Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()

prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic:

mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);

If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user
controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0
as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through
(and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it).
0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps
(div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047.

The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1,
so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and
[1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster
links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this
doesn't blow up for everyone.

What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc():

p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...));
hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);

A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback
unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns
the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution:

if (interval < hrtimer_resolution)
interval = hrtimer_resolution;

So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding
sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the
socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone.

The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with
TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer
implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net:
af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not
as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned
short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a
0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly
as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer
conversion turned it into.

(Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path
returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.)

Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by
default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works):

int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, ...);
int v = TPACKET_V3;
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v));
struct tpacket_req3 req = {
.tp_block_size = 0x10000000,
.tp_block_nr = 1,
.tp_frame_size = 2048,
.tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048,
.tp_retire_blk_tov = 0,
};
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req));

Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the
existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a
different fix, just say so and I'll respin.
Published: 2026-10-18
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Denial of Service through infinite kernel CPU usage
Action: Apply patch
AI Analysis

Impact

The vulnerability is an integer overflow in the af_packet network interface function prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(). User-controlled block sizes that exceed 256 MiB cause the 32-bit calculation to wrap to a negative value. The function then sets a high‑resolution timer with a negative relative timeout, which the kernel interprets as an immediate expiration. This causes the timer callback to fire continuously at the maximum rate, holding a critical lock for the remainder of the socket’s lifetime and spinning the CPU indefinitely. The result is a denial of service that can consume a core or all CPUs, effectively freezing the host.

Affected Systems

The issue occurs in the Linux kernel for any release that contains the af_packet TPACKET_V3 implementation and omits the overflow fix. All vendors shipping the upstream kernel—including stock Linux distributions—are affected until the patch is applied. The affected component is the kernel’s packet‑ring driver; specific version ranges are not enumerated in the advisory but include any kernel prior to the commit that added the 64‑bit calculation path.

Risk and Exploitability

No EPSS score is available and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, but the required conditions—CAP_NET_RAW privilege, an AF_PACKET raw socket, and a 1 Gbps NIC—make the risk high for privileged local actors. An attacker with the ability to open raw sockets can set a tp_block_size in the trigger range [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) or [1792,2048) MiB and cause the kernel timer to erupt. The local privilege requirement limits exploitation to users with elevated rights, yet once triggered the denial of service affects the whole system. The CVSS score is not specified in the advisory, yet the described impact warrants a high severity assessment.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 18, 2026 at 18:10 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update the Linux kernel to a release that contains the af_packet integer‐overflow fix (commit f7460d2989fa).
  • If an upgrade is not possible, rebuild the kernel without TPACKET_V3 support or configure packet_set_ring to disallow block sizes larger than 256 MiB.
  • Restrict processes that can open raw AF_PACKET sockets by limiting CAP_NET_RAW privileges or enforcing SELinux/AppArmor policies.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 18, 2026 at 18:10 UTC.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Sun, 18 Oct 2026 18:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-680

Sun, 18 Oct 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic: mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024); If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0 as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through (and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it). 0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps (div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047. The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1, so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and [1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this doesn't blow up for everyone. What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc(): p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...)); hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution: if (interval < hrtimer_resolution) interval = hrtimer_resolution; So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone. The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net: af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a 0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer conversion turned it into. (Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.) Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works): int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL)); bind(fd, ...); int v = TPACKET_V3; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v)); struct tpacket_req3 req = { .tp_block_size = 0x10000000, .tp_block_nr = 1, .tp_frame_size = 2048, .tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048, .tp_retire_blk_tov = 0, }; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)); Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a different fix, just say so and I'll respin.
Title af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-18T15:18:15.669Z

Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.356Z

Link: CVE-2026-98547

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-18T16:17:06.630

Modified: 2026-10-18T16:17:06.630

Link: CVE-2026-98547

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-18T18:15:15Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-680

    Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow