Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10

Andrii reported an issue with optimized uprobes [1] that can clobber
redzone area with call instruction storing return address on stack
where user code may keep temporary data without adjusting rsp.

Fixing this by moving the optimized uprobes on top of 10-bytes nop
instruction, so we can squeeze another instruction to escape the
redzone area before doing the call, like:

lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call tramp

Note the lea instruction is used to adjust the rsp register without
changing the flags.

We use nop10 and following transformation to optimized instructions
above and back as suggested by Peterz [2].

Optimize path (int3_update_optimize):

1) Initial state after set_swbp() installed the uprobe:
cc 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00

From offset 0 this is INT3 followed by the tail of the original
10-byte NOP.

After a previous unoptimization bytes 5..9 may still contain the
old call instruction, which remains valid for threads already there.

2) Rewrite the LEA tail and call displacement:
cc [8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3]

From offset 0 this traps on the uprobe INT3. Bytes 1..9 are not
executable entry points while byte 0 is trapped.

3) Publish the first LEA byte:
[48] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3

From offset 0 this is:
lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call <uprobe-trampoline>

Unoptimize path (int3_update_unoptimize):

1) Initial optimized state:
48 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
Same as 3) above.

2) Trap new entries before restoring the NOP bytes:
[cc] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3

From offset 0 this traps. A thread that had already executed the
LEA can still reach the intact CALL at offset 5.

3) Restore bytes 1..4 of the original NOP while keeping byte 0 trapped
and byte 5 as CALL.
cc [2e 0f 1f 84] e8 d0 d1 d2 d3

From offset 0 this still traps. Offset 5 is still the CALL for any
thread that was already past the first LEA byte.

4) Publish the first byte of the original NOP:
[66] 2e 0f 1f 84 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3

From offset 0 this is the restored 10-byte NOP; the CALL opcode and
displacement are now only NOP operands. Offset 5 still decodes as
CALL for a thread that was already there.

Tthere is only a single target uprobe-trampoline for the given nop10
instruction address, so the CALL instruction will not be changed across
unoptimization/optimization cycles.
Therefore, any task that is preempted at the CALL instruction is guaranteed
to observe that CALL and not anything else.

Note as explained in [2] we need to use following nop10:
PF1 PF2 ESC NOPL MOD SIB DISP32
NOP10: 0x66, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -- cs nopw 0x00000000(%rax,%rax,1)

which means we need to allow 0x2e prefix which maps to INAT_PFX_CS
attribute in is_prefix_bad function.

Also changing the uprobe syscall error when called out of uprobe
trampoline to -EPROTO, so we are able to detect the fixed kernel.

The optimized uprobe performance stays the same:

uprobe-nop : 3.129 ± 0.013M/s
uprobe-push : 3.045 ± 0.006M/s
uprobe-ret : 1.095 ± 0.004M/s
--> uprobe-nop10 : 7.170 ± 0.020M/s
uretprobe-nop : 2.143 ± 0.021M/s
uretprobe-push : 2.090 ± 0.000M/s
uretprobe-ret : 0.942 ± 0.000M/s
--> uretprobe-nop10: 3.381 ± 0.003M/s
usdt-nop : 3.245 ± 0.004M/s
--> usdt-nop10 : 7.256 ± 0.023M/s

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260509003146.976844-1-andrii@kernel.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260518104306.GU3102624@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/#t
Published: 2026-09-17
Score: n/a
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: Kernel memory corruption due to improper uprobe handling
Action: Assess Impact
AI Analysis

Impact

The Linux kernel’s uprobes implementation contains a bug where the optimization of a 10‑byte NOP sequence places a CALL instruction that stores a return address onto the user stack before the stack pointer has been adjusted. This can clobber the redzone area where user code may keep temporary data, leading to stack corruption and potential kernel instability or privilege escalation. The weakness resembles an uncontrolled write to a kernel memory buffer (CWE‑787).

Affected Systems

All Linux kernel releases that support the uprobes tracing infrastructure may be affected until the optimization is corrected. No specific version range is listed, so any kernel using uprobes could potentially encounter the stack clobbering issue until the patch is integrated.

