| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| PTZOptics and possibly other ValueHD-based pan-tilt-zoom cameras use default, shared credentials for the administrative web interface. |
| PTZOptics and possibly other ValueHD-based pan-tilt-zoom cameras use hard-coded, default administrative credentials. The passwords can readily be cracked. Many cameras have SSH or telnet listening on all interfaces. The passwords cannot be changed by the user, nor can the SSH or telnet service be disabled by the user. |
| ECOVACS robot vacuums and base stations communicate via an insecure Wi-Fi network with a deterministic AES encryption key, which can be easily derived. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: prevent ethtool ops after shutdown
A crash can occur if an ethtool operation is invoked
after shutdown() is called.
shutdown() is invoked during system shutdown to stop DMA operations
without performing expensive deallocations. It is discouraged to
unregister the netdev in this path, so the device may still be visible
to userspace and kernel helpers.
In gve, shutdown() tears down most internal data structures. If an
ethtool operation is dispatched after shutdown(), it will dereference
freed or NULL pointers, leading to a kernel panic. While graceful
shutdown normally quiesces userspace before invoking the reboot
syscall, forced shutdowns (as observed on GCP VMs) can still trigger
this path.
Fix by calling netif_device_detach() in shutdown().
This marks the device as detached so the ethtool ioctl handler
will skip dispatching operations to the driver. |
| ECOVACS vacuum robot base stations do not validate firmware updates, so malicious over-the-air updates can be sent to base station via insecure connection between robot and base station. |
| A flaw has been found in elunez eladmin up to 2.7. This impacts the function updateUserEmail of the file /api/users/updateEmail/ of the component Email Address Handler. Executing manipulation of the argument id/email can lead to improper authorization. The attack may be performed from remote. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been published and may be used. It is required to know the RSA-encrypted password of the attacked user account. |
| A vulnerability has been found in PHPGurukul Online Course Registration 3.1. Affected is an unknown function of the file /admin/semester.php. The manipulation of the argument semester leads to sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files
Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds
the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer
that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the
filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across
function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer
hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.
Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done
for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a
bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the
iterator's hash between writers and readers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed
When the length of the string written to set_ftrace_filter exceeds
FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, the following KASAN alarm will be triggered:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000d00bd5ba by task ash/165
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: ash Not tainted 6.16.0-g6bcdbd62bd56-dirty
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x34/0x50 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0x158
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x398
print_report+0xb0/0x280
kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x30
strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x100/0x2d8
ftrace_regex_release+0x484/0x618
__fput+0x364/0xa58
____fput+0x28/0x40
task_work_run+0x154/0x278
do_notify_resume+0x1f0/0x220
el0_svc+0xec/0xf0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0
The reason is that trace_get_user will fail when processing a string
longer than FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, but not set the end of parser->buffer to 0.
Then an OOB access will be triggered in ftrace_regex_release->
ftrace_process_regex->strsep->strpbrk. We can solve this problem by
limiting access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
Each recvmsg() call must process either
- only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)
- one non-DATA record
If the next record has different type than what has already been
processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record
has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where
we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record
to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.
Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible,
since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer,
and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext
skb for access to metadata like length).
Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing
loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and
then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case
we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's
zero length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix backlog accounting in qdisc_dequeue_internal
This issue applies for the following qdiscs: hhf, fq, fq_codel, and
fq_pie, and occurs in their change handlers when adjusting to the new
limit. The problem is the following in the values passed to the
subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call given a tbf parent:
When the tbf parent runs out of tokens, skbs of these qdiscs will
be placed in gso_skb. Their peek handlers are qdisc_peek_dequeued,
which accounts for both qlen and backlog. However, in the case of
qdisc_dequeue_internal, ONLY qlen is accounted for when pulling
from gso_skb. This means that these qdiscs are missing a
qdisc_qstats_backlog_dec when dropping packets to satisfy the
new limit in their change handlers.
One can observe this issue with the following (with tc patched to
support a limit of 0):
export TARGET=fq
tc qdisc del dev lo root
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: tbf rate 8bit burst 100b latency 1ms
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 1000
echo ''; echo 'add child'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
ping -I lo -f -c2 -s32 -W0.001 127.0.0.1 2>&1 >/dev/null
echo ''; echo 'after ping'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc change dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 0
echo ''; echo 'after limit drop'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 2: parent 1:1 sfq
echo ''; echo 'post graft'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
The second to last show command shows 0 packets but a positive
number (74) of backlog bytes. The problem becomes clearer in the
last show command, where qdisc_purge_queue triggers
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog with the positive backlog and causes an
underflow in the tbf parent's backlog (4096 Mb instead of 0).
To fix this issue, the codepath for all clients of qdisc_dequeue_internal
has been simplified: codel, pie, hhf, fq, fq_pie, and fq_codel.
qdisc_dequeue_internal handles the backlog adjustments for all cases that
do not directly use the dequeue handler.
The old fq_codel_change limit adjustment loop accumulated the arguments to
the subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call through the cstats field.
However, this is confusing and error prone as fq_codel_dequeue could also
potentially mutate this field (which qdisc_dequeue_internal calls in the
non gso_skb case), so we have unified the code here with other qdiscs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/ism: fix concurrency management in ism_cmd()
The s390x ISM device data sheet clearly states that only one
request-response sequence is allowable per ISM function at any point in
time. Unfortunately as of today the s390/ism driver in Linux does not
honor that requirement. This patch aims to rectify that.
This problem was discovered based on Aliaksei's bug report which states
that for certain workloads the ISM functions end up entering error state
(with PEC 2 as seen from the logs) after a while and as a consequence
connections handled by the respective function break, and for future
connection requests the ISM device is not considered -- given it is in a
dysfunctional state. During further debugging PEC 3A was observed as
well.
A kernel message like
[ 1211.244319] zpci: 061a:00:00.0: Event 0x2 reports an error for PCI function 0x61a
is a reliable indicator of the stated function entering error state
with PEC 2. Let me also point out that a kernel message like
[ 1211.244325] zpci: 061a:00:00.0: The ism driver bound to the device does not support error recovery
is a reliable indicator that the ISM function won't be auto-recovered
because the ISM driver currently lacks support for it.
On a technical level, without this synchronization, commands (inputs to
the FW) may be partially or fully overwritten (corrupted) by another CPU
trying to issue commands on the same function. There is hard evidence that
this can lead to DMB token values being used as DMB IOVAs, leading to
PEC 2 PCI events indicating invalid DMA. But this is only one of the
failure modes imaginable. In theory even completely losing one command
and executing another one twice and then trying to interpret the outputs
as if the command we intended to execute was actually executed and not
the other one is also possible. Frankly, I don't feel confident about
providing an exhaustive list of possible consequences. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
open_tree_attr: do not allow id-mapping changes without OPEN_TREE_CLONE
As described in commit 7a54947e727b ('Merge patch series "fs: allow
changing idmappings"'), open_tree_attr(2) was necessary in order to
allow for a detached mount to be created and have its idmappings changed
without the risk of any racing threads operating on it. For this reason,
mount_setattr(2) still does not allow for id-mappings to be changed.
However, there was a bug in commit 2462651ffa76 ("fs: allow changing
idmappings") which allowed users to bypass this restriction by calling
open_tree_attr(2) *without* OPEN_TREE_CLONE.
can_idmap_mount() prevented this bug from allowing an attached
mountpoint's id-mapping from being modified (thanks to an is_anon_ns()
check), but this still allows for detached (but visible) mounts to have
their be id-mapping changed. This risks the same UAF and locking issues
as described in the merge commit, and was likely unintentional. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rainshadow-cec: fix TOCTOU race condition in rain_interrupt()
In the interrupt handler rain_interrupt(), the buffer full check on
rain->buf_len is performed before acquiring rain->buf_lock. This
creates a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, as
rain->buf_len is concurrently accessed and modified in the work
handler rain_irq_work_handler() under the same lock.
Multiple interrupt invocations can race, with each reading buf_len
before it becomes full and then proceeding. This can lead to both
interrupts attempting to write to the buffer, incrementing buf_len
beyond its capacity (DATA_SIZE) and causing a buffer overflow.
Fix this bug by moving the spin_lock() to before the buffer full
check. This ensures that the check and the subsequent buffer modification
are performed atomically, preventing the race condition. An corresponding
spin_unlock() is added to the overflow path to correctly release the
lock.
