| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Mattermost versions 10.5.x <= 10.5.8, 9.11.x <= 9.11.17 fail to properly validate access controls which allows any authenticated user to download sensitive files via board file download endpoint using UUID enumeration |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: mediatek: mt8195: Add platform entry for ETDM1_OUT_BE dai link
Commit e70b8dd26711 ("ASoC: mediatek: mt8195: Remove afe-dai component
and rework codec link") removed the codec entry for the ETDM1_OUT_BE
dai link entirely instead of replacing it with COMP_EMPTY(). This worked
by accident as the remaining COMP_EMPTY() platform entry became the codec
entry, and the platform entry became completely empty, effectively the
same as COMP_DUMMY() since snd_soc_fill_dummy_dai() doesn't do anything
for platform entries.
This causes a KASAN out-of-bounds warning in mtk_soundcard_common_probe()
in sound/soc/mediatek/common/mtk-soundcard-driver.c:
for_each_card_prelinks(card, i, dai_link) {
if (adsp_node && !strncmp(dai_link->name, "AFE_SOF", strlen("AFE_SOF")))
dai_link->platforms->of_node = adsp_node;
else if (!dai_link->platforms->name && !dai_link->platforms->of_node)
dai_link->platforms->of_node = platform_node;
}
where the code expects the platforms array to have space for at least one entry.
Add an COMP_EMPTY() entry so that dai_link->platforms has space. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc()
The 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which
isn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends
up making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily
valid.
Basically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the
caller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept,
it's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious
profiling is done using timers anyway these days.
And the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the
simplest of cases. We've lost the comment at some point (I think when
the 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say:
Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy
of eflags from PUSHF.
which explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the
stack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check
if they might be eflags or the return pc:
Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses
but that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock
debugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack
frame.
It causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and
others [2].
With no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code.
Just for historical interest, here's some background commits relating to
this code from 2006:
0cb91a229364 ("i386: Account spinlocks to the caller during profiling for !FP kernels")
31679f38d886 ("Simplify profile_pc on x86-64")
and a code unification from 2009:
ef4512882dbe ("x86: time_32/64.c unify profile_pc")
but the basics of this thing actually goes back to before the git tree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Fix invalid dereferencing of indirect CCW data pointer
Fix invalid dereferencing of indirect CCW data pointer in
dasd_eckd_dump_sense() that leads to a kernel panic in error cases.
When using indirect addressing for DASD CCWs (IDAW) the CCW CDA pointer
does not contain the data address itself but a pointer to the IDAL.
This needs to be translated from physical to virtual as well before
using it.
This dereferencing is also used for dasd_page_cache and also fixed
although it is very unlikely that this code path ever gets used. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in B-Link BL-AC2100 up to 1.0.3. Affected by this issue is the function delshrpath of the file /goform/set_delshrpath_cfg of the component Web Management Interface. The manipulation of the argument Type results in stack-based buffer overflow. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: fix reference leak in asymmetric_verify()
Don't leak a reference to the key if its algorithm is unknown. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't walk off the end of a directory data block
This adds sanity checks for xfs_dir2_data_unused and xfs_dir2_data_entry
to make sure don't stray beyond valid memory region. Before patching, the
loop simply checks that the start offset of the dup and dep is within the
range. So in a crafted image, if last entry is xfs_dir2_data_unused, we
can change dup->length to dup->length-1 and leave 1 byte of space. In the
next traversal, this space will be considered as dup or dep. We may
encounter an out of bound read when accessing the fixed members.
In the patch, we make sure that the remaining bytes large enough to hold
an unused entry before accessing xfs_dir2_data_unused and
xfs_dir2_data_unused is XFS_DIR2_DATA_ALIGN byte aligned. We also make
sure that the remaining bytes large enough to hold a dirent with a
single-byte name before accessing xfs_dir2_data_entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tap_get_user_xdp() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be
sent downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tap_get_user_xdp()-->skb_set_network_header() may assume the size is more
than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause out-of-bound
access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer with incorrect
or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tap_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tap_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41090 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tun_xdp_one() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be sent
downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tun_xdp_one-->eth_type_trans() may access the Ethernet header although it
can be less than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause
out-of-bound access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer
with incorrect or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tun_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted for
IFF_TAP.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tun_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41091 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
filelock: Fix fcntl/close race recovery compat path
When I wrote commit 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when
fcntl/close race is detected"), I missed that there are two copies of the
code I was patching: The normal version, and the version for 64-bit offsets
on 32-bit kernels.
