Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area

When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the
GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max
possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of
the shared buffer.

The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the
length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always
specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len
is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know
the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).

Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.
Published: 2026-07-19
Score: 9.3 Critical
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

The Linux kernel's KVM SEV module incorrectly computes the maximum length of the in‑GHCB scratch area. The code treats the supplied length as a minimum, while the protection state controller path actually requires the full size to avoid buffer overflows. This miscalculation, classified as CWE‑131, can allow a malicious guest to overflow the scratch buffer, corrupt host memory, and achieve arbitrary code execution on the host.

Affected Systems

All Linux installations running the KVM hypervisor with Secure Encrypted Virtualization enabled are potentially affected. The vulnerability applies to any kernel that has not incorporated the patches in the cited commits, regardless of distribution or release version, as the change is in the kernel's core KVM code.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 9.3 indicates a high severity, and the EPSS score of less than 1% suggests low exploitation probability at present. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating no known widespread attacks. The likely attack vector is a compromised or malicious guest VM that issues a protection state controller request triggering an out‑of‑bounds write, thereby enabling the attacker to gain host control. The risk escalates if the host runs untrusted guests without additional isolation.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 3, 2026 at 02:03 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Linux kernel to a version that includes the SEV scratch area length patch, as released by the upstream kernel maintainers.
  • If a kernel upgrade is not immediately possible, disable SEV support on KVM instances or restrict guest access to the scratch area by using appropriate QEMU command‑line options or host‑level isolation.
  • Apply additional host hardening measures such as enabling SELinux or other mandatory access control frameworks, and monitor for anomalous guest‑initiated PSC requests.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 3, 2026 at 02:03 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8593-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8603-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8618-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
History

Mon, 27 Jul 2026 20:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-119
CWE-787

Wed, 22 Jul 2026 18:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-119
CWE-787

Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-131
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Important


Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Sun, 19 Jul 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer. The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert). Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.
Title KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-05T12:37:26.628Z

Reserved: 2026-07-19T07:54:57.022Z

Link: CVE-2026-63939

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2026-07-19T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-63939 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-03T02:15:05Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-131

    Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size