This possible bug was found by an experimental static analysis tool
developed by our team. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Fix stack protector issue in send_ipi_data()
Function kvm_io_bus_read() is called in function send_ipi_data(), buffer
size of parameter *val should be at least 8 bytes. Since some emulation
functions like loongarch_ipi_readl() and kvm_eiointc_read() will write
the buffer *val with 8 bytes signed extension regardless parameter len.
Otherwise there will be buffer overflow issue when CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
is enabled. The bug report is shown as follows:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: send_ipi_data+0x194/0x1a0 [kvm]
CPU: 11 UID: 107 PID: 2692 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1+ #102 PREEMPT(full)
Stack : 9000000005901568 0000000000000000 9000000003af371c 900000013c68c000
900000013c68f850 900000013c68f858 0000000000000000 900000013c68f998
900000013c68f990 900000013c68f990 900000013c68f6c0 fffffffffffdb058
fffffffffffdb0e0 900000013c68f858 911e1d4d39cf0ec2 9000000105657a00
0000000000000001 fffffffffffffffe 0000000000000578 282049464555206e
6f73676e6f6f4c20 0000000000000001 00000000086b4000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000005709968 90000000058f9000
900000013c68fa68 900000013c68fab4 90000000029279f0 900000010153f940
900000010001f360 0000000000000000 9000000003af3734 000000004390000c
00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
...
Call Trace:
[<9000000003af3734>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
[<9000000003aed168>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c
[<9000000003ad0ab0>] vpanic+0x108/0x2c4
[<9000000003ad0ca8>] panic+0x3c/0x40
[<9000000004eb0a1c>] __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x18
[<ffff8000023473f8>] send_ipi_data+0x190/0x1a0 [kvm]
[<ffff8000023313e4>] __kvm_io_bus_write+0xa4/0xe8 [kvm]
[<ffff80000233147c>] kvm_io_bus_write+0x54/0x90 [kvm]
[<ffff80000233f9f8>] kvm_emu_iocsr+0x180/0x310 [kvm]
[<ffff80000233fe08>] kvm_handle_gspr+0x280/0x478 [kvm]
[<ffff8000023443e8>] kvm_handle_exit+0xc0/0x130 [kvm] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp: fix race conditions in ppp_fill_forward_path
ppp_fill_forward_path() has two race conditions:
1. The ppp->channels list can change between list_empty() and
list_first_entry(), as ppp_lock() is not held. If the only channel
is deleted in ppp_disconnect_channel(), list_first_entry() may
access an empty head or a freed entry, and trigger a panic.
2. pch->chan can be NULL. When ppp_unregister_channel() is called,
pch->chan is set to NULL before pch is removed from ppp->channels.
Fix these by using a lockless RCU approach:
- Use list_first_or_null_rcu() to safely test and access the first list
entry.
- Convert list modifications on ppp->channels to their RCU variants and
add synchronize_net() after removal.
- Check for a NULL pch->chan before dereferencing it. |
| A vulnerability was found in itsourcecode POS Point of Sale System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /inventory/main/vendors/datatables/unit_testing/templates/-complex_header.php. The manipulation of the argument scripts results in cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250: fix panic due to PSLVERR
When the PSLVERR_RESP_EN parameter is set to 1, the device generates
an error response if an attempt is made to read an empty RBR (Receive
Buffer Register) while the FIFO is enabled.
In serial8250_do_startup(), calling serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR,
UART_LCR_WLEN8) triggers dw8250_check_lcr(), which invokes
dw8250_force_idle() and serial8250_clear_and_reinit_fifos(). The latter
function enables the FIFO via serial_out(p, UART_FCR, p->fcr).
Execution proceeds to the serial_port_in(port, UART_RX).
This satisfies the PSLVERR trigger condition.
When another CPU (e.g., using printk()) is accessing the UART (UART
is busy), the current CPU fails the check (value & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) ==
(lcr & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) in dw8250_check_lcr(), causing it to enter
dw8250_force_idle().
Put serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR, UART_LCR_WLEN8) under the port->lock
to fix this issue.
Panic backtrace:
[ 0.442336] Oops - unknown exception [#1]
[ 0.442343] epc : dw8250_serial_in32+0x1e/0x4a
[ 0.442351] ra : serial8250_do_startup+0x2c8/0x88e
...