Thanks to Greg KH for stumbling over this while doing the stable
backport...
Apply exactly the same fix to the compat path for 32-bit kernels. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Fix VM_FAULT_HWPOISON handling in do_exception()
There is no support for HWPOISON, MEMORY_FAILURE, or ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC on
s390. Therefore we do not expect to see VM_FAULT_HWPOISON in
do_exception().
However, since commit af19487f00f3 ("mm: make PTE_MARKER_SWAPIN_ERROR more
general"), it is possible to see VM_FAULT_HWPOISON in combination with
PTE_MARKER_POISONED, even on architectures that do not support HWPOISON
otherwise. In this case, we will end up on the BUG() in do_exception().
Fix this by treating VM_FAULT_HWPOISON the same as VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, similar
to x86 when MEMORY_FAILURE is not configured. Also print unexpected fault
flags, for easier debugging.
Note that VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE is not expected, because s390 cannot
support swap entries on other levels than PTE level. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: discard write access to the directory open
may_open() does not allow a directory to be opened with the write access.
However, some writing flags set by client result in adding write access
on server, making ksmbd incompatible with FUSE file system. Simply, let's
discard the write access when opening a directory.
list_add corruption. next is NULL.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:26!
pc : __list_add_valid+0x88/0xbc
lr : __list_add_valid+0x88/0xbc
Call trace:
__list_add_valid+0x88/0xbc
fuse_finish_open+0x11c/0x170
fuse_open_common+0x284/0x5e8
fuse_dir_open+0x14/0x24
do_dentry_open+0x2a4/0x4e0
dentry_open+0x50/0x80
smb2_open+0xbe4/0x15a4
handle_ksmbd_work+0x478/0x5ec
process_one_work+0x1b4/0x448
worker_thread+0x25c/0x430
kthread+0x104/0x1d4
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: prefer nft_chain_validate
nft_chain_validate already performs loop detection because a cycle will
result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE).
It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nft_lookup, so there
appears no reason to iterate the maps again.
nf_tables_check_loops() and all its helper functions can be removed.
This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s.
This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in
unbounded recursion:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ....
Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1
[..]
with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores.
I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from
nft_validate_register_store(), at this point the transaction is still in
progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph.
For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend
on table->validate_state in case we could catch an error earlier
(for improved error reporting to userspace). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: drop bogus WARN_ON
Happens when rules get flushed/deleted while packet is out, so remove
this WARN_ON.
This WARN exists in one form or another since v4.14, no need to backport
this to older releases, hence use a more recent fixes tag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Defer work in bpf_timer_cancel_and_free
Currently, the same case as previous patch (two timer callbacks trying
to cancel each other) can be invoked through bpf_map_update_elem as
well, or more precisely, freeing map elements containing timers. Since
this relies on hrtimer_cancel as well, it is prone to the same deadlock
situation as the previous patch.
It would be sufficient to use hrtimer_try_to_cancel to fix this problem,
as the timer cannot be enqueued after async_cancel_and_free. Once
async_cancel_and_free has been done, the timer must be reinitialized
before it can be armed again. The callback running in parallel trying to
arm the timer will fail, and freeing bpf_hrtimer without waiting is
sufficient (given kfree_rcu), and bpf_timer_cb will return
HRTIMER_NORESTART, preventing the timer from being rearmed again.
However, there exists a UAF scenario where the callback arms the timer
before entering this function, such that if cancellation fails (due to
timer callback invoking this routine, or the target timer callback
running concurrently). In such a case, if the timer expiration is
significantly far in the future, the RCU grace period expiration
happening before it will free the bpf_hrtimer state and along with it
the struct hrtimer, that is enqueued.
Hence, it is clear cancellation needs to occur after
async_cancel_and_free, and yet it cannot be done inline due to deadlock
issues. We thus modify bpf_timer_cancel_and_free to defer work to the
global workqueue, adding a work_struct alongside rcu_head (both used at
_different_ points of time, so can share space).
Update existing code comments to reflect the new state of affairs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: cyclic allocation of msg_id to avoid reuse
Reusing the msg_id after a maliciously completed reopen request may cause
a read request to remain unprocessed and result in a hung, as shown below:
t1 | t2 | t3
-------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_close(A)
cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_reopening(A)
queue_work(fscache_object_wq, &info->work)
ondemand_object_worker
cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(A)
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN)
// get msg_id 6
wait_for_completion(&req_A->done)
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
// read msg_id 6 req_A
cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
copy_to_user
// Malicious completion msg_id 6
copen 6,-1
cachefiles_ondemand_copen
complete(&req_A->done)
// will not set the object to close
// because ondemand_id && fd is valid.
