Description
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior accept a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. I measured a 169-byte request driving a dompdf render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16.
Analysis
No analysis available yet.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| dompdf | dompdf | affected |
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Remediation
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Tracking
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Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
 Github GHSA |
GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m | Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions |
References
History
Tue, 28 Jul 2026 21:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior accept a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. I measured a 169-byte request driving a dompdf render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16. | |
| Title | Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-400 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Subscriptions
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-28T20:42:57.010Z
Reserved: 2026-07-07T18:20:06.127Z
Link: CVE-2026-59941
Vulnrichment
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NVD
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Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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Weaknesses
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CWE-400
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption