Description
A denial-of-service vulnerability was identified in misp-stix when processing attacker-controlled STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents.

The STIX import code used sys.exit() to handle several parsing and loading failures. Because SystemExit inherits from BaseException rather than Exception, these failures bypassed the exception handlers used by callers of the library. As a result, a malformed STIX document could terminate a long-running importer process instead of returning a recoverable parsing error.

Additionally, no limit was imposed on the size of STIX documents before parsing. A submitted document was therefore read and materialised in memory before its validity or type was evaluated. Depending on the document and parsing path, processing could consume approximately two to seven times the input size in memory, allowing a sufficiently large STIX document to cause excessive memory and CPU consumption and potentially terminate or severely degrade the importing service.

An attacker able to provide STIX content to a MISP-STIX import workflow could exploit either condition to affect availability. A malformed document could cause abnormal process termination through an uncaught SystemExit, while a large document could exhaust resources during deserialisation and conversion.

The fixes replace process-terminating sys.exit() calls with catchable exceptions such as STIXLoadingError and MissingSTIXContentError, and extend exception handling around the complete STIX detection and conversion process. The importer also now enforces an input-size limit before parsing. The default maximum is 100 MB, can be adjusted by callers, and can explicitly be disabled when required. STIX 1 inputs are additionally checked for the expected root element before the complete XML tree is constructed.

ImpactSuccessful exploitation can cause:

* termination of a long-running MISP-STIX importer;
* excessive memory allocation;
* excessive CPU consumption;
* degradation or temporary unavailability of services relying on the converter;
* interruption of batch or automated STIX ingestion workflows.
Published: 2026-08-21
Score: 8.7 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

A denial‑of‑service vulnerability arises when the misp‑stix library processes attacker‑controlled STIX documents. The import code uses sys.exit() for parsing errors, which bypasses the standard exception handling path and can terminate the importer process. Additionally, the library accepts documents of arbitrary size, materializing the entire payload in memory before validation. A malicious actor can therefore send either a malformed or an excessively large STIX file to either crash the service or exhaust its memory and CPU resources.

Affected Systems

Systems that embed the misp‑stix library for STIX ingestion—including MISP‑STIX importer services and automated STIX ingestion workflows—are impacted. The vendor misp:misp-stix applies to any deployment that processes incoming STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents. No specific version information is available in the current data, so all releases of the library before the fix are potentially vulnerable.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 8.7 indicates high severity, and the EPSS score is not available, so current exploitation likelihood is unknown. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Based on the description, it is inferred that an attacker must be able to submit STIX content to an importer, either through a public endpoint or an internal API. When successful, the attacker can trigger a ProcessExit exception that terminates the importer, or provide a large, valid STIX payload that causes memory exhaustion and excessive CPU usage, resulting in service degradation or downtime.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 21, 2026 at 11:24 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the misp‑stix library to the latest release that replaces sys.exit() with catchable exceptions and enforces a 100 MB input size limit.
  • Verify that the importer configuration enables the maximum input size (default 100 MB) and adjust if the business requirement demands a different value.
  • Wrap the import call with handlers for STIXLoadingError and MissingSTIXContentError to ensure the service can recover from a failed parse without terminating the process.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 21, 2026 at 11:24 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Fri, 21 Aug 2026 10:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A denial-of-service vulnerability was identified in misp-stix when processing attacker-controlled STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents. The STIX import code used sys.exit() to handle several parsing and loading failures. Because SystemExit inherits from BaseException rather than Exception, these failures bypassed the exception handlers used by callers of the library. As a result, a malformed STIX document could terminate a long-running importer process instead of returning a recoverable parsing error. Additionally, no limit was imposed on the size of STIX documents before parsing. A submitted document was therefore read and materialised in memory before its validity or type was evaluated. Depending on the document and parsing path, processing could consume approximately two to seven times the input size in memory, allowing a sufficiently large STIX document to cause excessive memory and CPU consumption and potentially terminate or severely degrade the importing service. An attacker able to provide STIX content to a MISP-STIX import workflow could exploit either condition to affect availability. A malformed document could cause abnormal process termination through an uncaught SystemExit, while a large document could exhaust resources during deserialisation and conversion. The fixes replace process-terminating sys.exit() calls with catchable exceptions such as STIXLoadingError and MissingSTIXContentError, and extend exception handling around the complete STIX detection and conversion process. The importer also now enforces an input-size limit before parsing. The default maximum is 100 MB, can be adjusted by callers, and can explicitly be disabled when required. STIX 1 inputs are additionally checked for the expected root element before the complete XML tree is constructed. ImpactSuccessful exploitation can cause: * termination of a long-running MISP-STIX importer; * excessive memory allocation; * excessive CPU consumption; * degradation or temporary unavailability of services relying on the converter; * interruption of batch or automated STIX ingestion workflows.
Title Denial of Service in MISP-STIX Import via Malformed or Oversized STIX Documents in misp-stix library
Weaknesses CWE-400
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L'}


Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: CIRCL

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-21T12:09:16.956Z

Reserved: 2026-08-21T09:55:04.399Z

Link: CVE-2026-77755

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-21T12:09:06.748Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-21T10:16:39.363

Modified: 2026-08-21T12:16:36.393

Link: CVE-2026-77755

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-21T11:30:04Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-400

    Uncontrolled Resource Consumption