// ondemand_object_worker() is done
// but the object is still reopening.
// new open req_B
cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(B)
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN)
// reuse msg_id 6
process_open_req
copen 6,A.size
// The expected failed copen was executed successfully
Expect copen to fail, and when it does, it closes fd, which sets the
object to close, and then close triggers reopen again. However, due to
msg_id reuse resulting in a successful copen, the anonymous fd is not
closed until the daemon exits. Therefore read requests waiting for reopen
to complete may trigger hung task.
To avoid this issue, allocate the msg_id cyclically to avoid reusing the
msg_id for a very short duration of time. |
| A vulnerability was found in D-Link DCS-935L up to 1.13.01. The impacted element is the function sub_402280 of the file /HNAP1/. The manipulation of the argument HNAP_AUTH/SOAPAction results in stack-based buffer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. |
| A vulnerability was determined in CodeAstro Simple Pharmacy Management 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /view.php. This manipulation of the argument bar_code causes sql injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object
When queuing ondemand_object_worker() to re-open the object,
cachefiles_object is not pinned. The cachefiles_object may be freed when
the pending read request is completed intentionally and the related
erofs is umounted. If ondemand_object_worker() runs after the object is
freed, it will incur use-after-free problem as shown below.
process A processs B process C process D
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req()
// send a read req X
// wait for its completion
// close ondemand fd
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release()
// set object as CLOSE
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read()
// set object as REOPENING
queue_work(fscache_wq, &info->ondemand_work)
// close /dev/cachefiles
cachefiles_daemon_release
cachefiles_flush_reqs
complete(&req->done)
// read req X is completed
// umount the erofs fs
cachefiles_put_object()
// object will be freed
cachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info()
kmem_cache_free(object)
// both info and object are freed
ondemand_object_worker()
When dropping an object, it is no longer necessary to reopen the object,
so use cancel_work_sync() to cancel or wait for ondemand_object_worker()
to finish. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix uninitialized ratelimit_state->lock access in __ext4_fill_super()
In the following concurrency we will access the uninitialized rs->lock:
ext4_fill_super
ext4_register_sysfs
// sysfs registered msg_ratelimit_interval_ms
// Other processes modify rs->interval to
// non-zero via msg_ratelimit_interval_ms
ext4_orphan_cleanup
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Errors on filesystem, "
__ext4_msg
___ratelimit(&(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_msg_ratelimit_state)
if (!rs->interval) // do nothing if interval is 0
return 1;
raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&rs->lock, flags)
raw_spin_trylock(lock)
_raw_spin_trylock
__raw_spin_trylock
spin_acquire(&lock->dep_map, 0, 1, _RET_IP_)
lock_acquire
__lock_acquire
register_lock_class
assign_lock_key
dump_stack();
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_msg_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
raw_spin_lock_init(&rs->lock);
// init rs->lock here
and get the following dump_stack:
=========================================================
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe
you didn't initialize this object before use?
turning off the locking correctness validator.
CPU: 12 PID: 753 Comm: mount Tainted: G E 6.7.0-rc6-next-20231222 #504
[...]
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x170
dump_stack+0x18/0x30
register_lock_class+0x740/0x7c0
__lock_acquire+0x69/0x13a0
lock_acquire+0x120/0x450
_raw_spin_trylock+0x98/0xd0
___ratelimit+0xf6/0x220
__ext4_msg+0x7f/0x160 [ext4]
ext4_orphan_cleanup+0x665/0x740 [ext4]
__ext4_fill_super+0x21ea/0x2b10 [ext4]
ext4_fill_super+0x14d/0x360 [ext4]
[...]
=========================================================
Normally interval is 0 until s_msg_ratelimit_state is initialized, so
___ratelimit() does nothing. But registering sysfs precedes initializing
rs->lock, so it is possible to change rs->interval to a non-zero value
via the msg_ratelimit_interval_ms interface of sysfs while rs->lock is
uninitialized, and then a call to ext4_msg triggers the problem by
accessing an uninitialized rs->lock. Therefore register sysfs after all
initializations are complete to avoid such problems. |
