Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator

ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array
with:

for (; i < le16_to_cpu(rb->rf_records.rl_used); i++) {
rec = &rb->rf_records.rl_recs[i];
...

rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common
configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by
ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the
16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly
off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against
that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW
operation walks the array.

A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the
loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i]
for i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling
ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does:

if (index < le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used))
memmove(&rf_list->rl_recs[index + 1],
&rf_list->rl_recs[index],
(le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used) - index) *
sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec));

i.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an
offset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink
(FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent
whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to
run off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model
is local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a
raw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem.

ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block's ECC,
signature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used
against the block's actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of
gap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes
for the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity
and the "used" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]:

if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}

if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_next_free_rec) >
le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}

Add the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block():
reject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block
capacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used >
rl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set,
because in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list
(rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is
already validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the
referenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing
"!(rb->rf_flags & OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)" guard used elsewhere in this
file (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or
rf_list is the live member of the union.

With this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block
validation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption
check in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in
ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove()
in ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec().

Verified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build:
replaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in
__ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch,
and triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the
forged rl_used/rl_count.
Published: 2026-09-11
Score: 8.8 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: Local Privilege Escalation
Action: Immediate Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

The flaw resides in the OCFS2 filesystem module of the Linux kernel. During the validation of refcount blocks, the fields rl_used and rl_count are not bounded against the on‑disk record capacity, allowing a crafted block with rl_used set to 0xffff to cause the code to walk far beyond the 4 KiB boundary. This exceeds the block’s size and results in an out‑of‑bounds read followed by an out‑of‑bounds memmove that can copy up to roughly one megabyte from an invalid memory area. The corruption extends into the kernel address space and can lead to privilege escalation or arbitrary code execution. Based on the description, it is inferred that the attacker must be able to execute local privileged actions such as mounting a crafted OCFS2 image or performing raw writes to the underlying block device.

Affected Systems

This vulnerability affects all Linux kernel implementations that include the OCFS2 filesystem module. The flaw is present in any kernel version that ships with the default OCFS2 implementation until a patch is applied. Both Linux distributions and the upstream kernel contain the vulnerable code. No specific version constraints are enumerated in the CNA data; therefore any kernel that supports OCFS2 can be impacted, regardless of the major or minor release number.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 8.8 indicates a high severity. The EPSS score is less than 1%, implying a low likelihood of exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The attacker model is local; CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to mount a crafted OCFS2 image or to perform raw writes to the block device. It is inferred that the exploit relies on a user with administrative privileges on the host. The vulnerability is not reachable over the network and therefore depends on local access. If triggered, the out‑of‑bounds read and write during refcount handling can corrupt kernel memory, potentially enabling privilege escalation or arbitrary code execution.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 15, 2026 at 22:39 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Apply an updated Linux kernel that includes the refcount block validation patch.
  • Restrict CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges or limit OCFS2 mounting to trusted administrators.
  • Monitor kernel logs for ocfs2_validate_refcount_block errors, KASAN reports, or kernel panics indicating attempted exploitation.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 15, 2026 at 22:39 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6528-1 linux security update
History

Mon, 14 Sep 2026 12:30:00 +0000


Sun, 13 Sep 2026 06:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H'}

cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Sat, 12 Sep 2026 12:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-787
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate


Fri, 11 Sep 2026 23:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array with: for (; i < le16_to_cpu(rb->rf_records.rl_used); i++) { rec = &rb->rf_records.rl_recs[i]; ... rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the 16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW operation walks the array. A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i] for i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does: if (index < le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used)) memmove(&rf_list->rl_recs[index + 1], &rf_list->rl_recs[index], (le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used) - index) * sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec)); i.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an offset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink (FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to run off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model is local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a raw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem. ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block's ECC, signature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used against the block's actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of gap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes for the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity and the "used" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]: if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) { rc = ocfs2_error(...); goto bail; } if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_next_free_rec) > le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count)) { rc = ocfs2_error(...); goto bail; } Add the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block(): reject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block capacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used > rl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set, because in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list (rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is already validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the referenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing "!(rb->rf_flags & OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)" guard used elsewhere in this file (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or rf_list is the live member of the union. With this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block validation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption check in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove() in ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(). Verified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build: replaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in __ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch, and triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the forged rl_used/rl_count.
Title ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-14T12:00:27.844Z

Reserved: 2026-09-11T19:38:34.714Z

Link: CVE-2026-89493

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-11T20:19:31.220

Modified: 2026-09-14T13:19:06.250

Link: CVE-2026-89493

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-09-11T19:43:44Z

Links: CVE-2026-89493 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-15T22:45:07Z

Weaknesses