| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Fix double free of skb in coredump
hci_devcd_append() would free the skb on error so the caller don't
have to free it again otherwise it would cause the double free of skb.
Reported-by : Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: qca: fix NULL-deref on non-serdev suspend
Qualcomm ROME controllers can be registered from the Bluetooth line
discipline and in this case the HCI UART serdev pointer is NULL.
Add the missing sanity check to prevent a NULL-pointer dereference when
wakeup() is called for a non-serdev controller during suspend.
Just return true for now to restore the original behaviour and address
the crash with pre-6.2 kernels, which do not have commit e9b3e5b8c657
("Bluetooth: hci_qca: only assign wakeup with serial port support") that
causes the crash to happen already at setup() time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: qca: fix NULL-deref on non-serdev setup
Qualcomm ROME controllers can be registered from the Bluetooth line
discipline and in this case the HCI UART serdev pointer is NULL.
Add the missing sanity check to prevent a NULL-pointer dereference when
setup() is called for a non-serdev controller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: fix out of bounds memory access
The problem is detected by KASAN.
btrtl driver uses private hci data to store 'struct btrealtek_data'.
If btrtl driver is used with btusb, then memory for private hci data
is allocated in btusb. But no private data is allocated after hci_dev,
when btrtl is used with hci_h5.
This commit adds memory allocation for hci_h5 case.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in btrtl_initialize+0x6cc/0x958 [btrtl]
Write of size 8 at addr ffff00000f5a5748 by task kworker/u9:0/76
Hardware name: Pine64 PinePhone (1.2) (DT)
Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth]
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x9c/0x128
show_stack+0x20/0x38
dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60
print_report+0xf8/0x5d8
kasan_report+0x90/0xd0
__asan_store8+0x9c/0xc0
[btrtl]
h5_btrtl_setup+0xd0/0x2f8 [hci_uart]
h5_setup+0x50/0x80 [hci_uart]
hci_uart_setup+0xd4/0x260 [hci_uart]
hci_dev_open_sync+0x1cc/0xf68 [bluetooth]
hci_dev_do_open+0x34/0x90 [bluetooth]
hci_power_on+0xc4/0x3c8 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Allocated by task 53:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x68/0x78
__kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8
__kmalloc+0x1b4/0x3b0
hci_alloc_dev_priv+0x28/0xa58 [bluetooth]
hci_uart_register_device+0x118/0x4f8 [hci_uart]
h5_serdev_probe+0xf4/0x178 [hci_uart]
serdev_drv_probe+0x54/0xa0
really_probe+0x254/0x588
__driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x210
driver_probe_device+0x64/0x160
__driver_attach_async_helper+0x88/0x158
async_run_entry_fn+0xd0/0x388
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb0/0x150
kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0x14/0x20
__queue_work+0x33c/0x960
queue_work_on+0x98/0xc0
hci_recv_frame+0xc8/0x1e8 [bluetooth]
h5_complete_rx_pkt+0x2c8/0x800 [hci_uart]
h5_rx_payload+0x98/0xb8 [hci_uart]
h5_recv+0x158/0x3d8 [hci_uart]
hci_uart_receive_buf+0xa0/0xe8 [hci_uart]
ttyport_receive_buf+0xac/0x178
flush_to_ldisc+0x130/0x2c8
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Second to last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb0/0x150
kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0x14/0x20
__queue_work+0x788/0x960
queue_work_on+0x98/0xc0
__hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x23c/0x7a0 [bluetooth]
__hci_cmd_sync+0x24/0x38 [bluetooth]
btrtl_initialize+0x760/0x958 [btrtl]
h5_btrtl_setup+0xd0/0x2f8 [hci_uart]
h5_setup+0x50/0x80 [hci_uart]
hci_uart_setup+0xd4/0x260 [hci_uart]
hci_dev_open_sync+0x1cc/0xf68 [bluetooth]
hci_dev_do_open+0x34/0x90 [bluetooth]
hci_power_on+0xc4/0x3c8 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0
worker_thread+0x410/0x778
kthread+0x168/0x178
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
================================================================== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: Fix memory leak
This checks if CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP is enabled before attempting to clone
the skb and also make sure btmtk_process_coredump frees the skb passed
following the same logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Avoid potential use-after-free in hci_error_reset
While handling the HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event, if the underlying
BT controller is not responding, the GPIO reset mechanism would
free the hci_dev and lead to a use-after-free in hci_error_reset.