Risk and Exploitability

The EPSS score is < 1 %, indicating the likelihood of exploitation is very low, and the vulnerability is not currently listed in CISA’s KEV catalog. Exploitation would require the ability to install or manipulate uprobes, typically a local kernel‑level capability. While the bug could lead to memory corruption, the path to a successful attack is non‑easily exploitable and would likely be limited to privileged users or administrators with kernel control.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 19, 2026 at 08:36 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to a Linux kernel version that includes the corrected uprobe NOP10 optimization.
  • Disable or carefully configure uprobes and other dynamic tracing mechanisms to avoid manipulating the user stack while the kernel is executing these traps.
  • Monitor kernel logs for signs of stack corruption or unexpected crashes that may indicate the presence of the bug.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 19, 2026 at 08:36 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Sat, 19 Sep 2026 09:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-787

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10 Andrii reported an issue with optimized uprobes [1] that can clobber redzone area with call instruction storing return address on stack where user code may keep temporary data without adjusting rsp. Fixing this by moving the optimized uprobes on top of 10-bytes nop instruction, so we can squeeze another instruction to escape the redzone area before doing the call, like: lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp call tramp Note the lea instruction is used to adjust the rsp register without changing the flags. We use nop10 and following transformation to optimized instructions above and back as suggested by Peterz [2]. Optimize path (int3_update_optimize): 1) Initial state after set_swbp() installed the uprobe: cc 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 From offset 0 this is INT3 followed by the tail of the original 10-byte NOP. After a previous unoptimization bytes 5..9 may still contain the old call instruction, which remains valid for threads already there. 2) Rewrite the LEA tail and call displacement: cc [8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3] From offset 0 this traps on the uprobe INT3. Bytes 1..9 are not executable entry points while byte 0 is trapped. 3) Publish the first LEA byte: [48] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this is: lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp call <uprobe-trampoline> Unoptimize path (int3_update_unoptimize): 1) Initial optimized state: 48 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 Same as 3) above. 2) Trap new entries before restoring the NOP bytes: [cc] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this traps. A thread that had already executed the LEA can still reach the intact CALL at offset 5. 3) Restore bytes 1..4 of the original NOP while keeping byte 0 trapped and byte 5 as CALL. cc [2e 0f 1f 84] e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this still traps. Offset 5 is still the CALL for any thread that was already past the first LEA byte. 4) Publish the first byte of the original NOP: [66] 2e 0f 1f 84 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this is the restored 10-byte NOP; the CALL opcode and displacement are now only NOP operands. Offset 5 still decodes as CALL for a thread that was already there. Tthere is only a single target uprobe-trampoline for the given nop10 instruction address, so the CALL instruction will not be changed across unoptimization/optimization cycles. Therefore, any task that is preempted at the CALL instruction is guaranteed to observe that CALL and not anything else. Note as explained in [2] we need to use following nop10: PF1 PF2 ESC NOPL MOD SIB DISP32 NOP10: 0x66, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -- cs nopw 0x00000000(%rax,%rax,1) which means we need to allow 0x2e prefix which maps to INAT_PFX_CS attribute in is_prefix_bad function. Also changing the uprobe syscall error when called out of uprobe trampoline to -EPROTO, so we are able to detect the fixed kernel. The optimized uprobe performance stays the same: uprobe-nop : 3.129 ± 0.013M/s uprobe-push : 3.045 ± 0.006M/s uprobe-ret : 1.095 ± 0.004M/s --> uprobe-nop10 : 7.170 ± 0.020M/s uretprobe-nop : 2.143 ± 0.021M/s uretprobe-push : 2.090 ± 0.000M/s uretprobe-ret : 0.942 ± 0.000M/s --> uretprobe-nop10: 3.381 ± 0.003M/s usdt-nop : 3.245 ± 0.004M/s --> usdt-nop10 : 7.256 ± 0.023M/s [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260509003146.976844-1-andrii@kernel.org/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260518104306.GU3102624@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/#t
Title uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-17T16:11:57.248Z

Reserved: 2026-09-17T16:02:15.090Z

Link: CVE-2026-93164

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-17T17:18:11.890

Modified: 2026-09-17T17:18:11.890

Link: CVE-2026-93164

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-20T05:00:11Z

Weaknesses