The $import-pnp operation in Pathling Server accepts a caller‑supplied exportUrl and uses it as the remote FHIR Bulk Export endpoint without validating it against a trusted source. When PNP credentials are configured, Pathling builds a credentialed client, downloads files from the specified host, and then reclassifies those files as trusted local imports. This circumvents the allowlist that protects the standard $import operation, allowing an authenticated attacker to perform Server‑Side Request Forgery to internal or external hosts, potentially leaking credentials and poisoning warehouse data. The weakness is a combination of unchecked input validation (CWE‑20), excessive trust in caller‑provided data (CWE‑345), and an SSRF flaw (CWE‑918).

The vulnerability affects versions of Pathling Server prior to 2.0.0 released by aehrc. Any deployment of Pathling Server 1.x or older that allows the $import‑pnp operation is impacted.

The CVSS score of 8.6 indicates a high‑severity flaw. No EPSS score is available, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, so the exploitation probability is currently uncertain but not negligible. Attackers must be authenticated against Pathling to use $import‑pnp, after which they can target internal resources and retrieve or inject data. Given the potential for credential leakage, data integrity compromise, and control over data ingestion, the risk to affected organizations is high.