and providing a clear error message.
[cassel: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate index entry key bounds
[BUG]
A malformed NTFS directory index entry can advertise a key_size larger
than the bytes actually present in its NTFS_DE payload. Directory lookup
then passes that malformed key to cmp_fnames(), which can read past the
end of the kmalloc'ed index buffer.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fname_full_size fs/ntfs3/ntfs.h:590 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cmp_fnames+0x1ea/0x230 fs/ntfs3/index.c:46
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801c313018 by task syz.6.3365/9279
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbe/0x130 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xd1/0x650 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xfb/0x140 mm/kasan/report.c:595
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378
fname_full_size fs/ntfs3/ntfs.h:590 [inline]
cmp_fnames+0x1ea/0x230 fs/ntfs3/index.c:46
hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x3ed/0x670 fs/ntfs3/index.c:762
indx_find+0x4b5/0x900 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1186
dir_search_u+0x2c0/0x460 fs/ntfs3/dir.c:254
ntfs_lookup+0x1cc/0x2a0 fs/ntfs3/namei.c:85
__lookup_slow+0x241/0x450 fs/namei.c:1816
lookup_slow fs/namei.c:1833 [inline]
walk_component+0x31c/0x570 fs/namei.c:2151
link_path_walk+0x592/0xd60 fs/namei.c:2519
path_lookupat+0x138/0x660 fs/namei.c:2675
filename_lookup+0x1f3/0x560 fs/namei.c:2705
filename_setxattr+0xad/0x1c0 fs/xattr.c:660
path_setxattrat+0x1d8/0x280 fs/xattr.c:713
__do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:754 [inline]
__se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:750 [inline]
__x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xd0/0x150 fs/xattr.c:750
...
Allocated by task 9279:
kasan_save_stack+0x39/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:77
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:573
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:400 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xc3/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:417
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:262 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5650 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2bd/0x900 mm/slub.c:5662
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline]
indx_read+0x41d/0xad0 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1059
indx_find+0x447/0x900 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1179
dir_search_u+0x2c0/0x460 fs/ntfs3/dir.c:254
ntfs_lookup+0x1cc/0x2a0 fs/ntfs3/namei.c:85
__lookup_slow+0x241/0x450 fs/namei.c:1816
lookup_slow fs/namei.c:1833 [inline]
walk_component+0x31c/0x570 fs/namei.c:2151
link_path_walk+0x592/0xd60 fs/namei.c:2519
path_lookupat+0x138/0x660 fs/namei.c:2675
filename_lookup+0x1f3/0x560 fs/namei.c:2705
filename_setxattr+0xad/0x1c0 fs/xattr.c:660
path_setxattrat+0x1d8/0x280 fs/xattr.c:713
__do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:754 [inline]
__se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:750 [inline]
__x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xd0/0x150 fs/xattr.c:750
...
[CAUSE]
The index-header validators only validated INDEX_HDR-level geometry.
They did not walk each NTFS_DE to verify entry alignment, subnode
layout, or that key_size fit inside the entry payload. They also
allowed a last sentinel entry to carry a non-zero key_size.
[FIX]
Walk every NTFS_DE in ntfs3's index-header validators and reject
entries with invalid layout, mismatched subnode state, oversized
key_size, or non-zero sentinel keys before lookup or log replay can
consume them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()
The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a
character count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:
if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size))
This computes: name_len + 16 > e_size
The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):
sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size
Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size
The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.
A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size
but large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.
Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: sja1105: flower: reject cross-chip redirect
dsa_port_from_netdev() may return a valid port from a different switch
chip. Programming another chip's port index into the local hardware
causes redirection to the wrong port, or an out-of-bounds access if the
index exceeds the local chip's port count.
Apply a minimal fix that adds a check to catch this case and adjusts the
extack message. When cls->common.skip_sw is not set, the operation could
instead redirect to the upstream port and let the software or upstream
switch(es) handle the forward, but that is not addressed here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix buffer overflow during vBIOS update
Clamp the buffer postion to write by setting the bin attribute
to the maximum buffer size so that VFS layer will block the
out-of-bounds accessing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: NUL-terminate replaced sysctl value
When writing to sysctls, proc_sys_call_handler() guarantees that the
buffer passed to proc handlers is NUL-terminated. If
bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() replaces the pending sysctl value, it can
hand a replacement buffer directly to proc handlers. However, the
helper currently copies only buf_len bytes into that buffer without
appending a NUL terminator, leaving downstream parsers vulnerable to
out-of-bounds access.
Fix this by appending a '\0' after the replaced value to restore the
expected sysctl semantics. Since the helper already rejects buf_len
greater than PAGE_SIZE - 1, there is always room for the extra byte.
Reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN while exercising
the sysctl replacement path with a cgroup/sysctl BPF program. The
reproducer targets `/proc/sys/net/core/flow_limit_cpu_bitmap`, fills
the original user write buffer with non-zero bytes, and overrides the
sysctl value so the replacement buffer lacks a terminating NUL. Under
that setup, the pre-fix kernel reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800de57000 by task repro_patch3/66
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 66 Comm: repro_patch3 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc3-00269-g8370ca1f87cc #6 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
print_report+0xcb/0x5e0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0
? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
bitmap_parse+0x37/0x2e0
flow_limit_cpu_sysctl+0xc6/0x840
? __pfx_flow_limit_cpu_sysctl+0x10/0x10
? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x5ba/0x870
proc_sys_call_handler+0x31d/0x480
? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
...
</TASK>
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 4096-byte region [ffff88800de56000, ffff88800de57000)
With this fix applied, rerunning the same sysctl-targeted path yields
no corresponding KASAN reports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: tree-checker: validate names in ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF
ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed
by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already
valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can
therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and
BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI
name buffer.
Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader
uses them. Reject records that do not contain a non-empty name, whose
name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, or whose
name exceeds BTRFS_NAME_LEN.
For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len
instead of deriving the copy length from the item size. The ioctl result is
zeroed when allocated. That leaves the existing trailing zero byte
untouched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate connectionless PSM length
Connectionless L2CAP frames carry a two-byte PSM at the start of the
payload. l2cap_recv_frame() currently reads that PSM unconditionally
after validating only the outer L2CAP length.
A malformed connectionless frame with a zero- or one-byte payload can
therefore make the parser read beyond the advertised skb payload and use
tailroom bytes as part of the PSM. A VHCI-backed QEMU reproducer
injected a one-byte connectionless payload and reached the unchecked
read.
Reject connectionless frames that cannot contain the PSM before reading
or pulling it. This preserves all valid connectionless frames while
dropping only structurally incomplete packets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: validate inline dentry name lengths before conversion
Inline dentry conversion copies names out of the inline dentry area
before checking that each recorded name length fits in the available
filename slots.
A corrupted image can therefore make the conversion path read past
the inline filename storage while building the regular dentry block.
Validate each inline dentry name length against the inline filename
area before copying it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: caiaq: validate EP1 reply lengths
usb_ep1_command_reply_dispatch() uses buf[0] as a command byte and then
reads command-specific fixed items from the same URB buffer. Several
paths use buf + 1, buf[1], buf[2], or buf + 3 without first proving that
urb->actual_length contains those bytes.
Add per-command length checks, use a payload length derived from the
bytes after the command byte for the control-state copy, and reject short
analog input payloads before the input helper reads fixed offsets from
the EP1 reply. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rsi: avoid reading TKIP MIC keys for non-TKIP ciphers
rsi_hal_load_key() copies tx_mic_key and rx_mic_key from data[16] and
data[24] whenever key data is present. Those offsets are only part of
the 32-byte TKIP key layout. Shorter keys used by other ciphers, such as
CCMP, do not provide those bytes, so the unconditional copies can read
past the supplied key buffer.
Only copy the MIC keys for TKIP, and reject malformed TKIP keys that are
shorter than the expected 32-byte layout.
[drop useless length check] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: validate assoc response length before status and IE access
cfg80211_rx_assoc_resp() initialises the status and response-IE fields
of cfg80211_connect_resp_params from the management frame before
proving that the frame is long enough for those offsets. S1G and
regular association responses also have different IE offsets, but the
S1G path only patched resp_ie after the unsafe initialiser had already
run.
Defer resp_ie, resp_ie_len, and status to after the link-iteration
loop. Use a bool to remember whether the frame is S1G, then validate
the appropriate minimum length and set all three fields in a single
if/else block. Funnel short-frame and SME-reject cleanup through a
shared free_bss label for the abandon paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: validate rx/tx MLME callback frame lengths before access
cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt() and cfg80211_tx_mlme_mgmt() call tracepoints
before rejecting frames shorter than the frame-control field. After
that, they only require len >= 2 before dispatching into subtype
handlers that assume their fixed fields are present.
The frames that trip this are not shorter than 2 bytes; they are short
relative to their subtype. mwifiex is a concrete in-tree example on the
length side: mwifiex_process_mgmt_packet() only requires a 4-address
ieee80211_hdr plus the 2-byte firmware length prefix before handing the
frame to cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt(). After stripping the length prefix and
removing addr4, pkt_len can be exactly 24: a bare 3-address management
header with no reason-code body. The existing WARN_ON(len < 2) does not
fire on such a frame, and cfg80211_process_deauth() then reads
u.deauth.reason_code as a two-byte access starting at offset 24,
immediately past the 24-byte buffer.
Add a frame-control length gate, then validate each subtype's minimum
frame size in an if/else-if chain that mirrors the dispatch logic. Trace
only after the frame is known to be well-formed.
Side effects of this change:
- The WARN_ON(len < 2) is dropped. It only guarded the frame_control
read, never the subtype fixed fields, and it does not fire on the
frames that actually trigger the out-of-bounds read (which are >= 2).
The len >= 2 check is kept as the guard before dereferencing
frame_control, but without the warning: these are exported callbacks
and a malformed frame from a driver should be dropped silently rather
than backtraced.
- cfg80211_tx_mlme_mgmt() previously routed every non-deauth subtype
through disassociation handling; it now silently ignores unrecognised
subtypes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: fix key index receive bound checks
libipw_rx() reads skb->data[hdrlen + 3] to extract the WEP key index in
both the software-decrypt key selection path and the hardware-decrypted
IV/ICV strip path. In both places the existing guard only checks
skb->len >= hdrlen + 3, which proves bytes up to hdrlen + 2 but not the
byte at hdrlen + 3.
Require hdrlen + 4 bytes before reading that item in both paths. This is
a local source-boundary check only; it does not change the key index
semantics. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rsi: validate beacon length before fixed buffer copy
rsi_prepare_beacon() copies the mac80211 beacon frame after
FRAME_DESC_SZ into a management skb whose usable tailroom may be smaller
than MAX_MGMT_PKT_SIZE after alignment.
Validate the beacon length against the actual tailroom before the copy
and skb_put(). Leave ownership of the management skb with the caller on
error, matching the existing rsi_send_beacon() cleanup path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: validate sta_id in BA window status notif
BA_WINDOW_STATUS_NOTIFICATION_ID extracts a 5-bit sta_id from the
firmware notification and uses it to index fw_id_to_mac_id[] without
bounds checking. Validate sta_id before array access to prevent
out-of-bounds indexing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix an off-by-1 boundary check
Before looking at the 11th byte, check the length is big enough. |
