| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Reject non-8-byte ATOMIC_WRITE payloads
atomic_write_reply() at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c
unconditionally dereferences 8 bytes at payload_addr(pkt):
value = *(u64 *)payload_addr(pkt);
check_rkey() previously accepted an ATOMIC_WRITE request with pktlen ==
resid == 0 because the length validation only compared pktlen against
resid. A remote initiator that sets the RETH length to 0 therefore reaches
atomic_write_reply() with a zero-byte logical payload, and the responder
reads sizeof(u64) bytes from past the logical end of the packet into
skb->head tailroom, then writes those 8 bytes into the attacker's MR via
rxe_mr_do_atomic_write(). That is a remote disclosure of 4 bytes of kernel
tailroom per probe (the other 4 bytes are the packet's own trailing ICRC).
IBA oA19-28 defines ATOMIC_WRITE as exactly 8 bytes. Anything else is
protocol-invalid. Hoist a strict length check into check_rkey() so the
responder never reaches the unchecked dereference, and keep the existing
WRITE-family length logic for the normal RDMA WRITE path.
Reproduced on mainline with an unmodified rxe driver: a sustained
zero-length ATOMIC_WRITE probe repeatedly leaks adjacent skb head-buffer
bytes into the attacker's MR, including recognisable kernel strings and
partial kernel-direct-map pointer words. With this patch applied the
responder rejects the PDU and the MR stays all-zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put
virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly
from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we
posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf()
and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one().
Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because
alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually
handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore
report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put()
to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by
the device.
The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0)
leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type
byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory.
Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and
sg_init_one(), and gate virtbt_rx_work() on that same constant so
the bound checked matches the buffer actually exposed to the device.
Reject used.len == 0 in the same gate so an empty completion can
no longer reach virtbt_rx_handle().
Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the length value comes from an
untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log.
Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer
overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened the USB 9p
transport against unchecked device-reported length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget
isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass an attacker-
controlled block number (ifid->block or ifid->parent_block) from
the NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which only rejects
block == 0 before calling isofs_iget() and ultimately sb_bread().
A crafted file handle with fh_len sufficient to pass the check
added by commit 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small
fid") can still drive the server to read any in-range block on the
backing device as if it were an iso_directory_record. That earlier
fix was assigned CVE-2025-37780.
sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the
EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range
reads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device, the
unrelated bytes end up in iso_inode_info fields that reach the NFS
client as dentry metadata. The deployment surface (isofs exported
over NFS from loop-mounted images) is narrow and requires an
authenticated NFS peer, but the malformed-file-handle class is
reportable as hardening next to the existing CVE-2025-37780 fix.
Reject block >= ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones in isofs_export_iget() so
the check covers both isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent()
call sites with a single line. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: remove station if connection prep fails
If connection preparation fails for MLO connections, then the
interface is completely reset to non-MLD. In this case, we must
not keep the station since it's related to the link of the vif
being removed. Delete an existing station. Any "new_sta" is
already being removed, so that doesn't need changes.
This fixes a use-after-free/double-free in debugfs if that's
enabled, because a vif going from MLD (and to MLD, but that's
not relevant here) recreates its entire debugfs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Fix mana_destroy_wq_obj() cleanup in mana_ib_create_qp_rss()
Sashiko points out there are two bugs here in the error unwind flow, both
related to how the WQ table is unwound.
First there is a double i-- on the first failure path due to the while loop
having a i--, remove it.
Second if mana_ib_install_cq_cb() fails then mana_create_wq_obj() is not
undone due to the above i--. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: Check event message buffer response for bad data
The event message buffer response data size got checked later when
processing, but check it right after the response comes back. It
appears some BMCs may return an empty message instead of an error
when fetching events.
There are apparently some new BMCs that make this error, so we need to
compensate. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: check for nEPT/nNPT in slow flush hypercalls
Checking is_guest_mode(vcpu) is incorrect, because translate_nested_gpa()
is only valid if an L2 guest is running *with nested EPT/NPT enabled*.
Instead use the same condition as translate_nested_gpa() itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
without initialisation:
struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;
The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:
/* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
__u8 broadcast[32];
};
The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
as the length:
memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:
nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)
leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.
The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.
Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK /
NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an
IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks
each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per
VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return
addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack
instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.
Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: fix potential data-race
This mptcp_pm_add_timer() helper is executed as a timer callback in
softirq context. To avoid any data races, the socket lock needs to be
held with bh_lock_sock().