Here's the call trace observed on a ChromeOS device with Intel AX201:
queue_work_on+0x3e/0x6c
__hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x2ee/0x4c0 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a6>]
? init_wait_entry+0x31/0x31
__hci_cmd_sync+0x16/0x20 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]
hci_error_reset+0x4f/0xa4 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]
process_one_work+0x1d8/0x33f
worker_thread+0x21b/0x373
kthread+0x13a/0x152
? pr_cont_work+0x54/0x54
? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This patch holds the reference count on the hci_dev while processing
a HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event to avoid potential crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: fix use-after-free at btmtksdio_recv_event
We should not access skb buffer data anymore after hci_recv_frame was
called.
[ 39.634809] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btmtksdio_recv_event+0x1b0
[ 39.634855] Read of size 1 at addr ffffff80cf28a60d by task kworker
[ 39.634962] Call trace:
[ 39.634974] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3b8
[ 39.634999] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[ 39.635016] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x78
[ 39.635040] print_address_description+0x70/0x2f0
[ 39.635062] kasan_report+0x154/0x194
[ 39.635079] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x44/0x50
[ 39.635099] btmtksdio_recv_event+0x1b0/0x1c4
[ 39.635129] btmtksdio_txrx_work+0x6cc/0xac4
[ 39.635157] process_one_work+0x560/0xc5c
[ 39.635177] worker_thread+0x7ec/0xcc0
[ 39.635195] kthread+0x2d0/0x3d0
[ 39.635215] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 39.635247] Allocated by task 0:
[ 39.635260] (stack is not available)
[ 39.635281] Freed by task 2392:
[ 39.635295] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68
[ 39.635319] kasan_set_track+0x28/0x3c
[ 39.635338] kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
[ 39.635357] ____kasan_slab_free+0x104/0x150
[ 39.635374] __kasan_slab_free+0x18/0x28
[ 39.635391] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x114/0x248
[ 39.635410] kfree+0xf8/0x2b4
[ 39.635427] skb_free_head+0x58/0x98
[ 39.635447] skb_release_data+0x2f4/0x410
[ 39.635464] skb_release_all+0x50/0x60
[ 39.635481] kfree_skb+0xc8/0x25c
[ 39.635498] hci_event_packet+0x894/0xca4 [bluetooth]
[ 39.635721] hci_rx_work+0x1c8/0x68c [bluetooth]
[ 39.635925] process_one_work+0x560/0xc5c
[ 39.635951] worker_thread+0x7ec/0xcc0
[ 39.635970] kthread+0x2d0/0x3d0
[ 39.635990] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 39.636021] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff80cf28a600
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 39.636039] The buggy address is located 13 bytes inside of
512-byte region [ffffff80cf28a600, ffffff80cf28a800) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: fix reference counting for struct tpm_chip
The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning:
1. Open device /dev/tpmrm.
2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi.
3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac
sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4
brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes
raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm
snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835]
CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2
Hardware name: BCM2711
[<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8)
[<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108)
[<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8)
[<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4)
[<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm])
[<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm])
[<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0)
[<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc)
[<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c)
Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0)
bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000
bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684
bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944
---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]---
The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference
in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero.
Since commit 8979b02aaf1d ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the
extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken,
because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set.
Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from
tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point
in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2.
Commit fdc915f7f719 ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>")
already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra
reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results
in the call of this function.
Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister().
Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new
function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the
good case and error cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix queuing commands when HCI_UNREGISTER is set
hci_cmd_sync_queue shall return an error if HCI_UNREGISTER flag has
been set as that means hci_unregister_dev has been called so it will
likely cause a uaf after the timeout as the hdev will be freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix not cleanup led when bt_init fails
bt_init() calls bt_leds_init() to register led, but if it fails later,
bt_leds_cleanup() is not called to unregister it.