[ 0.442416] console_on_rootfs+0x26/0x70 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: caam - Prevent crash on suspend with iMX8QM / iMX8ULP
Since the CAAM on these SoCs is managed by another ARM core, called the
SECO (Security Controller) on iMX8QM and Secure Enclave on iMX8ULP, which
also reserves access to register page 0 suspend operations cannot touch
this page.
This is similar to when running OPTEE, where OPTEE will reserve page 0.
Track this situation using a new state variable no_page0, reflecting if
page 0 is reserved elsewhere, either by other management cores in SoC or
by OPTEE.
Replace the optee_en check in suspend/resume with the new check.
optee_en cannot go away as it's needed elsewhere to gate OPTEE specific
situations.
Fixes the following splat at suspend:
Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] SMP
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP ACU6C (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : readl+0x0/0x18
lr : rd_reg32+0x18/0x3c
sp : ffffffc08192ba20
x29: ffffffc08192ba20 x28: ffffff8025190000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffffc0808ae808 x25: ffffffc080922338 x24: ffffff8020e89090
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffc080922000 x21: ffffff8020e89010
x20: ffffffc080387ef8 x19: ffffff8020e89010 x18: 000000005d8000d5
x17: 0000000030f35963 x16: 000000008f785f3f x15: 000000003b8ef57c
x14: 00000000c418aef8 x13: 00000000f5fea526 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffffff8025190870 x7 : ffffff8021726880 x6 : 0000000000000002
x5 : ffffff80217268f0 x4 : ffffff8021726880 x3 : ffffffc081200000
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffff8020e89010 x0 : ffffffc081200004
Call trace:
readl+0x0/0x18
caam_ctrl_suspend+0x30/0xdc
dpm_run_callback.constprop.0+0x24/0x5c
device_suspend+0x170/0x2e8
dpm_suspend+0xa0/0x104
dpm_suspend_start+0x48/0x50
suspend_devices_and_enter+0x7c/0x45c
pm_suspend+0x148/0x160
state_store+0xb4/0xf8
kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
sysfs_kf_write+0x38/0x48
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xb4/0x178
vfs_write+0x118/0x178
ksys_write+0x6c/0xd0
__arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x1c
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x64/0xb0
do_el0_svc+0x90/0xb0
el0_svc+0x18/0x44
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0x124
el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
Code: 88dffc21 88dffc21 5ac00800 d65f03c0 (b9400000) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ivsc: Fix crash at shutdown due to missing mei_cldev_disable() calls
Both the ACE and CSI driver are missing a mei_cldev_disable() call in
their remove() function.
This causes the mei_cl client to stay part of the mei_device->file_list
list even though its memory is freed by mei_cl_bus_dev_release() calling
kfree(cldev->cl).
This leads to a use-after-free when mei_vsc_remove() runs mei_stop()
which first removes all mei bus devices calling mei_ace_remove() and
mei_csi_remove() followed by mei_cl_bus_dev_release() and then calls
mei_cl_all_disconnect() which walks over mei_device->file_list dereferecing
the just freed cldev->cl.
And mei_vsc_remove() it self is run at shutdown because of the
platform_device_unregister(tp->pdev) in vsc_tp_shutdown()
When building a kernel with KASAN this leads to the following KASAN report:
[ 106.634504] ==================================================================
[ 106.634623] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mei_cl_set_disconnected (drivers/misc/mei/client.c:783) mei
[ 106.634683] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88819cb62018 by task systemd-shutdow/1
[ 106.634729]
[ 106.634767] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 106.634770] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 16 9640/09CK4V, BIOS 1.12.0 02/10/2025
[ 106.634773] Call Trace:
[ 106.634777] <TASK>
...
[ 106.634871] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:636)
[ 106.634901] mei_cl_set_disconnected (drivers/misc/mei/client.c:783) mei
[ 106.634921] mei_cl_all_disconnect (drivers/misc/mei/client.c:2165 (discriminator 4)) mei
[ 106.634941] mei_reset (drivers/misc/mei/init.c:163) mei
...
[ 106.635042] mei_stop (drivers/misc/mei/init.c:348) mei
[ 106.635062] mei_vsc_remove (drivers/misc/mei/mei_dev.h:784 drivers/misc/mei/platform-vsc.c:393) mei_vsc
[ 106.635066] platform_remove (drivers/base/platform.c:1424)
Add the missing mei_cldev_disable() calls so that the mei_cl gets removed
from mei_device->file_list before it is freed to fix this. |
