wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()
Robert Morris reported:
|If a malicious USB device pretends to be an Intersil p54 wifi
|interface and generates an eeprom_readback message with a large
|eeprom->v1.len, p54_rx_eeprom_readback() will copy data from the
|message beyond the end of priv->eeprom.
|
|static void p54_rx_eeprom_readback(struct p54_common *priv,
| struct sk_buff *skb)
|{
| struct p54_hdr *hdr = (struct p54_hdr *) skb->data;
| struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *eeprom = (struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *) hdr->data;
|
| if (priv->fw_var >= 0x509) {
| memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v2.data,
| le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v2.len));
| } else {
| memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v1.data,
| le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v1.len));
| }
| [...]
The eeprom->v{1,2}.len is set by the driver in p54_download_eeprom().
The device is supposed to provide the same length back to the driver.
But yes, it's possible (like shown in the report) to alter the value
to something that causes a crash/panic due to overrun.
This patch addresses the issue by adding the size to the common device
context, so p54_rx_eeprom_readback no longer relies on possibly tampered
values... That said, it also checks if the "firmware" altered the value
and no longer copies them.
The one, small saving grace is: Before the driver tries to read the eeprom,
it needs to upload >a< firmware. the vendor firmware has a proprietary
license and as a reason, it is not present on most distributions by
default.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DLA |
DLA-4327-1 | linux security update |
Debian DLA |
DLA-4328-1 | linux-6.1 security update |
Debian DSA |
DSA-5973-1 | linux security update |
EUVD |
EUVD-2025-20898 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback() Robert Morris reported: |If a malicious USB device pretends to be an Intersil p54 wifi |interface and generates an eeprom_readback message with a large |eeprom->v1.len, p54_rx_eeprom_readback() will copy data from the |message beyond the end of priv->eeprom. | |static void p54_rx_eeprom_readback(struct p54_common *priv, | struct sk_buff *skb) |{ | struct p54_hdr *hdr = (struct p54_hdr *) skb->data; | struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *eeprom = (struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *) hdr->data; | | if (priv->fw_var >= 0x509) { | memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v2.data, | le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v2.len)); | } else { | memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v1.data, | le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v1.len)); | } | [...] The eeprom->v{1,2}.len is set by the driver in p54_download_eeprom(). The device is supposed to provide the same length back to the driver. But yes, it's possible (like shown in the report) to alter the value to something that causes a crash/panic due to overrun. This patch addresses the issue by adding the size to the common device context, so p54_rx_eeprom_readback no longer relies on possibly tampered values... That said, it also checks if the "firmware" altered the value and no longer copies them. The one, small saving grace is: Before the driver tries to read the eeprom, it needs to upload >a< firmware. the vendor firmware has a proprietary license and as a reason, it is not present on most distributions by default. |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7774-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7774-2 | Linux kernel (FIPS) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7774-3 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7775-1 | Linux kernel (Azure FIPS) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7775-2 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7776-1 | Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7775-3 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7774-4 | Linux kernel (KVM) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7774-5 | Linux kernel (NVIDIA Tegra IGX) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7834-1 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-2 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-3 | Linux kernel (AWS) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-4 | Linux kernel (GCP) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7856-1 | Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities |
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Tue, 16 Dec 2025 17:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Debian
Debian debian Linux |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-787 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Debian
Debian debian Linux |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
cvssV3_1
|
Mon, 03 Nov 2025 18:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
Wed, 16 Jul 2025 13:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
epss
|
epss
|
Fri, 11 Jul 2025 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Thu, 10 Jul 2025 08:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback() Robert Morris reported: |If a malicious USB device pretends to be an Intersil p54 wifi |interface and generates an eeprom_readback message with a large |eeprom->v1.len, p54_rx_eeprom_readback() will copy data from the |message beyond the end of priv->eeprom. | |static void p54_rx_eeprom_readback(struct p54_common *priv, | struct sk_buff *skb) |{ | struct p54_hdr *hdr = (struct p54_hdr *) skb->data; | struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *eeprom = (struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *) hdr->data; | | if (priv->fw_var >= 0x509) { | memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v2.data, | le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v2.len)); | } else { | memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v1.data, | le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v1.len)); | } | [...] The eeprom->v{1,2}.len is set by the driver in p54_download_eeprom(). The device is supposed to provide the same length back to the driver. But yes, it's possible (like shown in the report) to alter the value to something that causes a crash/panic due to overrun. This patch addresses the issue by adding the size to the common device context, so p54_rx_eeprom_readback no longer relies on possibly tampered values... That said, it also checks if the "firmware" altered the value and no longer copies them. The one, small saving grace is: Before the driver tries to read the eeprom, it needs to upload >a< firmware. the vendor firmware has a proprietary license and as a reason, it is not present on most distributions by default. | |
| Title | wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback() | |
| References |
|
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2025-11-03T17:36:58.983Z
Reserved: 2025-04-16T04:51:24.006Z
Link: CVE-2025-38348
No data.
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2025-07-10T09:15:29.840
Modified: 2025-12-16T17:35:21.510
Link: CVE-2025-38348
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2025-07-13T11:06:34Z
Debian DLA
Debian DSA
EUVD
Ubuntu USN