This can cause panic if the argument "bluetooth-power" in text is freed
and then another led_trigger_register() tries to access it:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc06d3bc0
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30
Call Trace:
<TASK>
led_trigger_register+0x10d/0x4f0
led_trigger_register_simple+0x7d/0x100
bt_init+0x39/0xf7 [bluetooth]
do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4e0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iwlwifi: mvm: check debugfs_dir ptr before use
When "debugfs=off" is used on the kernel command line, iwiwifi's
mvm module uses an invalid/unchecked debugfs_dir pointer and causes
a BUG:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000004f
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 503 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc5 #7
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 15 5510/076F7Y, BIOS 2.4.1 11/05/2021
RIP: 0010:iwl_mvm_dbgfs_register+0x692/0x700 [iwlmvm]
Code: 69 a0 be 80 01 00 00 48 c7 c7 50 73 6a a0 e8 95 cf ee e0 48 8b 83 b0 1e 00 00 48 c7 c2 54 73 6a a0 be 64 00 00 00 48 8d 7d 8c <48> 8b 48 50 e8 15 22 07 e1 48 8b 43 28 48 8d 55 8c 48 c7 c7 5f 73
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a0ba68 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffffffffffff RBX: ffff88817d6e3328 RCX: ffff88817d6e3328
RDX: ffffffffa06a7354 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffc90000a0ba6c
RBP: ffffc90000a0bae0 R08: ffffffff824e4880 R09: ffffffffa069d620
R10: ffffc90000a0ba00 R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90000a0bb28 R14: ffff88817d6e3328 R15: ffff88817d6e3320
FS: 00007f64dd92d740(0000) GS:ffff88847f640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000004f CR3: 000000016fc79001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? iwl_mvm_mac_setup_register+0xbdc/0xda0 [iwlmvm]
iwl_mvm_start_post_nvm+0x71/0x100 [iwlmvm]
iwl_op_mode_mvm_start+0xab8/0xb30 [iwlmvm]
_iwl_op_mode_start+0x6f/0xd0 [iwlwifi]
iwl_opmode_register+0x6a/0xe0 [iwlwifi]
? 0xffffffffa0231000
iwl_mvm_init+0x35/0x1000 [iwlmvm]
? 0xffffffffa0231000
do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x1b0
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1e5/0x2f0
? do_init_module+0x1e/0x220
do_init_module+0x48/0x220
load_module+0x2602/0x2bc0
? __kernel_read+0x145/0x2e0
? kernel_read_file+0x229/0x290
__do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0x130
? __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0x130
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f64dda564dd
Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1b 29 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffdba393f88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f64dda564dd
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005575399e2ab2 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055753a91c5e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575399e2ab2
R13: 000055753a91ceb0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055753a923018
</TASK>
Modules linked in: btintel(+) btmtk bluetooth vfat snd_hda_codec_hdmi fat snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic iwlmvm(+) snd_sof_pci_intel_tgl mac80211 snd_sof_intel_hda_common soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence soundwire_bus snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof_pci snd_sof snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_soc_core btrfs snd_compress snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec raid6_pq iwlwifi snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore cfg80211 intel_ish_ipc(+) thunderbolt rfkill intel_ishtp ucsi_acpi wmi i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid evdev
CR2: 000000000000004f
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Check the debugfs_dir pointer for an error before using it.
[change to make both conditional] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_qca: Fix driver shutdown on closed serdev
The driver shutdown callback (which sends EDL_SOC_RESET to the device
over serdev) should not be invoked when HCI device is not open (e.g. if
hci_dev_open_sync() failed), because the serdev and its TTY are not open
either. Also skip this step if device is powered off
(qca_power_shutdown()).
The shutdown callback causes use-after-free during system reboot with
Qualcomm Atheros Bluetooth:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
0072662f67726fd7
...
CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Tainted: G W
6.1.0-rt5-00325-g8a5f56bcfcca #8
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT)
Call trace:
tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x4/0x30
serdev_device_write_flush+0x24/0x34
qca_serdev_shutdown+0x80/0x130 [hci_uart]
device_shutdown+0x15c/0x260
kernel_restart+0x48/0xac
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50
Read of size 8 at addr ffff16270c2e0018 by task systemd-shutdow/1
CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted
6.1.0-next-20221220-00014-gb85aaf97fb01-dirty #28
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace.part.0+0xdc/0xf0
show_stack+0x18/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
print_report+0x188/0x488
kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
__asan_load8+0x80/0xac
tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50
ttyport_write_flush+0x34/0x44
serdev_device_write_flush+0x48/0x60
qca_serdev_shutdown+0x124/0x274
device_shutdown+0x1e8/0x350
kernel_restart+0x48/0xb0
__do_sys_reboot+0x244/0x2d0
__arm64_sys_reboot+0x54/0x70
invoke_syscall+0x60/0x190
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x160
do_el0_svc+0x44/0xf0
el0_svc+0x2c/0x6c
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: qcom-geni-serial: fix slab-out-of-bounds on RX FIFO buffer
Driver's probe allocates memory for RX FIFO (port->rx_fifo) based on
default RX FIFO depth, e.g. 16. Later during serial startup the
qcom_geni_serial_port_setup() updates the RX FIFO depth
(port->rx_fifo_depth) to match real device capabilities, e.g. to 32.
