Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()

Yiming Qian reported :
<quote>
I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg
ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()`
(local DoS).

The core issue is a mismatch between:

- a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type
`__u16`) and
- a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt->dst1opt`)

when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided.

- `include/net/ipv6.h`:
- `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible).
(lines 291-307, especially 298)
- `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`:
- Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen`
without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`:
- Uses `opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen` to compute header
sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`:
- Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt->opt_flen` is non-zero.
(lines 1930-1934)
- `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`:
- Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)` (based on the
pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)

1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator:

- `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`.

2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs
and increments `opt_flen` each time:

- In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`:
- It computes `len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);`
- It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net->user_ns,
CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922)
- Then it does:
- `opt->opt_flen += len;` (line 927)
- `opt->dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928)

There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy
`IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at
`net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`).

If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps
while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte)
destination-options header.

In the attached PoC (`poc.c`):

- 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` => `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048`
- 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` => `len = 8`
- Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8`
- The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header.

3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`:

- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`:
- `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen +
opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;`

With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate
what will be pushed later.

4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from
`dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`:

- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`:
- `if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);`
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes
`dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`.
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does:
- `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
- `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));`

With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers
`skb_under_panic()` -> `BUG()`:

- `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`)
- `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`)

- The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target
netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`).
- Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user
namespaces.
- An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged
user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain
namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this).

- Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash).
-
---truncated---
Published: 2026-04-13
Score: 5.5 Medium
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: Local Denial of Service via kernel panic
Action: Patch ASAP
AI Analysis

Impact

A flaw in the IPv6 sendmsg path makes the kernel accumulate an option length into a 16‑bit counter while later using a pointer to the last provided destination‑options header without checking for overflow. When enough large options are supplied, the length counter wraps back to a small value while the actual header remains large, causing the skb push operation to use too little headroom and trigger a kernel panic through skb_under_panic. The result is a local denial of service that brings the entire system down. The vulnerability is an integer overflow that leads to a crash.

Affected Systems

The weakness exists in the Linux kernel’s IPv6 networking code. All Linux distributions that ship an affected kernel version are potentially vulnerable; however, no specific kernel release list is provided in the advisory, so the exact impacted versions remain unknown.

Risk and Exploitability

The reported CVSS score of 5.5 marks it as moderate severity, and the EPS score is not available, so exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified precisely. The bug can be triggered by a task that has CAP_NET_RAW in the relevant namespace, a capability that root or a user with the ability to create user‑namespace pairs can acquire. Consequently, any user who can instantiate a user namespace with network namespace capabilities can exploit the flaw, leading to a panic and system reboot. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, suggesting no known widespread exploitation yet, but the local nature of the attack and lack of publicly available mitigations mean that patching remains the most reliable defense.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on April 14, 2026 at 01:28 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Linux kernel to a version that incorporates the patch for the IPv6 destination‑options overflow bug. If an immediate kernel upgrade is not possible, apply the specific patch from the kernel commit referenced in the provided URLs. Consider removing the CAP_NET_RAW capability from untrusted processes or disabling user namespaces if your environment allows it. Monitor system logs for unexpected kernel panics, and reboot promptly if a crash occurs.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on April 14, 2026 at 01:28 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Tue, 14 Apr 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-190
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate


Mon, 13 Apr 2026 13:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl() Yiming Qian reported : <quote> I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()` (local DoS). The core issue is a mismatch between: - a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type `__u16`) and - a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt->dst1opt`) when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided. - `include/net/ipv6.h`: - `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298) - `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`: - Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen` without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933) - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`: - Uses `opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen` to compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465) - `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`: - Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt->opt_flen` is non-zero. (lines 1930-1934) - `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`: - Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)` (based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211) 1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator: - `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`. 2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs and increments `opt_flen` each time: - In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`: - It computes `len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);` - It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922) - Then it does: - `opt->opt_flen += len;` (line 927) - `opt->dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928) There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy `IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at `net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`). If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header. In the attached PoC (`poc.c`): - 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` => `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048` - 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` => `len = 8` - Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8` - The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header. 3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`: - In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`: - `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;` With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later. 4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from `dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`: - In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`: - `if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);` - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes `dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`. - In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does: - `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));` - `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));` With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers `skb_under_panic()` -> `BUG()`: - `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`) - `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`) - The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`). - Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user namespaces. - An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this). - Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash). - ---truncated---
Title ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-04-13T13:21:03.284Z

Reserved: 2026-03-09T15:48:24.087Z

Link: CVE-2026-31415

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-04-13T14:16:10.707

Modified: 2026-04-13T15:01:43.663

Link: CVE-2026-31415

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-04-13T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-31415 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-04-14T16:34:33Z

Weaknesses