If the socket is in use, retry again soon after, similar to what is done
with the keepalive timer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event()
Sashiko points out the radix_tree itself is RCU safe, but nothing ever
frees the mlx4_srq struct with RCU, and it isn't even accessed within the
RCU critical section. It also will crash if an event is delivered before
the srq object is finished initializing.
Use the spinlock since it isn't easy to make RCU work, use
refcount_inc_not_zero() to protect against partially initialized objects,
and order the refcount_set() to be after the srq is fully initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smack: /smack/doi: accept previously used values
Writing to /smack/doi a value that has ever been
written there in the past disables networking for
non-ambient labels.
E.g.
# cat /smack/doi
3
# netlabelctl -p cipso list
Configured CIPSO mappings (1)
DOI value : 3
mapping type : PASS_THROUGH
# netlabelctl -p map list
Configured NetLabel domain mappings (3)
domain: "_" (IPv4)
protocol: UNLABELED
domain: DEFAULT (IPv4)
protocol: CIPSO, DOI = 3
domain: DEFAULT (IPv6)
protocol: UNLABELED
# cat /smack/ambient
_
# cat /proc/$$/attr/smack/current
_
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.964 ms
# echo foo >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.956 ms
unknown option 86
# echo 4 >/smack/doi
# echo 3 >/smack/doi
!> [ 214.050395] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17
# echo 3 >/smack/doi
!> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:678 remove rc = -2
!> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
!!> ping: 10.1.95.12: Address family for hostname not supported
# echo _ >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.617 ms
This happens because Smack keeps decommissioned DOIs,
fails to re-add them, and consequently refuses to add
the “default” domain map:
# netlabelctl -p cipso list
Configured CIPSO mappings (2)
DOI value : 3
mapping type : PASS_THROUGH
DOI value : 4
mapping type : PASS_THROUGH
# netlabelctl -p map list
Configured NetLabel domain mappings (2)
domain: "_" (IPv4)
protocol: UNLABELED
!> (no ipv4 map for default domain here)
domain: DEFAULT (IPv6)
protocol: UNLABELED
Fix by clearing decommissioned DOI definitions and
serializing concurrent DOI updates with a new lock.
Also:
- allow /smack/doi to live unconfigured, since
adding a map (netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add) may fail.
CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN(0) indicates the unconfigured DOI
- add new DOI before removing the old default map,
so the old map remains if the add fails
(2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/display/dp_mst: Add protection against 0 vcpi
When releasing a timeslot there is a slight chance we may end up
with the wrong payload mask due to overflow if the delayed_destroy_work
ends up coming into play after a DP 2.1 monitor gets disconnected
which causes vcpi to become 0 then we try to make the payload =
~BIT(vcpi - 1) which is a negative shift. VCPI id should never
really be 0 hence skip changing the payload mask if VCPI is 0.
Otherwise it leads to
<7> [515.287237] xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm:drm_dp_mst_get_port_malloc
[drm_display_helper]] port ffff888126ce9000 (3)
<4> [515.287267] -----------[ cut here ]-----------
<3> [515.287268] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in
../drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c:4575:36
<3> [515.287271] shift exponent -1 is negative
<4> [515.287275] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 3108 Comm: kworker/u64:33 Tainted: G
S U 6.17.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-3795-3e79699fa1b216e92+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
<4> [515.287279] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
<4> [515.287279] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z790-P
WIFI, BIOS 1645 03/15/2024
<4> [515.287281] Workqueue: drm_dp_mst_wq drm_dp_delayed_destroy_work
[drm_display_helper]
<4> [515.287303] Call Trace:
<4> [515.287304] <TASK>
<4> [515.287306] dump_stack_lvl+0xc1/0xf0
<4> [515.287313] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
<4> [515.287316] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x133/0x2e0
<4> [515.287324] ? drm_atomic_get_private_obj_state+0x186/0x1d0
<4> [515.287333] drm_dp_atomic_release_time_slots.cold+0x17/0x3d
[drm_display_helper]
<4> [515.287355] mst_connector_atomic_check+0x159/0x180 [xe]
<4> [515.287546] drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset+0x4d9/0xfa0
<4> [515.287550] ? __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x6f/0x1a60
<4> [515.287562] intel_atomic_check+0x119/0x2b80 [xe]
<4> [515.287740] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90
<4> [515.287747] ? lock_release+0xce/0x2a0
<4> [515.287754] drm_atomic_check_only+0x6a2/0xb40
<4> [515.287758] ? drm_atomic_add_affected_connectors+0x12b/0x140
<4> [515.287765] drm_atomic_commit+0x6e/0xf0
<4> [515.287766] ? _pfx__drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10
<4> [515.287774] drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x25c/0x2b0
<4> [515.287794] drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x60/0x1b0
<4> [515.287795] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
<4> [515.287801] drm_client_modeset_commit+0x26/0x50
<4> [515.287804] __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0xdc/0x110
<4> [515.287810] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event+0x120/0x140
<4> [515.287814] drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x28/0xd0
<4> [515.287819] drm_client_hotplug+0x6c/0xf0
<4> [515.287824] drm_client_dev_hotplug+0x9e/0xd0
<4> [515.287829] drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x1a/0x30
<4> [515.287834] drm_dp_delayed_destroy_work+0x3df/0x410
[drm_display_helper]
<4> [515.287861] process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0
<4> [515.287874] worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0
<4> [515.287879] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4> [515.287882] kthread+0x11c/0x250
<4> [515.287886] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [515.287890] ret_from_fork+0x2d7/0x310
<4> [515.287894] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [515.287897] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: Fix NULL pointer dereference on panthor_fw_unplug