The RX UART handle code will read "port->rx_fifo_depth" number of words
into "port->rx_fifo" buffer, thus exceeding the bounds. This can be
observed in certain configurations with Qualcomm Bluetooth HCI UART
device and KASAN:
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Product ID :0x00000010
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA SOC Version :0x400a0200
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA ROM Version :0x00000200
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Patch Version:0x00000d2b
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA controller version 0x02000200
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Downloading qca/htbtfw20.tlv
bluetooth hci0: Direct firmware load for qca/htbtfw20.tlv failed with error -2
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Failed to request file: qca/htbtfw20.tlv (-2)
Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Failed to download patch (-2)
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in handle_rx_uart+0xa8/0x18c
Write of size 4 at addr ffff279347d578c0 by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rt5-00350-gb2450b7e00be-dirty #26
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0
show_stack+0x18/0x40
dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8
print_report+0x188/0x488
kasan_report+0xb4/0x100
__asan_store4+0x80/0xa4
handle_rx_uart+0xa8/0x18c
qcom_geni_serial_handle_rx+0x84/0x9c
qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x24c/0x760
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x108/0x500
handle_irq_event+0x6c/0x110
handle_fasteoi_irq+0x138/0x2cc
generic_handle_domain_irq+0x48/0x64
If the RX FIFO depth changes after probe, be sure to resize the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: b43: Stop/wake correct queue in DMA Tx path when QoS is disabled
When QoS is disabled, the queue priority value will not map to the correct
ieee80211 queue since there is only one queue. Stop/wake queue 0 when QoS
is disabled to prevent trying to stop/wake a non-existent queue and failing
to stop/wake the actual queue instantiated.
Log of issue before change (with kernel parameter qos=0):
[ +5.112651] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ +0.000005] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 25513 at net/mac80211/util.c:449 __ieee80211_wake_queue+0xd5/0x180 [mac80211]
[ +0.000067] Modules linked in: b43(O) snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype overlay ccm af_packet amdgpu snd_hda_codec_cirrus snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio drm_exec amdxcp gpu_sched xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_rpfilter ipt_rpfilter xt_pkttype xt_LOG nf_log_syslog xt_tcpudp nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink sch_fq_codel btusb uinput iTCO_wdt ctr btrtl intel_pmc_bxt i915 intel_rapl_msr mei_hdcp mei_pxp joydev at24 watchdog btintel atkbd libps2 serio radeon btbcm vivaldi_fmap btmtk intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_hdmi bluetooth uvcvideo nls_iso8859_1 applesmc nls_cp437 x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_hda_intel intel_powerclamp vfat videobuf2_vmalloc coretemp fat snd_intel_dspcfg crc32_pclmul uvc polyval_clmulni snd_intel_sdw_acpi loop videobuf2_memops snd_hda_codec tun drm_suballoc_helper polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper drm_buddy tap ecdh_generic videobuf2_v4l2 gf128mul macvlan ttm ghash_clmulni_intel ecc tg3
