| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Use-after-free (UAF) was possible in the `lzma.LZMADecompressor`, `bz2.BZ2Decompressor`, and `gzip.GzipFile` when a memory allocation fails with a `MemoryError` and the decompression instance is re-used. This scenario can be triggered if the process is under memory pressure. The fix cleans up the dangling pointer in this specific error condition.
The vulnerability is only present if the program re-uses decompressor instances across multiple decompression calls even after a `MemoryError` is raised during decompression. Using the helper functions to one-shot decompress data such as `lzma.decompress()`, `bz2.decompress()`, `gzip.decompress()`, and `zlib.decompress()` are not affected as a new decompressor instance is used per call. If the decompressor instance is not re-used after an error condition, this usage is similarly not vulnerable. |
| Mitgation of CVE-2026-4519 was incomplete. If the URL contained "%action" the mitigation could be bypassed for certain browser types the "webbrowser.open()" API could have commands injected into the underlying shell. See CVE-2026-4519 for details. |
| The "profiling.sampling" module (Python 3.15+) and "asyncio introspection capabilities" (3.14+, "python -m asyncio ps" and "python -m asyncio pstree") features could be used to read and write addresses in a privileged process if that process connected to a malicious or "infected" Python process via the remote debugging feature. This vulnerability requires persistently and repeatedly connecting to the process to be exploited, even after the connecting process crashes with high likelihood due to ASLR. |
| User-controlled header names and values containing newlines can allow injecting HTTP headers. |
| When using http.cookies.Morsel, user-controlled cookie values and parameters can allow injecting HTTP headers into messages. Patch rejects all control characters within cookie names, values, and parameters. |
| The
email module, specifically the "BytesGenerator" class, didn’t properly quote newlines for email headers when
serializing an email message allowing for header injection when an email
is serialized. This is only applicable if using "LiteralHeader" writing headers that don't respect email folding rules, the new behavior will reject the incorrectly folded headers in "BytesGenerator". |
| The webbrowser.open() API would accept leading dashes in the URL which
could be handled as command line options for certain web browsers. New
behavior rejects leading dashes. Users are recommended to sanitize URLs
prior to passing to webbrowser.open(). |
| The import hook in CPython that handles legacy *.pyc files (SourcelessFileLoader) is incorrectly handled in FileLoader (a base class) and so does not use io.open_code() to read the .pyc files. sys.audit handlers for this audit event therefore do not fire. |
| When calling base64.b64decode() or related functions the decoding process would stop after encountering the first padded quad regardless of whether there was more information to be processed. This can lead to data being accepted which may be processed differently by other implementations. Use "validate=True" to enable stricter processing of base64 data. |
| There is a defect in the CPython “tarfile” module affecting the “TarFile” extraction and entry enumeration APIs. The tar implementation would process tar archives with negative offsets without error, resulting in an infinite loop and deadlock during the parsing of maliciously crafted tar archives.
This vulnerability can be mitigated by including the following patch after importing the “tarfile” module: https://gist.github.com/sethmlarson/1716ac5b82b73dbcbf23ad2eff8b33e1 |
| Allows modifying some file metadata (e.g. last modified) with filter="data" or file permissions (chmod) with filter="tar" of files outside the extraction directory.
You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Only Python versions 3.12 or later are affected by these vulnerabilities, earlier versions don't include the extraction filter feature.
Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected.
Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links. |
| On Windows a directory returned by tempfile.mkdtemp() would not always have permissions set to restrict reading and writing to the temporary directory by other users, instead usually inheriting the correct permissions from the default location. Alternate configurations or users without a profile directory may not have the intended permissions.
If you’re not using Windows or haven’t changed the temporary directory location then you aren’t affected by this vulnerability. On other platforms the returned directory is consistently readable and writable only by the current user.
This issue was caused by Python not supporting Unix permissions on Windows. The fix adds support for Unix “700” for the mkdir function on Windows which is used by mkdtemp() to ensure the newly created directory has the proper permissions. |
| The “ipaddress” module contained incorrect information about whether certain IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were designated as “globally reachable” or “private”. This affected the is_private and is_global properties of the ipaddress.IPv4Address, ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Address, and ipaddress.IPv6Network classes, where values wouldn’t be returned in accordance with the latest information from the IANA Special-Purpose Address Registries.
CPython 3.12.4 and 3.13.0a6 contain updated information from these registries and thus have the intended behavior. |
| CPython 3.9 and earlier doesn't disallow configuring an empty list ("[]") for SSLContext.set_npn_protocols() which is an invalid value for the underlying OpenSSL API. This results in a buffer over-read when NPN is used (see CVE-2024-5535 for OpenSSL). This vulnerability is of low severity due to NPN being not widely used and specifying an empty list likely being uncommon in-practice (typically a protocol name would be configured). |
| There is a defect in the CPython standard library module “mimetypes” where on Windows the default list of known file locations are writable meaning other users can create invalid files to cause MemoryError to be raised on Python runtime startup or have file extensions be interpreted as the incorrect file type.
This defect is caused by the default locations of Linux and macOS platforms (such as “/etc/mime.types”) also being used on Windows, where they are user-writable locations (“C:\etc\mime.types”).
To work-around this issue a user can call mimetypes.init() with an empty list (“[]”) on Windows platforms to avoid using the default list of known file locations. |
| There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython.
The
email module didn’t properly quote newlines for email headers when
serializing an email message allowing for header injection when an email
is serialized. |
| When folding a long comment in an email header containing exclusively unfoldable characters, the parenthesis would not be preserved. This could be used for injecting headers into email messages where addresses are user-controlled and not sanitized. |
| The imaplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters. |
| User-controlled data URLs parsed by urllib.request.DataHandler allow injecting headers through newlines in the data URL mediatype. |
| During an address list folding when a separating comma ends up on a folded line and that line is to be unicode-encoded then the separator itself is also unicode-encoded. Expected behavior is that the separating comma remains a plan comma. This can result in the address header being misinterpreted by some mail servers. |