This patch removes the MCU halt and wait for halt procedures during
panthor_fw_unplug() as the MCU can be in a variety of states or the FW
may not even be loaded/initialized at all, the latter of which can lead
to a NULL pointer dereference.
It should be safe on unplug to just disable the MCU without waiting for
it to halt as it may not be able to. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Initialize new folios before use
KMSAN reports an uninitialized value in longest_match_std(), invoked
from ntfs_compress_write(). When new folios are allocated without being
marked uptodate and ni_read_frame() is skipped because the caller expects
the frame to be completely overwritten, some reserved folios may remain
only partially filled, leaving the rest memory uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: fix ntfs_mount_options leak in ntfs_fill_super()
In ntfs_fill_super(), the fc->fs_private pointer is set to NULL without
first freeing the memory it points to. This causes the subsequent call to
ntfs_fs_free() to skip freeing the ntfs_mount_options structure.
This results in a kmemleak report:
unreferenced object 0xff1100015378b800 (size 32):
comm "mount", pid 582, jiffies 4294890685
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ed ff ed ff 00 04 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc ed541d8c):
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x424/0x5a0
__ntfs_init_fs_context+0x47/0x590
alloc_fs_context+0x5d8/0x960
__x64_sys_fsopen+0xb1/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:
fallocate -l 100M test.file
mount test.file /tmp/test
Since sbi->options is duplicated from fc->fs_private and does not
directly use the memory allocated for fs_private, it is unnecessary to
set fc->fs_private to NULL.
Additionally, this patch simplifies the code by utilizing the helper
function put_mount_options() instead of open-coding the cleanup logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init()
mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When
ib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls
through and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to
devr->s0 and devr->s1.
This leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks
"if (devr->s1) return 0;" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised;
users in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via
to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences
the ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown.
Fix by adding the same `goto unlock` in the s1 failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted
The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU
allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns
ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC
coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one
descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's
physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns
the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set
the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move
through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both
"submissions" and "completions."
In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring
with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks
for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the
network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the
ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its
position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the
descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops
early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called.
This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own):
- `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid)
- `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated)
- `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL)
But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In
the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle
`cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting
in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned
commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration
limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the
previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover
`dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to
cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:')
when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to
catch up to `dirty_rx`.
Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next
entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the
final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but
fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix
intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a
copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical,
any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for
stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there.
In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the
MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any
further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors.
Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill()
succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But
this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change. |
| In the Linux kernel 5.0.21, mounting a crafted btrfs filesystem image can lead to slab-out-of-bounds write access in index_rbio_pages in fs/btrfs/raid56.c. |
| In xsltCopyText in transform.c in libxslt 1.1.33, a pointer variable isn't reset under certain circumstances. If the relevant memory area happened to be freed and reused in a certain way, a bounds check could fail and memory outside a buffer could be written to, or uninitialized data could be disclosed. |
| drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_display.c in the Linux kernel 5.2.14 does not check the alloc_workqueue return value, leading to a NULL pointer dereference. NOTE: A third-party software maintainer states that the work queue allocation is happening during device initialization, which for a graphics card occurs during boot. It is not attacker controllable and OOM at that time is highly unlikely |