[ +0.000044] videodev bridge snd_hda_core rapl crc16 drm_display_helper cec mousedev snd_hwdep evdev intel_cstate bcm5974 hid_appleir videobuf2_common stp mac_hid libphy snd_pcm drm_kms_helper acpi_als mei_me intel_uncore llc mc snd_timer intel_gtt industrialio_triggered_buffer apple_mfi_fastcharge i2c_i801 mei snd lpc_ich agpgart ptp i2c_smbus thunderbolt apple_gmux i2c_algo_bit kfifo_buf video industrialio soundcore pps_core wmi tiny_power_button sbs sbshc button ac cordic bcma mac80211 cfg80211 ssb rfkill libarc4 kvm_intel kvm drm irqbypass fuse backlight firmware_class efi_pstore configfs efivarfs dmi_sysfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 dm_crypt cbc encrypted_keys trusted asn1_encoder tee tpm rng_core input_leds hid_apple led_class hid_generic usbhid hid sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic ahci libahci libata uhci_hcd ehci_pci ehci_hcd crct10dif_pclmul crct10dif_common sha512_ssse3 sha512_generic sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel usbcore scsi_mod libaes crypto_simd cryptd scsi_common
[ +0.000055] usb_common rtc_cmos btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_generic crc32c_intel xor raid6_pq dm_snapshot dm_bufio dm_mod dax [last unloaded: b43(O)]
[ +0.000009] CPU: 7 PID: 25513 Comm: irq/17-b43 Tainted: G W O 6.6.7 #1-NixOS
[ +0.000003] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro8,3/Mac-942459F5819B171B, BIOS 87.0.0.0.0 06/13/2019
[ +0.000001] RIP: 0010:__ieee80211_wake_queue+0xd5/0x180 [mac80211]
[ +0.000046] Code: 00 45 85 e4 0f 85 9b 00 00 00 48 8d bd 40 09 00 00 f0 48 0f ba ad 48 09 00 00 00 72 0f 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 cb 6d 3c d0 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8d b4 16 94 00 00
[ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003c77d60 EFLAGS: 00010097
[ +0.000001] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000001] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff88820b924900
[ +0.000002] RBP: ffff88820b924900 R08: ffffc90003c77d90 R09: 000000000003bfd0
[ +0.000001] R10: ffff88820b924900 R11: ffffc90003c77c68 R12: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000001] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90003c77d90 R15: ffffffffc0fa6f40
[ +0.000001] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000001] CS: 0010 DS: 0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: sdio: Honor the host max_req_size in the RX path
Lukas reports skb_over_panic errors on his Banana Pi BPI-CM4 which comes
with an Amlogic A311D (G12B) SoC and a RTL8822CS SDIO wifi/Bluetooth
combo card. The error he observed is identical to what has been fixed
in commit e967229ead0e ("wifi: rtw88: sdio: Check the HISR RX_REQUEST
bit in rtw_sdio_rx_isr()") but that commit didn't fix Lukas' problem.
Lukas found that disabling or limiting RX aggregation works around the
problem for some time (but does not fully fix it). In the following
discussion a few key topics have been discussed which have an impact on
this problem:
- The Amlogic A311D (G12B) SoC has a hardware bug in the SDIO controller
which prevents DMA transfers. Instead all transfers need to go through
the controller SRAM which limits transfers to 1536 bytes
- rtw88 chips don't split incoming (RX) packets, so if a big packet is
received this is forwarded to the host in it's original form
- rtw88 chips can do RX aggregation, meaning more multiple incoming
packets can be pulled by the host from the card with one MMC/SDIO
transfer. This Depends on settings in the REG_RXDMA_AGG_PG_TH
register (BIT_RXDMA_AGG_PG_TH limits the number of packets that will
be aggregated, BIT_DMA_AGG_TO_V1 configures a timeout for aggregation
and BIT_EN_PRE_CALC makes the chip honor the limits more effectively)
Use multiple consecutive reads in rtw_sdio_read_port() and limit the
number of bytes which are copied by the host from the card in one
MMC/SDIO transfer. This allows receiving a buffer that's larger than
the hosts max_req_size (number of bytes which can be transferred in
one MMC/SDIO transfer). As a result of this the skb_over_panic error
is gone as the rtw88 driver is now able to receive more than 1536 bytes
from the card (either because the incoming packet is larger than that
or because multiple packets have been aggregated).
