| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement
Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS).
CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented
Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data
and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks",
holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't
writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their
contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address
coming from the traditional stack.
In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In
various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of
the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then
invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an
exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.
Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right:
Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack.
The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing. |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| x86: unintended memory sharing between guests On Intel systems that support the "virtualize APIC accesses" feature, a guest can read and write the global shared xAPIC page by moving the local APIC out of xAPIC mode. Access to this shared page bypasses the expected isolation that should exist between two guests. |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction |
| Incomplete cleanup in specific special register write operations for some Intel(R) Processors may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access. |
| Incomplete cleanup in specific special register read operations for some Intel(R) Processors may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access. |
| Incomplete cleanup of microarchitectural fill buffers on some Intel(R) Processors may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access. |
| Incomplete cleanup of multi-core shared buffers for some Intel(R) Processors may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access. |
| Xenstore: Guests can create arbitrary number of nodes via transactions T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] In case a node has been created in a transaction and it is later deleted in the same transaction, the transaction will be terminated with an error. As this error is encountered only when handling the deleted node at transaction finalization, the transaction will have been performed partially and without updating the accounting information. This will enable a malicious guest to create arbitrary number of nodes. |
| An optional feature of PCI MSI called "Multiple Message" allows a
device to use multiple consecutive interrupt vectors. Unlike for MSI-X,
the setting up of these consecutive vectors needs to happen all in one
go. In this handling an error path could be taken in different
situations, with or without a particular lock held. This error path
wrongly releases the lock even when it is not currently held.
|
| The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.2.6, and Xen 4.3.x through 4.6.x, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS panic or hang) by triggering many #DB (aka Debug) exceptions, related to svm.c. |
| The grant-table feature in Xen through 4.8.x mishandles MMIO region grant references, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (loss of grant trackability), aka XSA-224 bug 3. |
| The grant-table feature in Xen through 4.8.x does not ensure sufficient type counts for a GNTMAP_device_map and GNTMAP_host_map mapping, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (count mismanagement and memory corruption) or obtain privileged host OS access, aka XSA-224 bug 2. |
| Race condition in the grant table code in Xen 4.6.x through 4.9.x allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (free list corruption and host crash) or gain privileges on the host via vectors involving maptrack free list handling. |