In case of an receive errors (-EILSEQ has been observed by Lukas) we
need to drain the remaining data from the card's buffer, otherwise the
card will return corrupt data for the next rtw_sdio_read_port() call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_codec: Fix leaking content of local_codecs
The following memory leak can be observed when the controller supports
codecs which are stored in local_codecs list but the elements are never
freed:
unreferenced object 0xffff88800221d840 (size 32):
comm "kworker/u3:0", pid 36, jiffies 4294898739 (age 127.060s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
f8 d3 02 03 80 88 ff ff 80 d8 21 02 80 88 ff ff ..........!.....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffffb324f557>] __kmalloc+0x47/0x120
[<ffffffffb39ef37d>] hci_codec_list_add.isra.0+0x2d/0x160
[<ffffffffb39ef643>] hci_read_codec_capabilities+0x183/0x270
[<ffffffffb39ef9ab>] hci_read_supported_codecs+0x1bb/0x2d0
[<ffffffffb39f162e>] hci_read_local_codecs_sync+0x3e/0x60
[<ffffffffb39ff1b3>] hci_dev_open_sync+0x943/0x11e0
[<ffffffffb396d55d>] hci_power_on+0x10d/0x3f0
[<ffffffffb30c99b4>] process_one_work+0x404/0x800
[<ffffffffb30ca134>] worker_thread+0x374/0x670
[<ffffffffb30d9108>] kthread+0x188/0x1c0
[<ffffffffb304db6b>] ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50
[<ffffffffb300206a>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: avoid deadlock between hci_dev->lock and socket lock
Commit eab2404ba798 ("Bluetooth: Add BT_PHY socket option") added a
dependency between socket lock and hci_dev->lock that could lead to
deadlock.
It turns out that hci_conn_get_phy() is not in any way relying on hdev
being immutable during the runtime of this function, neither does it even
look at any of the members of hdev, and as such there is no need to hold
that lock.
This fixes the lockdep splat below:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.12.0-rc1-00026-g73d464503354 #10 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bluetoothd/1118 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8f078383c078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8f07e831d920 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x8b/0x610
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}:
lock_sock_nested+0x72/0xa0
l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x18/0x70 [bluetooth]
l2cap_config_rsp+0x27a/0x520 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sig_channel+0x658/0x1330 [bluetooth]
l2cap_recv_frame+0x1ba/0x310 [bluetooth]
hci_rx_work+0x1cc/0x640 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0
worker_thread+0x3c/0x380
kthread+0x13e/0x160
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #2 (&chan->lock#2/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
l2cap_chan_connect+0x33a/0x940 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sock_connect+0x141/0x2a0 [bluetooth]
__sys_connect+0x9b/0xc0
__x64_sys_connect+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #1 (&conn->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
l2cap_chan_connect+0x322/0x940 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sock_connect+0x141/0x2a0 [bluetooth]
__sys_connect+0x9b/0xc0
__x64_sys_connect+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50
lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x5a9/0x610 [bluetooth]
__sys_getsockopt+0xcc/0x200
__x64_sys_getsockopt+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&hdev->lock --> &chan->lock#2/1 --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP);
lock(&chan->lock#2/1);
lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP);
lock(&hdev->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by bluetoothd/1118:
#0: ffff8f07e831d920 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x8b/0x610 [bluetooth]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 1118 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.12.0-rc1-00026-g73d464503354 #10
Hardware name: LENOVO 20K5S22R00/20K5S22R00, BIOS R0IET38W (1.16 ) 05/31/2017
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7f/0xa1
check_noncircular+0x105/0x120
? __lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50
__lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50
lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
? __lock_acquire+0x2e1/0x1a50
? lock_is_held_type+0xb4/0x120
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
__mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
? lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth]
hci_conn_get_phy+0x
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: Clear ffs_eventfd in ffs_data_clear.
ffs_data_clear is indirectly called from both ffs_fs_kill_sb and
ffs_ep0_release, so it ends up being called twice when userland closes ep0
and then unmounts f_fs.
If userland provided an eventfd along with function's USB descriptors, it
ends up calling eventfd_ctx_put as many times, causing a refcount
underflow.
NULL-ify ffs_eventfd to prevent these extraneous eventfd_ctx_put calls.
Also, set epfiles to NULL right after de-allocating it, for readability.
For completeness, ffs_data_clear actually ends up being called thrice, the
last call being before the whole ffs structure gets freed, so when this
specific sequence happens there is a second underflow happening (but not
being reported):
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing# modprobe usb_f_fs
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo ffs_data_clear > set_ftrace_filter
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo function > current_tracer
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo 1 > tracing_on
(setup gadget, run and kill function userland process, teardown gadget)
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo 0 > tracing_on
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing# cat trace
smartcard-openp-436 [000] ..... 1946.208786: ffs_data_clear <-ffs_data_closed
smartcard-openp-431 [000] ..... 1946.279147: ffs_data_clear <-ffs_data_closed
smartcard-openp-431 [000] .n... 1946.905512: ffs_data_clear <-ffs_data_put
Warning output corresponding to above trace:
[ 1946.284139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 431 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x110/0x15c
[ 1946.293094] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 1946.298164] Modules linked in: usb_f_ncm(E) u_ether(E) usb_f_fs(E) hci_uart(E) btqca(E) btrtl(E) btbcm(E) btintel(E) bluetooth(E) nls_ascii(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) bcm2835_v4l2(CE) bcm2835_mmal_vchiq(CE) videobuf2_vmalloc(E) videobuf2_memops(E) sha512_generic(E) videobuf2_v4l2(E) sha512_arm(E) videobuf2_common(E) videodev(E) cpufreq_dt(E) snd_bcm2835(CE) brcmfmac(E) mc(E) vc4(E) ctr(E) brcmutil(E) snd_soc_core(E) snd_pcm_dmaengine(E) drbg(E) snd_pcm(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) soundcore(E) drm_kms_helper(E) cec(E) ansi_cprng(E) rc_core(E) syscopyarea(E) raspberrypi_cpufreq(E) sysfillrect(E) sysimgblt(E) cfg80211(E) max17040_battery(OE) raspberrypi_hwmon(E) fb_sys_fops(E) regmap_i2c(E) ecdh_generic(E) rfkill(E) ecc(E) bcm2835_rng(E) rng_core(E) vchiq(CE) leds_gpio(E) libcomposite(E) fuse(E) configfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) autofs4(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) crc32c_generic(E) sdhci_iproc(E) sdhci_pltfm(E) sdhci(E)
[ 1946.399633] CPU: 0 PID: 431 Comm: smartcard-openp Tainted: G C OE 5.15.0-1-rpi #1 Debian 5.15.3-1
[ 1946.417950] Hardware name: BCM2835
[ 1946.425442] Backtrace:
[ 1946.432048] [<c08d60a0>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c08d62ec>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[ 1946.448226] r7:00000009 r6:0000001c r5:c04a948c r4:c0a64e2c
[ 1946.458412] [<c08d62cc>] (show_stack) from [<c08d9ae0>] (dump_stack+0x28/0x30)
[ 1946.470380] [<c08d9ab8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0123500>] (__warn+0xe8/0x154)
[ 1946.482067] r5:c04a948c r4:c0a71dc8
[ 1946.490184] [<c0123418>] (__warn) from [<c08d6948>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa0/0xe4)
[ 1946.506758] r7:00000009 r6:0000001c r5:c0a71dc8 r4:c0a71e04
[ 1946.517070] [<c08d68ac>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c04a948c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x110/0x15c)
[ 1946.535309] r8:c0100224 r7:c0dfcb84 r6:ffffffff r5:c3b84c00 r4:c24a17c0
[ 1946.546708] [<c04a937c>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0380134>] (eventfd_ctx_put+0x48/0x74)
[ 1946.564476] [<c03800ec>] (eventfd_ctx_put) from [<bf5464e8>] (ffs_data_clear+0xd0/0x118 [usb_f_fs])
[ 1946.582664] r5:c3b84c00 r4:c2695b00
[ 1946.590668] [<bf546418>] (ffs_data_clear [usb_f_fs]) from [<bf547cc0>] (ffs_data_closed+0x9c/0x150 [usb_f_fs])
[ 1946.609608] r5:bf54d014 r4:c2695b00
[ 1946.617522] [<bf547c24>] (ffs_data_closed [usb_f_fs]) from [<bf547da0>] (ffs_fs_kill_sb+0x2c/0x30 [usb_f_fs])
[ 1946.636217] r7:c0dfcb
---truncated--- |
| Microsoft Bluetooth Driver Spoofing Vulnerability |
| An information leakage vulnerability in the Bluetooth Low Energy advertisement scan response in Bluetooth Core Specifications 4.0 through 5.2, and extended scan response in Bluetooth Core Specifications 5.0 through 5.2, may be used to identify devices using Resolvable Private Addressing (RPA) by their response or non-response to specific scan requests from remote addresses. RPAs that have been associated with a specific remote device may also be used to identify a peer in the same manner by using its reaction to an active scan request. This has also been called an allowlist-based side channel. |
